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"I'll never break my promise or forget my vow,
but God only knows what I can do right now. "
Love. Intimacy. Companionship. These are idyllic terms linked to
aspirations that drive most people at some point in time. But the path that
leads to anticipated bliss is strewn with relationships that not only disappoint
and fail,2 but also may be laden with violence.
Intimate partner violence (IPV) 3 has received considerable attention over the
last half century, which has provided greater insight than ever before into its
prevalence, characteristics, dynamics, risk factors, and consequences. For
example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that
7.7 million intimate-partner rapes and physical assaults occur in the United
States annually, with 62.3% of the victims women; this violence results in over
1500 deaths and costs the country more than $8 billion per year.4 The report
1. MEAT LOAF, Paradise by the Dashboard Light, on BAT OUT OF HELL (Cleveland
International/Epic Records 1977).
2. See, e.g., Divorce Rate: Divorce Rate in America, DIVORCERATE.ORG, http://divorce
rate.org/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2011) (reporting that roughly half of all first-time marriages in the
United States will end in divorce, as will two-thirds of second marriages, and
three-fourths of third marriages).
3. IPV has also been referred to as domestic abuse, spousal abuse, and domestic violence.
For a discussion of the terms and definitions applicable in this context and their impact, see
Walter S. DeKeseredy & Martin D. Schwartz, Definitional Issues, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 23, 23-34 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001). This Article uses the term
IPV because the Article focuses on the violence that may occur in sexual relationships between
adults (that is, not just between spouses), but does not address the violence involving other family
members or intergenerational violence (that is, not domestic relationships in general).
4. NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FACT SHEET (2011), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/IPVfactsheet-a.pdf. Although the focus of this
Article is IPV in the United States, IPV is pervasive throughout the world. For accounts of IPV
in other countries and societal responses to it, see MINDIE LAZARUS-BLACK, EVERYDAY HARM:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, COURT RITES, AND CULTURES OF RECONCILIATION 141-42 (2007)
(discussing IPV in the Caribbean, Israel, India, and the United States); Zakia Afrin, Domestic
Violence and the Need for an International Legal Response, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 359, 359-60, 365-70 (Manoj Kumar Sinha ed., 2010) (framing domestic
violence as an international human rights issue); Barbara Glesner Fines, Approaches to Protecting
Victims of Intimate Partner Violence in the United States and Ireland: People, Property, and
Politics, 79 UMKC L. REv. 395 (2010) (discussing IPV in Ireland); Carolyn Hoyle & Andrew
Sanders, Police Response to Domestic Violence: From Victim Choice to Victim Empowerment?,
40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 14, 28 (2000) (discussing IPV in the U.K.); Rebecca Morley & Audrey
Mullender, Hype or Hope? The Importation of Pro-Arrest Policies and Batterers' Programmes
from North America to Britain as Key Measures for Preventing Violence Against Women in the
Home, 6 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 265, 276 (1992) (discussing the impact of pro-arrest policies for
female IPV victims); Montserrat Sagot, The Critical Path of Women Affected by Family Violence
in Latin America: Case Studies from 10 Countries, II VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1292, 1298-
1303 (2005) (documenting accounts of domestic and sexual abuse in Latin American countries).
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that provided the basis for these estimates also determined that approximately
2.6 million of these incidents resulted in injury to the victim, and over 600,000
of them required some type of medical treatment.5 Further, research indicates
that injuries related to IPV comprise anywhere from two to twelve percent of
all emergency room visits by women, although these figures do not encompass
the increased risk of other illnesses and injuries associated with IPV that may
also require medical treatment.6 Notwithstanding the increased recognition of
its existence, IPV continues to be pervasive and a matter of considerable
concern with enormous adverse consequences.
Women are more likely to bear the brunt of IPV;7 between 2001 and 2005
approximately twenty-two percent of the violent victimizations of females
involved IPV, whereas only four percent of similar attacks on men involved
5. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, at v (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf.
6. Carolyn Snider et al., Intimate Partner Violence: Development of a Brief Risk
Assessment for the Emergency Department, 16 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1208, 1208 (2009).
Being a victim of IPV has been shown to markedly increase the risk of developing several
psychiatric disorders, such as alcohol dependence, anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress
disorder. Mayumi Okuda et al., Mental Health of Victims ofIntimate Partner Violence: Results
from a National Epidemiologic Survey, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 959, 960-62 (2011).
7. The issue of "gender symmetry" in IPV has been the subject of considerable debate.
Some studies have indicated that IPV is perpetrated by women in heterosexual relationships as
often as by males. See, e.g., John Archer, Sex Differences in Physically Aggressive Acts Between
Heterosexual Partners: A Meta-analytical Review, 7 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 313, 313
(2002); Donald G. Dutton, Female Intimate Partner Violence and Developmental Trajectories of
Abusive Females, 6 INT'L J. MEN'S HEALTH 54, 54 (2007). These studies, however, have been
challenged on several grounds, including their methodology, terminology, and
decontextualization of abuse. Jacquelyn Allen-Collinson, A Marked Man: Female-Perpetrated
Intimate Partner Abuse, 8 INT'L J. MEN'S HEALTH 22, 23 (2009). For example, studies
examining "more serious assaults" have found that women experience higher rates of IPV than
men. Measuring Intimate Partner (Domestic) Violence, NAT'L INST. JUST. (May 12, 2010),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/measuring.htm (last updated
May 12, 2010); see also TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 5, at 9 ex.1, 17 (summarizing results
of a national survey, which found that "women were significantly more likely than men to report
being victimized by an intimate partner . . . whether the type of violence was rape, physical
assault, or stalking"); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL
REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, at iv (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf (finding that
7.4% of the men surveyed had been victims of IPV, contrasted to 22.1% of women); Tara D.
Warner, Violent Acts and Injurious Consequences: An Examination of Competing Hypotheses
About Intimate Partner Violence Using Agency-Based Data, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 191
(2010) (finding that "[f]emale victims had over four times greater odds than males of
experiencing violence from an intimate partner"). Further, women generally suffer the majority
of physical and mental health injuries that result from IPV. Paige Hall Smith et al., A
Population-Based Study ofthe Prevalence and Distinctiveness ofBattering, Physical Assault, and
Sexual Assault in Intimate Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1208, 1208-09 (2002).
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IPV. It is estimated that at least one out of every four women will experience
some form of IPV during their lifetimes,9 and that one-third of all homicides of
women are perpetrated by intimate partners.10 Most IPV against women
occurs in private homes," with "simple assault" accounting for sixty-eight
percent of all IPV. 12
IPV often goes unreported. One study found that between 1994 and 2005,
only fifty-eight percent of female and about fifty-two percent of male IPV
victims reported their attacks to the police, and some studies indicate that rates
of non-reporting may be even higher.13 Similarly, estimates based on hospital
8. SHANNAN CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflipvus.pdf; see also LEE H. BOWKER, BEATING
WIFE-BEATING 2 (1983) ("Most of the[] [reported] domestic assaults (76 percent) [in Edinburgh
and Glasgow, Scotland, in 1984] were committed against wives by their husbands, while only 1
percent were committed against husbands by wives."); TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 5, at iv
("[W]omen are at significantly greater risk of intimate partner violence than men."); Harvey
Wallace & Anne Seymour, Chapter 8: Domestic Violence, in OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
1999 NATIONAL VICTIM ASSISTANCE ACADEMY (Grace Coleman et al. eds., 1999), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc archives/nvaa99/chap8.htm ("Intimate violence is primarily a crime
against women.").
9. Patricia Mahoney, Linda M. Williams & Carolyn M. West, Violence Against Women by
Intimate Relationship Partners, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 3,
at 143, 143, 150; see also Kathryn E. Litchman, Punishing the Protectors: The Illinois Domestic
Violence Act Remedy for Victims of Domestic Violence Against Police Misconduct, 38 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 765, 767 (2007) ("Domestic violence continues to be a problem of epic proportion.
Despite nationwide state-based legislative reform over the last three decades, nearly one in three
American women reports having been exposed to domestic violence by a partner at some point in
her life." (footnotes omitted)); Robert S. Thompson et al., Intimate Partner Violence: Prevalence,
Types, and Chronicity in Adult Women, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 447, 447 (2006) ("Intimate
partner violence (lPV) is widespread, with 25% to 54% of women reporting exposure in their
adult lifetime . . . ."). For a discussion of the disparities in governmental research findings
regarding the lifetime prevalence of IPV, see TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 5, at 13-14,
19-24.
10. Mahoney et al., supra note 9, at 143.
I1. Wallace & Seymour, supra note 8.
12. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf
/ipv01.pdf (documenting findings from a survey in which a representative sample of households
were contacted and inquiries were made about the occurrence of rape, sexual assault, robbery,
aggravated assault, and simple assault). Minor assault is generally defined as nonsexual
assault-other than robbery-that is not aggravated. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2A2.3 cmt. n.1 (2004). In contrast, aggravated assault is an assault involving "a
dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury . . . with that weapon" or "an intent to
commit another felony." Id. § 2A2.2 cmt. n. 1. Simple assault includes actions such as "slapping,
pushing, shoving, grabbing, [and] throwing objects at the victim," but does not include "kicking,
biting, hitting with a fist or object, beating up, or using a weapon," which constitute severe
assault. DONALD G. DUTTON, RETHINKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3-4 (2006).
13. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 5, at v ("Approximately one-fifth of all rapes,
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2011] Society's Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence
data suggest that the number of people treated in emergency rooms for IPV is
four times higher than the officially reported number.14 The most common
reason victims provide for not reporting an IPV incident to the police is that
the matter is private or personal; other rationales include fear of retaliation, a
desire to shield the offender, and police ineffectiveness.
Although IPV occurs across all socioeconomic levels, races and ethnicities,
genders, and age groups, the typical victim is an impoverished woman between
the ages of nineteen and twenty-nine.16 Often, the victims of IPV are isolated
from potential support systems, suffer from low self-esteem, fear leaving their
partners, and blame themselves for the abuse.' 7 Studies have documented a
correlation between victimization by an intimate partner and an increased risk
for a wide range of medical and psychosocial diagnoses, including substance
abuse, family and social problems, sexually transmitted diseases, and
depression. IPV also has negative effects on job productivity and
employment.
one-quarter of all physical assaults, and one-half of all stalkings perpetrated against female
respondents by intimates were reported to the police."); Wallace & Seymour, supra note 8; see
also CATALANO, supra note 8.
14. Wallace & Seymour, supra note 8 (comparing hospital estimates to the 1997 National
Crime Victimization Survey of the Office of Justice Programs). The Bureau of Justice Statistics
utilized the National Crime Victimization Survey in its Crime Data Brief on IPV. RENNISON,
supra note 12.
15. CATALANO, supra note 8.
16. Wallace & Seymour, supra note 8 ("Women in families with incomes below $10,000
were more likely . . . to be victims of violence by an intimate partner." (citation omitted)); see
also Thompson et al., supra note 9, at 452.
17. Wallace & Seymour, supra note 8; see also DENISE A. HINES & KATHLEEN
MALLEY-MORRISON, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: DEFINING, UNDERSTANDING,
AND COMBATING ABUSE 163 (2005) (suggesting that social isolation contributes to abuse);
Esperanza Bosch Fiol & Victoria A. Ferrer P6rez, Battered Women: Analysis of Demographic,
Relationship and Domestic Violence Characteristics, 8 PSYCHOL. SPAIN 3, 8, 10-11, 13 (2004)
(finding that abused women have difficulty leaving abusers or reporting abuse because they fear
more harm or blame themselves). But see LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME 218 (2d ed. 2000) (reporting that battered women do not believe they have low
self-esteem).
18. Amy E. Bonomi et al., Medical and Psychosocial Diagnoses in Women with a History
ofIntimate Partner Violence, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1692, 1694-96, 1695 tbl.2 (2009)
(finding an increased risk for a number of specific medical and psychosocial diagnoses among
women with a history of IPV); see also Tracie 0. Afifi et al., Mental Health Correlates of
Intimate Partner Violence in Marital Relationships in a Nationally Representative Sample of
Males and Females, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1398, 1409 tbl.3b (2009) (observing that
IPV in females is associated with increased odds of having anxiety disorders, disruptive behavior
disorders, substance abuse disorders, and suicidal thoughts); Maureen A. Walton et al., Correlates
of Intimate Partner Violence Among Men and Women in an Inner City Emergency Department,
28 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 366, 372 tbl.1 (2009) (finding that patients who reported IPV
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Typically, abusive individuals are male, misuse alcohol and other
substances, have a criminal record, experienced family violence during their
childhood, and tend to be jealous or possessive; however, they are found
among all age groups, races, and ethnicities. 20 Many abusers have weak ties to
their families, have a history of unstable employment and relationships, and
view the prevailing culture as condoning and even encouraging abuse.21
A particularly tragic consequence of IPV is its effect on children. Over
thirty-five percent of lPV incidents occurred while at least one child resided in
the home. Children in homes where IPV is present are themselves far more
likely to be psychologically3 and physically abused than children in homes
where IPV does not occur. 3 One study found that "[e]ight times as many
women report using physical discipline on their children while with their
victimization were more likely to exhibit signs of depression and were in the lowest quartile for
composite mental health).
19. Jennifer E. Swanberg, TK Logan & Caroline Macke, Intimate Partner Violence,
Employment, and the Workplace: Consequences and Future Directions, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE,
& ABUSE 286, 286 (2005).
20. Terrie Moffitt, Avshalom Caspi & Phil A. Silva, Findings About Partner Violence from
the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN
FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 39, 39 (1998), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171666.pdf; see also HINES & MALLEY-MORRISON, supra note 17,
at 165-66 (finding substance abuse and a history of family violence to be prevalent in batterers);
Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 552, 569 (2007) (suggesting that abusers are
commonly jealous and possessive); Carol B. Cunradi et al., Problem Drinking, Unemployment,
and Intimate Partner Violence Among a Sample of Construction Industry Workers and Their
Partners, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 66, 69-70 (2009) (finding that male partners who experienced
alcohol-related problems and unemployment were more likely to abuse intimate partners); Patrick
Tolan, Deborah Gorman-Smith & David Henry, Family Violence, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 557,
567-72 (2006) (discussing risk factors for abuse, including a history of crime or violence, current
and past alcohol and drug use, and a dysfunctional family background); Jennifer Waltz et al.,
Testing a Typology of Batterers, 68 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 658, 659 (2000)
(positing that the most violent pathological abusers tend to have histories of family violence and
jealous personalities).
21. Wallace & Seymour, supra note 8; see also Christine E. Cox, Jonathan Kotch & Mark
D. Everson, A Longitudinal Study of Modifying Influences in the Relationship Between Domestic
Violence and Child Maltreatment, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 5, 6, 12 tbl.I (2003) (finding that low
income is a significant risk factor and identifying a correlation between low social support and
domestic violence); Alan Rosenbaum & Penny A. Leisring, Beyond Power and Control: Towards
an Understanding of Partner Abusive Men, 34 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 7, 7-8 (2003) (explaining
how a history of abuse and exposure to family violence increases the risk of using violence in
future relationships); Tolan et al., supra note 19, at 568 (suggesting that poverty and low income
are risk factors for abuse). But see WALKER, supra note 17, at 18-19 ("There [is] no direct link
between unemployment and violent behavior. . .
22. CATALANO, supra note 8.
23. WALKER, supra note 17, at 216.
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batterers than when living alone or in a nonbattering relationship."24
Furthermore, children from homes where domestic violence was recurrent are
at an increased risk of becoming IPV abusers or victims.25 Children growing
up in violent homes are also at an increased risk for depression, attempted
suicide, sexually transmitted diseases, obesity, substance abuse, and poor
physical health in later life.26
This Article begins by providing in Part I a historical overview of society's
response to IPV, and then surveys the different faces of IPV and the varying
perspectives on how to address IPV legislatively in Part II. The Article in Part
III surveys how the fifty states and the District of Columbia define IPV. In
Part IV, the Article examines the mandatory-reporting approach to IPV,
including who must report IPV, when suspected IPV must be reported, the
penalties for a failure to report, who should receive the reports, and the
response system to filed reports. Part IV concludes by evaluating the
arguments in favor of and against mandatory IPV-reporting legislation. In Part
V, the Article reviews other efforts to combat IPV, including penal provisions
and the involvement of the criminal justice system, the removal of "marital
rape" immunity, the enactment of stalking statutes, mandatory-arrest laws,
"no-drop" prosecution provisions, the availability of civil protection orders,
creation of specialized IPV courts, the allowance of private lawsuits, and
court-mandated treatment programs.
In conclusion, this Article emphasizes the importance of distinguishing
among the various types of IPV and maintaining a flexible and multi-faceted
approach for responding to the varying needs of the victims of IPV. Society
should keep in mind the different types of IPV in determining how best to
24. Id at 217.
25. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 12, 20 (2d ed. 1996) ("[B]attered women were found to be 6 times as likely to have
been subjected to violence as a child than other women . . . and sons who witnessed battering
were 10 times as likely to become abusive to their domestic partners." (citations omitted));
WALKER, supra note 17, at 215-16 (reporting that four-fifths of lPV-abusive individuals come
from homes in which IPV occurred); Elizabeth A. Cannon et al., The Intergenerational
Transmission of Witnessing Intimate Partner Violence, 163 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS &
ADOLESCENT MED. 706, 707 (2009) (finding that children of women who witnessed IPV during
childhood were 1.29 times more likely to witness IPV themselves); Amy A. Ernst et al., Adult
Intimate Partner Violence Perpetrators Are Significantly More Likely to Have Witnessed Intimate
Partner Violence as a Child than Nonperpetrators, 27 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 641, 645 (2009);
David Russell, Kristen W. Springer & Emily A. Greenfield, Witnessing Domestic Abuse in
Childhood as an Independent Risk Factor for Depressive Symptoms in Young Adulthood, 34
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 448, 452 (2010) ("[F]requently witnessing domestic abuse in
childhood is an independent risk factor for depressive symptoms in young adulthood.").
26. Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to
Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE)
Study, 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245, 249-50 (1998).
925
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balance the punishment of IPV perpetrators and the needs of victims, including
the autonomy and respect to which victims are generally entitled.
I. CHRONICLING SOCIETY'S RESPONSE TO IPV THROUGH THE LAW
Like other forms of family violence, including child abuse,27 IPV has
occurred from time immemorial28 and has primarily targeted women.29 The
traditional institution of marriage subsumed a woman's legal identity within
her husband's; this patriarchal structure permitted the husband to discipline his
wife as he wished, so long as he did not cause permanent physical damage. 30
William Blackstone reasoned that because a husband was legally responsible
for his wife's misbehavior, he should be legally entrusted-within reasonable
bounds-with the power to "restrain[] her, by domestic chastisement." 31
Blackstone endorsed the view that private acts are subject only to moral, rather
than legal, disapproval; therefore, because family relations are private in
nature, they are not subject to legal review or legislation. 32
This view was so deeply engrained that even leaders of the first organized
feminist movement in the 1800s did not directly challenge the husband's
authority to physically "discipline" his wife, although they recognized and
expressed concern about the occurrence of wife battering. 33  Instead, they
promoted social reforms, such as temperance, which were viewed as likely
measures to decrease excessive wife battering. 34 Indeed, for hundreds of years
the legal system focused on merely limiting the amount of harm a husband
27. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse and
Society's Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819, 830 (2010).
28. See OLA BARNETT, CINDY L. MILLER-PERRIN & ROBIN D. PERRIN, FAMILY VIOLENCE
ACROSS THE LIFESPAN: AN INTRODUCTION xxiii (2d ed. 2005) ("Family violence . . . has
probably existed since the beginning of time.").
29. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 5, at 17.
30. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 22; ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 13 (2000); see, e.g., Joyner v. Joyner, 59 N.C. (I Jones Eq.)
322, 325 (1862) ("[T]he law gives the husband power to use such a degree of force as is
necessary to make the wife behave herself and know her place.").
31. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 432 (Univ. of
Chi. Press 1979) (1765). For example, under English common law, a man could "beat his wife
with a rod no bigger than his thumb" (a so-called "rule of thumb"). DONALD G. DUTTON, THE
DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 21
(2001); see also Linda Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARv. L. REV. 550, 557 (1999) (stating that several states had adopted this
"rule of thumb" practice).
32. DUTFON, supra note 12, at 9.
33. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 15-16.
34. Id. at 16.
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inflicted on his wife, rather than prohibiting or imposing sanctions for such
behavior.35
An American appellate court first ruled that husbands do not have a right to
36physically abuse their wives in 1871. The Alabama Supreme Court declared
that "the privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat [a wife] with a stick, to
pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict
upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law." 37 Other states
soon followed suit 38 : Massachusetts abrogated the legality of spousal abuse in
187 1,39 and Maryland enacted the first law criminalizing spousal abuse in
1883.40 During this time, the public's attitude shifted; marriage increasingly
became viewed as a mechanism to enhance companionship-rather than as a
hierarchical, authority-based structure-and judges and legal commentators no
longer readily defended husbands' legal prerogative to beat their wives.41
Additionally, calls for greater public morality, including temperance, during
42this period also seemingly spurred disapproval of this abuse.
Nonetheless, although most states effectively criminalized wife battering by
the late nineteenth century,43 most wives-particularly those within the lower
socioeconomic strata-still had little recourse against abusive husbands, as
courts were generally unwilling to enter into and examine the domestic
sphere.44 Furthermore, although a battered wife could ostensibly seek divorce,
she faced various legal, financial, and psychological obstacles and often was
35. See DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 23 (3d ed.
2000).
36. Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871).
37. Id (emphasis added).
38. BERRY, supra note 35, at 21 (summarizing the Fulgham decision and subsequent
reactions of Alabama, Maryland, and Massachusetts); SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 16 (noting
that three states established corporal punishment for wife abuse); see also BUZAWA & BUZAWA,
supra note 25, at 24 (describing how the feminist movement and sociologists like Gelles,
Steinmetz, and Strauss helped ignite the social and legal changes regarding domestic abuse).
39. Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871); SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at
16.
40. BERRY, supra note 35, at 21; Pat Campbell, Adult Abuse in Missouri: The Beating
Continues, 58 UMKC L. REv. 257, 259 (1990) (identifying the legislation "passed in Maryland in
1882 which made wife beating punishable by forty lashes or a year in jail").
41. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 16-17.
42. See DUTTON, supra note 12, at 10 (discussing how temperance laws lessened spousal
abuse).
43. Id.; see also Campbell, supra note 40, at 259 (discussing the movement that led to the
illegality of wife beating).
44. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 17 (noting the "judicial rationales of privacy and
immunity for non-intervention"); see also BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 30 (noting that
in the early 1800s courts generally dismissed domestic violence charges, probably because the
enforcement of morality in the private sphere was deemed improper).
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dissuaded from dissolving her marriage by the risk of significant economic
deprivation and the social stigma associated with divorce.45
Spousal abuse was rarely discussed during the twentieth century until a
second feminist wave revived the issue in the 1970s. 46 Until this revival,
society generally continued to embrace traditional notions of familial privacy,
which resulted in what has been characterized as the "Age of Denial" regarding
IPV. 47 Raising concerns about, or even suggesting the possible existence of,
domestic violence within a family was considered unacceptable; police by and
48large did not respond to such complaints. Legislators and judges typically
trumpeted the promotion and preservation of the family and discouraged
separation and divorce, while emphasizing their concern for the well being of
children raised without both parents. 49 If a battered woman did file a formal
complaint, she often was not afforded physical protection from the batterer.50
Some judges even encouraged the woman to withdraw the complaint and
resolve the matter privately, or referred her complaint to agencies that provided
social services to help the woman solve her problem. Most women who
sought a legal remedy focused their complaints on their husbands' failure to
provide economic support, rather than on any physical abuse they may have
152
experienced.
Thus, although the first wave of the women's rights movement during the
nineteenth century helped to promote the status of married women, few legal
instruments for relief were available to battered spouses. 54 Throughout the
first half of the twentieth century, the options available to abused women were
essentially limited to self-help, the assistance of friends or relatives, or the aid
of child-welfare agencies from which victims of abuse might receive some
subsidiary assistance designed to protect their children.
45. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2130-32, 2141 (1996).
46. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 20.
47. DUTTON, supra note 12, at 11; Siegel, supra note 45, at 2119-20.
48. DUTrON, supra note 12, at 11.
49. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 125-26, 128-29, 138 (1987);
SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 18.
50. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 18.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 19.
53. BARNETT, MILLER-PERRIN & PERRIN, supra note 28, at 10 (noting that the movement
focused mainly on women's suffrage and political and economic opportunities).
54. Id.
55. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 20.
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The rebirth of feminism in the 1960s led to a grassroots movement in the
561970s that focused on IPV-particularly wife battering. Activists established
shelters for battered women in a number of cities,57 demanded that
law-enforcement officials take action against abusive spouses, and pushed for
legislation addressing domestic violence. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter
established the Office of Domestic Violence in the U.S. Department of Justice
to disseminate information about spousal abuse. 59 As public awareness of IPV
began to grow dramatically during this time, so did victims' efforts to obtain
help. Police officials estimated that domestic-violence calls comprised fifteen
to forty percent of all calls requesting police assistance during the 1970s.60
Nevertheless, the response by the criminal justice system to reports of IPV
was still frequently inadequate. A study during the early 1970s revealed that
sentencing for domestic violence was very lenient, for the criminal justice
system widely embraced the view that women provoked abuse by creating
marital stress or through incendiary behavior.61 One study noted that only nine
out of twenty-three men arrested for severely beating their wives received jail
time as a sanction.62
Leniency similarly pervaded the front end of the criminal justice system, as
it was often difficult to convince law-enforcement officials to intercede in what
they characterized as mere domestic disputes. One particularly egregious and
widely publicized account illustrated the failure of law enforcement at the time
to respond to and address IPV adequately. 6 3 In October of 1982, a woman who
suffered two years of escalating abuse by her husband took her young son and
56. Id. Initially, wife abuse received little attention during this revival of feminism in the
1960s, although concerns were expressed about the subrogation of women and inequality in
marital relationships. BARNETT, MILLER-PERRIN & PERRIN, supra note 28, at 10.
57. BERRY, supra note 35, at 23; HINES & MALLEY-MORRISON, supra note 17, at 159-60.
Interestingly, the first shelters for women were mainly intended for wives of alcoholics and were
partially funded by Al-Anon, indicating that concerns about temperance may again have been
related to the attention given to wife beating. LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES:
THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 264 (1988).
58. PLECK, supra note 49, at 182; see also BARNETT, MILLER-PERRIN & PERRIN, supra note
28, at 10-11 (indicating that these changes occurred due to an increase in national attention). The
first domestic violence hotline and the first shelter for battered women were established in St.
Paul, Minnesota, and Pasadena, California, respectively, in 1972. Nichole Miras Mordini,
Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects on
Victim Safety andAutonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 307 (2004).
59. Mordini, supra note 58, at 307.
60. Campbell, supra note 40, at 260.
61. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 255 (2005).
62. Id.
63. See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1525-26 (D. Conn. 1984);
Patricia Brennan, 'A Cry for Help': The Victim's Own Story, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1989, at Y8
(noting that a movie recounts the Thurman case).
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64left their home to stay with friends. Shortly thereafter, her husband tracked
her down and attacked her.65 Although the police received a formal complaint,
they did not take any action against the husband.66 A few weeks later, her
husband returned, took the child, and threatened to kill his wife if she called
the police.67 Although the police were called three times that night, they failed
68to respond.
Days later, the husband was finally arrested after a police officer witnessed
him break the windshield of his wife's car with his fist as she sat in the
vehicle. 69 The child was then returned to the wife, and her husband was given
a six-month prison sentence; however, his sentence was suspended on the
condition that he leave his wife alone. 70 Despite this condition, he continued to
harass her over the next six months and told his coworkers that he planned to
kill her.
In May of 1983, the woman obtained a judicially issued restraining order
72
mandating that her husband stay away from her. The husband again ignored
the court's order; he went to where she was staying and demanded to see her.73
Although she called the police, they failed to arrive before her husband had
dragged her by her hair into the backyard and stabbed her thirteen times in
front of several witnesses.74  A police officer-who arrived twenty-five
minutes after the woman's call-watched as the man stomped on his wife's
head until her neck broke. The man then went inside, grabbed the child, and
told the child that he had "killed [his] [expletive] mother." 76 The police officer
radioed for backup and an ambulance, but even after twenty-seven minutes, the
officer still had not arrested the man, who had begun kicking his wife in the
head again. Five officers helped the woman into the ambulance, but still did
not subdue the husband. When the husband began to approach the woman's
stretcher in an attempt to attack her yet again, the police finally wrestled him to
64. Brennan, supra note 63, at Y8.
65. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see Brennan, supra note 63, at Y8.
68. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524-25.
69. Id
70. Id. at 1525.
71. Id. at 1525-26.
72. Id. at 1525.
73. Id.
74. Id at 1525-26; see Brennan, supra note 63, at Y9.
75. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524-25; see Brennan, supra note 63, at Y9.
76. See Brennan, supra note 63, at Y9.
77. Id
78. Id.
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the ground and arrested him.79  This account is often cited as highlighting
society's failure to protect victims of IPV during this era, and it is also believed
to have prompted some improvement in the legal system's response to IPV.so
Ten years later, however, another widely publicized IPV incident called into
question this purported progress: the 1994 double murder of Nicole Brown
Simpson, the ex-wife of football star O.J. Simpson, and Ronald Goldman,
Nicole's friend.81 This event once again directed the nation's attention to the
continuing problem of IPV and triggered another round of calls to improve
society's response to it.82 Although a jury acquitted O.J. Simpson of these
crimes in a subsequent murder trial, the explosion of media reports
documenting his abusive behavior and his ex-wife's fruitless attempts to gain
law-enforcement assistance led many to reassert that existing societal
responses to IPV were insufficient to protect battered women. Moreover,
some commentators expressed concern that the frequency and severity of the
domestic violence that permeated their relationship was downplayed during the
murder trial, even though the prosecution played a tape of a prior 911 call
made by Simpson's ex-wife.84  Despite the public outcry after Simpson was
acquitted, his acquittal reinforced the view that most IPV abusers are not held
legally accountable for their acts of violence.85 Additionally, the defense's
portrayal of his ex-wife as immoral, irresponsible, and dependent on him
79. Id The husband received a fifteen-year sentence, and the woman spent eight months in
a wheelchair, had a badly scarred face and back, and was left partially paralyzed. Id. at Y8-9. In
a landmark suit, she won a judgment of $2.3 million against the police department due to their
negligence in responding to her reports. Id. at Y8 (noting that she later settled for $1.9 million).
80. See KAREL KURST-SWANGER & JACQUELINE L. PETCOSKY, VIOLENCE IN THE HOME:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 92-93, 95 (2003).
81. Stacey L. McKinley, The Violence Against Women Act After United States v. Lopez:
Will Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Be Returned to the States?, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 345,
345-46 (1996).
82. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 201.
83. McKinley, supra note 81, at 345-46.
84. Patricia Edmonds, Messages Mixed on Domestic Violence, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 1996,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/nns09l.htm; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at
202-06. There are multiple reasons given to explain why the IPV element was downplayed
during this so-called trial of the century. First, for the jury to understand the relationship between
IPV and homicide, it needs to be heavily educated about IPV and given access to the complete
history of IPV in the particular relationship-both of which are complex strategic and evidentiary
undertakings. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 202-03. Second, prosecutors admitted after the trial
that they did not fully appreciate the relevance of IPV in this case and did not recognize that this
was a classic case of IPV that metamorphosed into murder. Id at 203. Third, one attorney noted
that jurors may view the presentation of evidence of domestic violence with "uncomprehending
disdain," and this may have made the prosecution reluctant to pursue this aspect at trial. Id at
205.
85. Edmonds, supra note 84; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 206 (quoting one
battered women who was upset about the acquittal because it sends "a message that violence is
ok").
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reinforced the flawed, yet widely held belief that battered women "deserve"
their abuse. 86
In 1997, a jury found Simpson civilly liable for the deaths of his ex-wife and
Ronald Goldman.87 During this civil trial, the presence of IPV played a greater
role; Simpson's assertion that he never abused his ex-wife severely damaged
his credibility given the substantial evidence of past abuse.8 8
Despite his acquittal, some credit Simpson's criminal trial as an impetus for
the passage of state legislation specifically targeting IPV. 89 Numerous fatality
review commissions on domestic violence were also subsequently
established,90 drawing on models for reviewing child fatalities and adverse
medical events in healthcare facilities.91 These commissions investigate IPV,
coordinate agency responses, enhance community awareness of IPV, and
promote related legislation in an effort to reduce abuse. 92 Their coordinated
efforts and findings can be quite valuable in determining how best to prevent
and respond to IPV.
The Simpson trial also contributed to an increased awareness of "femicide"
(homicides in which the victim is a woman) and led to additional reforms
86. Evelyn Boswell, O.J. Simpson Trial Demonstrates the Power of Language, MONT. ST.
U. COMMS. SERVICES (June 9, 1999), http://www.montana.edu/cpa/news/wwwpbarchives
/univ/simpson.html; see also Nancy S. Ehrenreich, O.J. Simpson & the Myth of Gender/Race
Conflict, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 931, 933 (1996) ("Attempts by the Simpson defense to paint
Nicole as a partying drug user are part of a time-worn tradition of depicting victims of male
violence as bad girls who deserved it.").
87. Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492,497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
88. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 207 (detailing the additional evidence admitted
during the civil trial).
89. Miccio, supra note 61, at 238.
90. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 208.
91. Neil Websdale, Maureen Sheeran & Byron Johnson, Reviewing Domestic Violence
Fatalities: Fatality Review Team Philosophies, VAWOR, http://www.vaw.umn.edul
documents/fatality/fatality.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2011). Child fatality review teams,
established in almost every state, investigate children's deaths. See Hafemeister, supra note 27,
at 892. They are typically multidisciplinary in nature, with representatives from law enforcement,
protective services, health agencies, and other relevant bodies. Id Their goal is to reduce the
number of preventable child deaths and improve the recognition and obstruction of child abuse by
investigating the causes of the deaths of children. Id at 892, 894; see, e.g., Texas Child Fatality
Review, TEX. DEPARTMENT ST. HEALTH SERVSICES, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/
mch/childfatalityreview.shtm (last visited Aug. 17, 2011) (discussing the structure and purpose
of the review team). Medical review teams are an integral component of most healthcare
facilities and typically investigate serious adverse events. See Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting
Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems Made a Measurable
Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 329, 359-60 (2005) (discussing voluntary medical reporting
systems).
92. See Neil Websdale, R&B: Violence Against Women: A Conversation Between a
Researcher and a Battered Woman About Domestic Violence Fatality Review, II VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1186, 1186-87 (2005).
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designed to facilitate the prosecution of these and other IPV cases. 93 For
instance, in California-where the Simpson trial took place-new hearsay
provisions and a no-drop prosecution law were enacted shortly after the trial,
and many other states soon followed suit.94
In 1994, partly in response to the Simpson trial, Congress passed the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),96 which made certain acts of
domestic violence federal crimes, mandated interstate enforcement of civil
protection orders, and provided funding for legal services and training for
prosecutors and police to enhance their responses to this type of violence. 97
The bill had languished in Congress for four years, but it was passed just two
months after the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson.98 VAWA imposed
affirmative obligations on the government to prevent and redress domestic
violence, and it represented a significant shift away from the historical
approach that required women to handle abuse on their own. 99
However, VAWA was immersed in controversy from its inception. Many
congressional members opposed the civil rights remedy contained in Title III
of the legislation, which authorized monetary damage awards to victims of
gender-motivated violence.100  Opponents raised federalism concerns and
argued that a federal remedy infringed on an area of the law traditionally
regulated by and reserved for the states. 01  Although Congress enacted the
civil-remedy provision, which was available through the federal courts, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck it down in United States v. Morrison.102 The Court
determined that this enactment exceeded the authority granted to Congress by
the Commerce Clause.1 03 Some commentators suggested that the
93. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 208-09.
94. Id. at 209. For a more extensive description of these state laws, see infra Part V.
95. Brief of Rita Gluzman as Amica Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21-25, United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-5); see also Dan Hasenstab, Is Hate a Form of
Commerce? The Questionable Constitutionality of Federal 'Hate Crime' Legislation, 45 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 973, 992 n. 167 (2001) (noting that the Simpson trial impacted VAWA's passage).
96. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
97. See Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and
Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 499, 502-03 (2003).
98. McKinley, supra note 81, at 346.
99. Tuilin D. Agikalin, Comment, Debunking the Dichotomy ofNonintervention: The Role of
the State in Regulating Domestic Violence, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1045, 1057 (2000).
100. Siegel, supra note 45, at 2196.
10 1. Id.
102. 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000). For a discussion of United States v. Morrison, see
Roberta L. Valente et al., The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, in SOURCEBOOK ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 3, at 279, 298-99.
103. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-15.
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federalism-based objection harkened back to the common law tradition in
which familial privacy was paramount and legal intervention was limited-the
very tradition, ironically, VAWA was intended to reverse. 104  Since the
passage of VAWA (notwithstanding the striking of the civil remedy provision),
non-fatal incidents of IPV have declined by sixty-three percent in the United
States, and the reporting of domestic violence has increased by fifty-one
percent.' 05
Although IPV may have decreased, criticisms of the legal system's response
to IPV persist. Notably, in May 1999, a Colorado woman involved in divorce
proceedings obtained a restraining order that prohibited her husband from
molesting or disturbing her or their children and directed him to remain at least
100 yards away from the family home.106 One month later, in clear violation
of this order, the husband came to the family home unannounced and abducted
his three daughters, who were playing outside.107 When the woman discovered
her children were missing, she contacted the police and, when they responded,
showed them the restraining order.o Despite this protective order, her
requests for help, and information that she provided about her husband's
involvement and whereabouts, the officers said there was nothing they could
do.109 At 3:20 the next morning, the husband "arrived at the police station and
opened fire with a semiautomatic handgun.""l0  The police returned fire and
104. Siegel, supra note 45, at 2199-2206.
105. The Violence Against Women Act of2005: Summary ofProvisions, NAT'L NETWORK TO
END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://nnedv.org/docs/PolicyNAWA2005FactSheet.pdf (last visited
Aug. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Summary of Provisions]. Though VAWA may have impacted
domestic violence, it should be noted that overall violent crime rates have dropped since 1993,
indicating that VAWA was not the sole source of the decline. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1999: CHANGES 1998-99 WITH TRENDS 1993-99 I
(2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv99.pdf (2000); see also PATSY
KLAUS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND THE NATION'S HOUSEHOLDS 1-2 (2007), available
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cnh05.pdf (reviewing the decline in overall violent
household crimes from 1994 to 2005). Whether the prevalence of IPV in the United States has
indeed decreased in recent years is controversial. Richard J. Gelles, Estimating the Incidence and
Prevalence of Violence Against Women: National Data Systems and Sources, 6 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 784, 785 (2000); see also Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, Societal
Change and Change in Family Violence from 1975 to 1985 as Revealed By Two National
Surveys, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 465, 472 (1986) (identifying a report showing a sharp
decrease in homicide, child abuse, and wife beatings, but cautioning against reliance on these
figures due to the many factors that figure into such statistics). However, the reporting of
domestic violence by victims has increased significantly and continues to increase. Intimate
Partner Violence in the U.S., U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/intimate
/table/repgen.cfm (last updated July 27, 2011).
106. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751 (2005).
107. Id at 753.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 753-54.
110. Id. at 754.
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killed him."' Inside his pickup truck, police found the bodies of his three
previously murdered daughters.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the woman could not bring a federal
civil rights action for damages against the municipality and its police officers
for failing to adequately enforce the restraining order.1 3  The Court
determined that Colorado law did not mandate police enforcement of
domestic-abuse restraining orders; thus, as the woman did not have a right to
have her restraining order enforced, the police's failure to enforce that order
did not constitute a violation of her federal civil rights or give rise to a related
claim for damages.1 14
In light of the continuing prevalence of IPV and related concerns, Congress
reauthorized VAWA on the eve of its expiration with the passage of the
Violence Against Women Act of 2000 (VAWA II), a part of the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.115 Some may find the level
of support for VAWA II surprising; it passed the House by a 371 to 1 vote and
the Senate by a 95 to 0 vote.116 VAWA II focused on strengthening prior
efforts to combat IPV, provided continuing funding for VAWA programs, and
buttressed efforts to promote access to civil protection orders and other civil
remedies. It also established block grants to be awarded to states for
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 766.
114. Id. at 765-66.
115. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 1001, 114 Stat. 1464, 1491 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2006)).
116. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 14,
2000), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13094. The original VAWA was passed as part of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, receiving a 235-195 vote in the
House and a 95-4 vote in the Senate. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, OFF. CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Aug. 21, 1994), http://artandhistory.house
.gov/highlights.aspx?action=view&intid=38; U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 103rd Congress - 2nd
Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/rollcall-vote-cfm
.cfm?congress=103&session=2&vote=00125 (last visited Aug. 17, 2011). VAWA I, though a
definite step in the right direction, provided a somewhat limited and primarily
criminal-justice-centered response system for domestic violence, which may be the reason why
VAWA II's more multi-faceted approach garnered more support in Congress. KRISTEN J. ROE,
NAT'L ALLIANCE TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT AND ITS
IMPACT ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE PUBLIC POLICY: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD 3-4
(2004), available at http://new.vawnet.org/AssocFilesVAWnet/VAWA-SVPubPol.pdf.
117. Murphy, supra note 97, at 502-03; see also Press Release, Violence Against Women
Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Awards over $23 Million for Civil Legal
Assistance to Victims of Domestic Violence (Oct. 19, 2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/archives/pressreleases/2000/ojp00011 4.html (discussing civil
legal-assistance funds). Significant support was also provided to legal services programs. ALAN
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"Services, Training, Officers, [and] Prosecutors" (STOP grants), which sought
to increase the ability of battered spouses to obtain and enforce protection
orders. 1 8
Congress reauthorized VAWA again in 2005.119 The 2005 Act also
provided funding for direct services for sexual-assault victims;120 education,
training, and service programs that address violence against older victims
(those of age fifty and older);121 transitional and long-term housing resources
for victims;122 and programs to address violence committed against children
and youth.1  In 2011, Congress granted about $418 million for DOJ-
conducted violence-apainst-women programs and $133 million for HHS-
conducted programs. VAWA is currently scheduled for reauthorization in
2011.125
W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE
FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (2003).
118. Murphy, supra note 97, at 503 (internal quotation marks omitted). VAWA 11 also
expanded protection to two other IPV-vulnerable groups of individuals: the elderly and women
with disabilities. NAT'L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, COMPARISON OF VAWA 1994,
VAWA 2000, AND VAWA 2005 REAUTHORIZATION BILL 7 (2006), available at
http://www.ncadv.org/files/VAWA_94_00_05.pdf. For example, VAWA II authorized five
million dollars in grants to prosecutors, law-enforcement officials, and others for educational
programs regarding the recognition, investigation, and prosecution of "elder abuse, neglect, and
exploitation." Id
119. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-162, § 1, 119 Stat. 2960, 2960 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 13701 (2006)). The 2005 Act reauthorized VAWA through the 2009 fiscal year. Id.
120. Id. § 202, 119 Stat. at 2994.
121. Id. §205, 119 Stat. at 3002.
122. Id. §§ 601-06, 119 Stat. at 3030-42.
123. Id. § 303, 119 Stat. at 3004. For an overview of changes in the 2005 VAWA, see NAT'L
TASK FORCE TO END SEXUAL & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005 H.R. 3402
(2005), available at http://www.ncadv.org/filesVAWAIllSectionbySectionSummary.pdf, and
Summary ofProvisions, supra note 105.
124. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 11-833-T, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL
ASSAULT, DATING VIOLENCE, AND STALKING: NATIONAL DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS
UNDERWAY TO ADDRESS SOME INFORMATION GAPS, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OF
THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE 1 (2011) [hereinafter GAO DV EFFORTS], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dll 833t.pdf. Additionally, President Barack Obama declared
October 2010 to be National Domestic Violence Awareness Month and the Department of
Defense has established programs to prevent IPV among service members. See Press Release,
White House, Presidential Proclamation-National Domestic Violence Awareness Month (Oct. 1,
2010) [hereinafter Presidential Press Release, Domestic Violence Awareness Month]; Donna
Miles, Military Launches Domestic Violence Awareness Campaign, DEPARTMENT DEF. (Oct. 4,
2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61131 [hereinafter Domestic Violence
Awareness Campaign].
125. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Senate Panel Is Urged to Renew Domestic Violence Law, WASH.
TIMES, July 13, 2011, http://washingtontimes.com/news/2011 /jul/13/senate-panel-is
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Despite these continuing federal legislative efforts,126 the problem of IPV
remains significant. Although the rate of reported nonfatal IPV has declined
from approximately 5.8 incidents (per 1000 people ages 12 or older) in 1993 to
2.3 incidents in 2005,127 other figures indicate the problems that IPV continues
to pose: over 7 million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults occur per
year in the United States; 2.6 million result in injury to the victim, over
600,000 require some type of medical treatment, and over 1500 result in the
death of the victim. 128  Further, studies suggest that the recent economic
crisisl29 may have lasting psychological and emotional effects on families,
potentially resulting in increased conflict and violence.130 Lending credence to
these predictions, a 2009 nationwide survey of domestic-violence shelters
showed a notable increase in the number of women seeking help since the
economic downturn began.131  Economic challenges have also adversely
impacted many domestic-violence service providers due to faltering state
-urged-to-renew-domestic-violence-l/#0 undefined,0 .
126. For a discussion of state efforts to redress IPV, see infra Parts V-VI.
127. CATALANO, supra note 8. As noted, it is sharply debated whether the prevalence of IPV
in the United States has in actuality decreased in recent years. See supra note 105.
128. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
129. As of January 2010, the U.S. Department of Labor estimated that 16.1% of American
workers are unemployed but trying to find a job, working part time when they would rather be
working full time, or have stopped looking for work. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Alternative
Measures ofLabor Underutilization, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB., http://www.bls.gov/news.release
/empsit.tl5.htm (last updated June 3, 2011).
130. See Michael Luo, Job Woes Exacting a Heavy Toll on Family Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2009, at Al, A12 (offering stress, effect on male self-image, and increased family contact as
potential explanations for intrafamilial conflict after parental job loss); see also Jacquelyn C.
Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite
Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003) ("[W]e found that unemployment
was the most important demographic risk factor for acts of intimate partner femicide. In fact,
abuser's lack of employment was the only demographic risk factor that significantly predicted
femicide risks after we controlled for a comprehensive list of more proximate risk factors,
increasing risks 4-fold . . . ."). But see WALKER, supra note 17, at 18 ("There was no direct link
between unemployment and violent behavior for our sample.").
131. Editorial, An Advocate for Women, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A32.
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budgets,1 3 2 and uestions continue to arise regarding the legal system's
response to IPV.
132. See Jesse McKinley, Abuse Shelters Are Limiting Their Services or Closing, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, at Al0; see also Marie Crandall et al., Illinois Trauma Centers and
Intimate Partner Violence: Are We Doing Our Share?, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2096,
2101 (2009) (reporting that twenty-two percent of trauma centers felt that their IPV services were
inadequate and noting that many blame insufficient financial resources); Radha lyengar &
Lindsay Sabik, The Dangerous Shortage of Domestic Violence Services, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS
1052, 1057 (2009) (documenting 5000 unmet requests for domestic-violence services in a single
twenty-four-hour period).
133. See Litchman, supra note 9, at 765-66 (discussing a prominently reported case and
tragic IPV compounded by inadequate societal responses to that IPV); see also Roger Alford &
Bruce Schreiner, Police: Ky. Politician Said He 'Wanted Revenge', TPM NEWS (Sept. 15, 2009),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2009/09/police ky politician-said-he-wanted revenge.php;
Christine Armario & Jonathan M. Katz, Fla. Mom Slain with Her 5 Children Endured Abuse,
BREITBART.COM (Sept. 21, 2009), http://breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9ARVOLOO&
show-article 1. A relatively recent case demonstrates the continuing questions regarding the legal
system's response to IPV. See Stacy Moore, Family Says Courts Shut Down Restraining Orders,
Hi-DESERT STAR (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.hidesertstar.com/articles/2010/02/03/news/doc
4b69381ed5e05699313614.txt. In August of 2009, California resident Katie Tagle ended an
abusive two-year relationship with Stephen Garcia, the father of her child, after he allegedly
punched her in the face and knocked her unconscious. Id. When Garcia discovered that there
was another man in her life in December of 2009, he reportedly "wigged out" during a child
custody exchange, and he also knocked her to the ground after she refused to marry him. Id
After receiving a series of threatening text messages from Garcia, Tagle requested an emergency
restraining order. Id However, because Tagle could not produce the text messages during her
hearing, the judge denied the emergency order and set a hearing date instead. Id. At the hearing,
Garcia admitted to slapping Tagle, but asserted it was only because Tagle had continually pushed
him to react. Id. This second judge denied Tagle's restraining order request, concluding that
Garcia did not pose a threat to Tagle and suggesting that she may have falsely alleged abuse to
gain custody of their son. Id. The day after the hearing, Garcia emailed Tagle a story entitled
"Necessary Evil" with a "Tragic Ending," in which a man murders his son and commits suicide
after the boy's mother refused to return to a relationship with him. Id. Tagle read the story and
immediately called 911, and the responding deputy got her an emergency restraining order. Id.
But just a week later, a third judge refused to uphold the order, directed Tagle to deliver their son
to Garcia for his scheduled visitation, and warned her about the consequences of lying. Id.
"[D]iscouraged and frightened by her last appearance in court, she did not seek another
restraining order or custody change," even when Garcia missed a custody transfer. Id. On
January 31, 2010, two weeks after his last court appearance, Garcia and the nine-month-old son
were found dead in an alleged murder-suicide. Kealan Oliver, Murder-Suicide Note Posted on
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Despite the federal government's efforts to reduce IPV,134 substantive
legislation directly responding to IPV has been controversial, particularly at the
all-important state level. 135  Instead, there has been widespread disagreement
as to how, and in some cases whether, society should respond.' 36 This can be
attributed, in part, to the diverse views regarding what causes IPV and how
best to redress it. Before turning to the various responses instituted by the
states, this Article will provide a brief overview of these views and their
potential impact on IPV legislation.
II. THE DIFFERENT FACES OF IPV
Advocates whose beliefs can be traced to the women's rights movement of
the 1960s and 1970s argue that the inequitable roles of men and women in
society need to be dramatically altered before IPV can be effectively
reduced.'3  They view IPV as the result of a social paradigm that promotes the
domination of men over women through "gender role socialization; social and
economic discrimination in education, the workplace, and the home; and lack
of access to child care."l 38  They argue that IPV should be redressed by
"promoting self-determination, self-organization, and democratic
participation" among women, and by encouraging all segments of society to
think differently about relationships between men and women. 139 Supporters
of this perspective may resist mandatory reporting and arrest legislation, as
134. See, e.g., GAO DV EFFORTS, supra note 124; Presidential Press Release, Domestic
Violence Awareness Month, supra note 124; Domestic Violence Awareness Campaign, supra
note 124; Understanding Intimate Partner Violence: Fact Sheet, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.govNiolencePrevention/pdf/IPV factsheet-a.pdf (last
visited Aug. 27, 2011).
135. See Gelles, supra note 105, at 788 (explaining that only a few states have enacted
mandatory reporting laws for domestic violence). The dichotomy between federal and state
responses to IPV stand in stark contrast to child abuse. Id. In contrast to IPV, when child abuse
first gained widespread national notoriety and publicity in the 1960s, virtually every state
launched legislation to promote the reporting of child abuse and to facilitate and enhance societal
responses to this abuse. Id; see also Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 839-41 (reviewing the
legislative responses to child abuse, particularly mandatory reporting laws).
136. See Agikalin, supra note 99, at 1053.
137. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 22; see also Michael P. Johnson, Patriarchal
Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of Violence Against Women, 57 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 283, 284 (1995) ("[T]he emphasis [of feminists] has been upon historical
traditions of the patriarchal family, contemporary constructions of masculinity and feminity, and
structural constraints that make escape difficult for women who are systematically beaten.").
138. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 22.
139. Id.
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these responses are perceived to further disempower women by removing their
control over the response to the IPV that they experience.140
An alternative approach focuses primarily on the perceived pathology,
dependency, and vulnerability of battered spouses, particularly those who
remain in their relationships. 4 1 Psychologist Lenore E.A. Walker's seminal
book The Battered Woman Syndrome documents the presence of these
characteristics in the battered women she studied.142 She argues that the
trauma caused by battering can develop into a "learned helplessness" that
makes it very difficult for a woman to leave an abusive relationship.'43 Such
findings have been used to promote a more proactive societal response to IPV,
based on the view that victims may be unable to protect themselves or their
own interests.144 Proponents contend that society should more routinely and
directly intervene in cases of IPV by utilizing the mechanisms of mandatory
reporting, investigation, arrest, prosecution, and sentencing-even over
objections from victims who assert that they neither want nor need
assistance.145
A third perspective focuses on how familial structures and dynamics may
permit, encourage, or perpetuate violence among family members; this
approach frames IPV as gender neutral and promotes the relatively
controversial view that women are as violent as men.146 Rejecting the notion
that IPV is primarily gender violence, this viewpoint posits that all forms of
family violence-be it child abuse, intimate partner violence, or elder abuse-
are attributable to similar root problems, such as substance abuse, stress, and
140. Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in
Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 175 (2003); Miccio, supra note 61, at
242.
141. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 23.
142. See WALKER, supra note 17, at 117-18.
143. Id. at 116-17.
144. See Miccio, supra note 61, at 303-06.
145. See id at 294 (criticizing this viewpoint for usurping women's autonomy). Some
opponents of this position assert that it inappropriately characterizes abused women as "irrational
beings . . . incapable of maturing into autonomous persons," rather than empowering them to
combat IPV. Id. at 311. This perspective has also been criticized for characterizing victims of
IPV as "unreasonable, incompetent, suffering from psychological impairment or just plain crazy."
Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male
Battering of Women, 23 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 38 (1989).
146. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 24. The assertion that IPV harms women and men
equally has been much debated and sharply criticized. See Johnson, supra note 137, at 285
(noting that some researchers have analogized female violence to male battering, and others have
found that "women [are] evidently as likely to utilize violence in response to couple conflict as
[arel men," determinations that have been challenged by feminist scholars).
940 [Vol. 60:1
2011] Society's Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence
the normative acceptance of violence within the family and society.147
Adherents to this view often challenge the conventional belief that women
have an exclusive or even primary need for related services.148 One potential
benefit of this perspective is that it treats IPV much like other forms of
interpersonal violence, rather than as a distinct, unique, and relatively
unimportant problem-an approach embraced by the 1984 U.S. Attorney
General's Task Force on Family Violence, which approached family violence
from a criminal-justice perspective and promoted initiatives that treated IPV
like other forms of interpersonal violence.' 49 The task force found that "the
solution . . . was arrest, prosecution, and incarceration" of IPV erpetrators,
regardless of whether the violence occurred in a familial context.
A fourth viewpoint, perhaps harkening back to the common law tradition,
generally opposes IPV responses that increase state intervention into the
private family sphere. 5 1 Proponents of this view are more willing to embrace
intervention in cases of child abuse because children have no source of
protection other than the state when endangered at home.152 Spouses,
however, are considered to be autonomous adults possessed of free will, who
are capable of making their own choices. 53 Rejecting the feminist perspective,
proponents of this view tend to assert that some spouses intentionally assume a
subordinate role and that doing so is their prerogative.154 Advocates of this
view generally seek to limit both legislation and law-enforcement efforts that
intrude into family matters, particularly when assistance has not been
sought. 5 5
147. See id. at 284 ("[T]he focus has been largely on commonalities among the various forms
of family violence, such as the surprising frequency of violence, the instigating role of stress, and
public adherence to norms accepting the use of some violence within the family context.").
148. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 71-73.
149. Miccio, supra note 61, at 288-90. The report was criticized by those who perceived
IPV more as a social issue; although critics recognized the need for criminal-justice intervention,
they found that this report did not adequately "address the material, social, and economic
concerns of women survivors . . . including relocation, long-term housing, job training, and
education." Id. at 290.
150. Id at 289-90.
151. Agikalin, supra note 99, at 1053.
152. Cf Mia M. McFarlane, Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence: An Inappropriate
Response for New York Health Care Professionals, 17 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 26 (1999).
153. Id. Although traditional feminists share a similar antipathy toward unrequested
governmental intervention, they are likely to advocate increased governmental services to assist
battered women and for public education to prevent abuse. Agikalin, supra note 99, at 1055.
154. See LARRY L. TIFFT, BATTERING OF WOMEN: THE FAILURE OF INTERVENTION AND
THE CASE FOR PREVENTION 4-5 (1993); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images ofBattered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (noting the blame women often
receive for failing to leave an abusive relationship).
155. Agikalin, supra note 99, at 1054. For example, initial federal attempts "in 1978 and
1979 to provide grant money to domestic violence shelters" were defeated by critics who argued
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The almost dizzying array of current societal responses to IPV may be
attributed to the divergence and virtual intransigence among these basic
positions. Scholars who have researched IPV similarly diverge as to the nature
of the problem, its contributing factors, and how to ameliorate it.156 However,
this divergence may be caused in part by a mistaken tendency to address IPV
as a monolithic phenomenon, when in actuality there exists two relatively
distinct forms of IPV that require different societal responses.1 57 A distinction
can be made between "patriarchal terrorism," characterized by the systematic
use of violence to maintain patriarchal control, and "common couple
violence," characterized by intermittent milder outbursts of violence by both
partners.158  Although the former tends to dominate headlines and therefore
shape legislative responses, the latter occurs more frequently.159  State
intervention is particularly appropriate for cases of "patriarchal terrorism," as
the victim is more likely to be at risk and less able to seek help or escape the
abuse.160 "Common couple violence," in contrast, typically "does not escalate
into more serious forms of violence."' 6 ' It can be argued that conflating these
two types of IPV has resulted in misguided societal responses to IPV.162
that such efforts constitute an inappropriate state interference into private family matters. Id at
1053.
156. See Johnson, supra note 137, at 283-84.
157. Id at 283 ("This article argues that there are, in fact, two distinct forms of couple
violence taking place in American households."). Professor Michael P. Johnson attributes this
divergence to two relatively independent "major streams of sociological work on couple violence
in families, one that is generally referred to as the family violence perspective, and the other of
which may be called the feminist perspective." Id (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). He
adds that "[t]he findings of the two literatures . . . lead to strikingly different conclusions
regarding a number of the central features of family violence" and suggests that the two
viewpoints "are in fact studying two distinctly different phenomena." Id. at 284.
158. Id. at 283, 286 (noting that "common couple violence ... is in fact gender balanced, and
is a product of a violence-prone culture and the privatized setting of most U.S. households,"
whereas "patriarchal terrorism . . . is a pattern perpetrated almost exclusively by men, and rooted
deeply in the patriarchal traditions of the Western family").
159. See id at 283 ("We are all too familiar with stories of women who are finally murdered
by husbands who have terrorized them for years.").
160. See id at 284-85, 287 (comparing patriarchal terrorism, "a product of patriarchal
traditions of men's right to control 'their' women . . . that involves the systematic use of not only
violence, but economic subordination, threats, isolation, and other control tactics," and common
couple violence, described as less patriarchal in nature with less aggressive violence involved).
161. Id at 286.
162. Id at 291-93. A growing number of other IPV subtypes have also been generated,
along with different proposed societal responses for each subtype. Thus, recent studies have
begun to recognize that discrete programs tailored toward these various subsets of batterers may
be more successful than employing a one-size-fits-all approach. See, e.g., Nicola Graham-Kevan
& Joan Archer, Intimate Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: A Test of Johnson's
Predictions in Four British Samples, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1247, 1254-61 (2003);
Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & Jeffrey C. Meehan, Typologies of Men Who Are Maritally Violent:
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Scientific and Clinical Implications, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1369, 1370-71 (2004)
(noting that one study identified fifteen types of abusers); Michael P. Johnson & Kathleen J.
Ferraro, Research on Domestic Violence in the 1990s: Making Distinctions, 62 J. MARRIAGE &
FAMILY 948 (2000); Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of
Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT.
REv. 476, 477 (2008) (identifying four different types of intimate partner violence, including
coercive controlling violence, violent resistance, situational couple violence, and separation-
instigated violence); Mary Z. Silverzweig, Domestic Terrorism: The Debate and Gender Divides,
12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 251, 254-55 (2010) (differentiating between "intimate terrorism," "violent
resistance," "situational couple violence," and "mutual violent control").
One study identified three dimensions for grouping perpetrators of IPV: "severity of violence,
focus of violence, and psychopathology or personality linked to violence." See Elizabeth
Gilchrist, Implicit Thinking About Implicit Theories in Intimate Partner Violence, 15 PSYCHOL.,
CRIME & L. 131, 132 (2009). Another study differentiated three types of
batterers-"sociopathic" (seven percent of all abusers), "antisocial" (forty-one percent), and
"typical" (fifty-two percent)-and recommended that any intervention be tailored to the type of
batterer, with the most extensive interventions reserved for the most violent abusers. Edward W.
Gondolf, Who Are Those Guys? Toward a Behavioral Typology of Batterers, 3 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 187, 196-97, 200 (1988). "Typical" batterers, compared to the other two types, are less
violent, less likely to use weapons, and have lower arrest rates; therefore, their victims are more
inclined to maintain or resume a relationship with them. Id. at 197. For sociopathic and
antisocial batterers, coordinated interventions and programs that focus on continuous restraint,
such as "intensive residential treatment approximating detoxification programs and long-term
outpatient treatment," rather than counseling or other conventional treatment programs that may
do more harm than good by giving victims false hope. Id at 200.
A third set of researchers categorized abusers by determining whether their violent tendencies
were only intrafamilial. Nancy M. Shields, George J. McCall & Christine R. Hanneke, Patterns
of Family and Nonfamily Violence: Violent Husbands and Violent Men, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS
83, 87-89 (1988). Abusers who are generally aggressive, rather than limiting their abuse to
intrafamilial settings, are more violent, more likely to abuse illegal drugs, and feel more justified
in using violence. Id.
One social scientist classified abusive individuals into three treatment categories: "family-only
aggressors" (fifty-two percent of their sample), "generally violent aggressors" (twenty-nine
percent), and "'emotionally volatile' aggressors" (nineteen percent). See Daniel G. Saunders, A
Typology of Men Who Batter: Three Types Derived from Cluster Analysis, 62 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 264, 270 (1992). "Family-only" abusers were less violent outside the
household, seemed to suppress their emotions, and were susceptible to the triggers of alcohol or
stress. Id at 270, 273. The "generalized aggressors" were the most likely to demonstrate violent
behavior in public, reported more frequent alcohol consumption, used more severe violence, and
were more likely to have been abused as children. Id. at 270. The "emotionally volatile"
batterers were less violent than the "generalized aggressors," but were more psychologically
abusive. Id The study concluded that family-only aggressors would benefit the most from
"assertiveness training" and were the best candidates for couples counseling. Id at 273. The
generally violent aggressor needed the most extensive intervention to begin "uncovering and
healing his psychic wounds," whereas the emotionally volatile abuser would benefit from
"systematic desensitization and cognitive restructuring." Id. However, the author noted that
emotionally volatile abusers were unlikely to appreciate the potentially criminal nature of their
actions. See id. at 274.
Finally, some have argued that successful interventions must identify the etiological basis for
the risk factors typically associated with IPV. For example, one model identified three interactive
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In any case, the four different perspectives discussed above tend to generate
distinct legislative res onses to IPV, and significant debate persists as to which
is the best approach. Because most legislative action on IPV in recent years
has occurred at the state level, where differences readily propagate, these
divergent views have resulted in a patchwork of laws and policies aimed at
addressing IPV, with little uniformity in the employed approaches.' 64
Before turning to the specific components of the approaches currently used
by the various states to combat IPV, it is important to note that the most
influential model law regarding IPV is the Model Code on Domestic and
Family Violence, crafted between 1991 and 1994 by the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges.165 Perhaps recognizing the divergent views
on how to address IPV, the drafters of this document emphasized developing a
'model code," not a "uniform code," and stated that "each chapter and section
can be independently assessed and accepted or modified."l 66 This Code has
been particularly instrumental in triggering legislative changes to policies
regarding the assignment of child custody after domestic violence occurs,167 as
well as shaping the duration of protective orders.168 Other provisions have
been more controversial and have received less support, including mandatory
reporting by law-enforcement officers who respond to domestic or family
violence calls,169 mandatory or presumptive warrantless arrests of perpetrators
of domestic or family violence,170 and the prohibition of "mutual orders of
protection," wherein both spouses obtain protective orders against one
factors that result in family crisis and lead to IPV, which include "A: the stressor event, B:
resources available to the individual and/or the family, and C: the perception or assigned meaning
of the individual and/or family." Emily S. Rolling & Matthew W. Brosi, A
Multi-leveled and Integrated Approach to Assessment and Intervention of Intimate Partner
Violence, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 229, 230 (2010). Alternatively, some posit that prevention and
intervention efforts must recognize the relationship of IPV to post-traumatic stress disorder and
hyperarousal. Kathryn M. Bell & Holly K. Orcutt, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Male
Perpetrated Intimate Partner Violence, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 562, 562 (2009).
163. Han, supra note 140, at 161.
164. See Aqikalin, supra note 99, at 1053-54. In contrast, the federal government has
asserted a more dominant role in directing state responses to child abuse. See Hafemeister, supra
note 27, at 842-44.
165. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC & FAMILY VIOLENCE, at v (1994), available at
http://www.ncjfcj.org/images/stories/dept/fvd/pdf/modecode fin_printable.pdf.
166. Id.
167. Peter G. Jaffe et al., Parenting Arrangements After Domestic Violence, 6 J. CENTER FOR
FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 81, 91 (2005).
168. Sean D. Thueson, Civil Domestic Violence Protection Orders in Wyoming: Do They
Protect Victims ofDomestic Violence?, 4 WYO. L. REv. 271, 283-84 (2004).
169. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC & FAMILY VIOLENCE § 205(A)-(B) (1994).
170. Id. After reviewing mandatory and presumptive arrest research, the drafters offered two
alternative sections instead. See id. §§ 205(A)-{B) cmt.
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another. The Code does not contain provisions for "no-drop"
prosecutions-mandatory prosecution of IPV perpetrators even when the
victim does not wish to press charges, or mandatory IPV reporting by
healthcare professionals. In addition to this model code, the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ) proposed a model anti-stalking law in 1993, and by 1999, all
fifty states had enacted anti-stalking legislation in some form, with many
following the NIJ model.172
III. DEFINING IPV
Intimate partner violence is generally thought to encompass a number of
specific behaviors, including intimidation, isolation, threats of violence, and
economic control, as well as physical violence such as hitting, kicking,
choking, and rape.173  However, legal definitions of IPV and the societal
response vary widely by state, reflecting divergent views regarding who should
or must be afforded assistance and support, and under what circumstances.174
VAWA defined domestic violence as
felony or misdemeanor crimes of violence committed by [1] a
current or former spouse of the victim, [2] by a person with whom
the victim shares a child in common, [3] by a person who is
cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse, [4]
171. Id. § 310.
172. Jeremy Travis, Director, Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Address at the National Center for
Women and Policing Conference, Stalking: Lessons from Recent Research (Apr. 14, 1999),
available at http://www.nij.gov/nij/about/speeches/past-directors/stalk.htm.
173. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 2, 7-8 (2d ed. 2008); see also Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of
Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing the
role of financial abuse in domestic-violence relationships). At the same time, attempting to
define violence in general and IPV in particular has plagued researchers attempting to estimate
the prevalence of IPV. As one well-known researcher has noted,
The definitional question has been debated for more than three decades and has been
contentious. On one hand, one definition is that violence is any act that is harmful to
the victim. This broad definition of violence includes physical attacks, threatened
physical attacks, psychological or emotional aggression and abuse, sexual assaults or
threatened sexual assaults, and neglectful behavior. On the other hand, a narrower
definition is confined to only acts of physical violence. For example, Gelles and Straus
(1979) defined violence as any act that has the intention of harming the other
individual-harm can range from slight pain to severe injury or death. Even here, there
are variations in the definition of violence. Physical violence can range from relatively
minor physical contact-such as a grab or a push, to severe acts that cause serious
injury or death. Acts of physical violence may or may not produce an injury, and the
injury can range from a bruise to a fatality. Furthermore, an act of violence may be
accidental or intentional.
Gelles, supra note 105, at 785-86.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 176-82.
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by a person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the
domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction or (5) any victim
protected by the jurisdiction's domestic or family violence laws. 175
Despite this federal definition, the language employed in states' IPV laws
varies widely. Half of the states target "domestic violence,"l 76 sixteen use the
arguably broader term "domestic abuse,"177 and the remainder use a variety of
phrases as limited as "family violence," "family abuse," or "family assault,"
and as expansive as "abuse" or "assault."178  No state law uses the phrase
175. 42 U.S.C. § 13925(6) (2006). This definition includes same-sex couples if they are also
protected under their jurisdictions' domestic-violence laws. Jennifer Heintz, Safe at Home Base?
A Look at the Military's New Approach to Dealing with Domestic Violence on Military
Installations, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 277, 280 (2003).
176. See ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1, 30-6-1 (1989 & Supp. 2010) (defining domestic violence and
abuse); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2010); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (2010); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6211 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3 (2010); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (1999 & Supp. 2010) (domestic violence, abuse); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28
(West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303 (2002 & Supp. 2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
60/103 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (domestic violence, abuse); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-34.5
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010) (domestic or family violence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3101
(2005 & Supp. 2009); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (LexisNexis 2010) (domestic violence and
abuse); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.1501 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.018 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (LexisNexis 2010)
(domestic violence, abuse); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW § 459-a (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2009
& Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-29-2, 15-15-1 (2003 & Supp. 2010)
(defining domestic violence in 12-29-2 and domestic abuse in 15-15-1); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-36-1 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West 2005
& Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-202 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2010) (defining
domestic violence or abuse); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102 (2009) (domestic violence, domestic
abuse).
177. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-1 (LexisNexis
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132
(2010 & Supp. 2011); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4001 (1998 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-2 1-1 (West 2007 & Supp.
2010); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-901 (LexisNexis 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (2006
& Supp. 2010) (domestic abuse, family violence); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 2003
& Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-29-2, 15-15-1 (2003 & Supp. 2010) (domestic violence,
domestic abuse); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-10 (1985 & Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 25-10-1 (2004 & Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(4) (2010); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.12 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-21-102 (domestic violence,
domestic abuse).
178. ALA. CODE § 30-5-1 (abuse); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a (West 2009 & Supp.
2010) (family violence); D.C. CODE § 16-1001(9) (2001 & Supp. 2010) ("intrafamily violence");
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (2010) (family violence); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-34.5 ("domestic
or family violence"); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010)
("domestic violence"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § I (West 2007 & Supp. 2010)
(abuse); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.010 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (abuse); MONT. CODE ANN.
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"intimate partner" (although Montana's statute does encompass the broader
phenomenon of "partner abuse"), perhaps because state legislatures intend to
limit these statutes to family1 79 or what are perceived to be more traditional
domestic settings.180 Some states, however, have extended their laws to reach
persons who are dating s8 or who otherwise have an "affinity" to the victim.182
Most state statutes do not indicate whether they apply to same-sex
relationships.m Although research suggests that same-sex domestic violence
occurs at the same rate as violence in heterosexual relationships, 84 and has
§ 40-15-101 (2009) (partner and family member assault); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1
(domestic violence, abuse); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (family violence, domestic abuse); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.705 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (defining abuse under the subtitle "family
abuse"); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (West 2010) (abuse); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.0021, 71.004 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010) (defining dating violence and family violence);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2010) (abuse); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2010) (family abuse).
The words "family" and "domestic" are often used interchangeably. Compare DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 1041, and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28, with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a. In some
states, "violence" and "abuse" are also used relatively interchangeably, with both defined as any
violation of the relevant criminal code. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041, and FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.28, with LA. REV. STAT. § 46:2132.
179. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28; N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW § 459-a.
180. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-38a; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.28; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 1; N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 459-a; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31.
181. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1; TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 71.0021, .004.
182. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 1.
183. See NAT'L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 2001, at 13-17 (2002) [hereinafter NCAVP REPORT],
available at http://www.avp.org/publications/reports/2001ncavpdvrpt.pdf. Only four states,
however, specify that a victim must be of the opposite sex to be protected under domestic
violence statutes. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2010 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-206(2)(b) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(b)(2) (2009 & Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-4-20(b)(iv) (1985 & Supp. 2010). The Virginia statute protects all persons who have been
cohabitating, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2010), but a Virginia Attorney General opinion defines
"cohabit" to exclude gay and lesbian couples, 1994 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 60. Notably, initial
federal attempts to provide funds for abused women's shelters in 1978 and 1979 were defeated
because of concerns that governmental protection and services would be afforded to, and
implicitly endorse, nontraditional relationships-particularly same-sex relationships. See
Agikalin, supra note 99, at 1053.
184. Joanna Bunker Rohrbaugh, Domestic Violence in Same-Gender Relationships, 44 FAM.
CT. REV. 287, 287 (2006). Approximately eleven percent of men and women in gay or lesbian
relationships report IPV. Shannon Little, Challenging Changing Legal Definitions ofFamily in
Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 259, 260 (2008).
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similarly negative effects on health and quality of life,' a 2001 survey
determined that only six states have laws that affirmatively permit protective
orders for gay and lesbian victims.186 The survey concluded that the vast
majority of jurisdictions (thirty-seven states as well as the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico) have relationship-neutral laws, while seven states actually
prohibit protective orders for victims of same-sex IPV, either explicitly or in
effect.187 In some states, statutes protecting victims of dating violence provide
the best available means for a victim of same-sex IPV to obtain help. The
2003 Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which effectively
invalidated anti-sodomy laws, may embolden future efforts to curtail same-sex
IPV.189 At the same time, other barriers or misperceptions of the abuse as "just
fighting," the fear of being "outed" as gay or lesbian, inadequate responses
from law-enforcement officers, and lack of access to family courts may
dissuade victims of same-sex IPV from seeking protection and thus effectively
limit the scope of these statutes. 190
State IPV laws also vary with regard to the type of violence or abuse
targeted, which may include physical violence, sexual violence, psychological
or emotional abuse,191 stalking,192 or some combination of these. 193  The
185. John R. Blosnich & Robert M. Bossarte, Comparisons of Intimate Partner Violence
Among Partners in Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Relationships in the United States, 99 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 2182, 2183-84 (2009).
186. NCAVP REPORT, supra note 183, at 16-17 (noting the states are Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania).
187. Id at 13-17.
188. Id at 14 (noting the option exists under Mississippi law).
189. See 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); Michelle Aulivola, Note, Outing Domestic Violence:
Affording Appropriate Protections to Gay and Lesbian Victims, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 162, 165
(2004) (discussing how the decision will impact gay rights); see also Tara R. Pfeifer, Out of the
Shadows: The Positive Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence,
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1251, 1271-77 (2005) (describing the decision as a "tremendous step" for
equal rights for same-sex couples).
190. NCAVP REPORT, supra note 183, at 10-12; Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not
Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28
NEW ENG. L. REV. 273, 281-92 (1993); Aulivola, supra note 189, at 164.
191. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
192. Nineteen states specifically include stalking in their definition of IPV or domestic
violence. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (a)(1)(m) (1989 & Supp. 2010); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203(d)
(West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (stating the Court may enjoin acts under § 6320, which lists stalking);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1(2) (2010); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-6-2-34.5 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002(l)(F)
(1998 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(b)(vi) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(d) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009)); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.018(1)(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(14) (LexisNexis 2006
& Supp. 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50B-1(a)(2) (2009 & Supp. 2010) (citing § 14-277.3A); OHIO REV. CODEANN.
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identified these four
categories of behavior as the predominant manifestations of IPV.194
Additionally, VAWA addresses all four types of violence as well, although it
stresses that each state's definition is controlling.1
95
IV. MANDATORY REPORTING
Unlike mandatory reporting of child abuse,1 96 mandatory reporting of IPV
has been a relatively recent and sporadic addition to state laws. Support for
mandatory reporting of IPV has been much more tepid than the relatively
strong support for mandatory reporting of child abuse, possibly due to how
the victims are perceived. 199 Children are viewed as vulnerable, innocent, and
less able to protect themselves from abuse, whereas adult IPV victims are
perceived as able to avoid or escae abuse, more capable of making their own
choices, and more autonomous. 20  As a result, many policy-makers believe
there is less need or justification for establishing mechanisms, such as
§ 3113.31(A)(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010) (citing § 2903.211); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 60.1(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a)(5) (West 2010);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(11) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-l(4)(i) (LexisNexis 2008
& Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1 101(1)(D) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.010(1)(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011). VAWA also includes stalking in its definitions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 13925(24) (2006).
193. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2010 & Supp. 2011) (including physical and
sexual abuse as domestic abuse); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2010) (including physical violence, sexual violence, and stalking); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-13-2(D) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (including all four categories of abuse).
194. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Intimate Partner Violence: Definitions,
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePreventionlintimatepartner
violence/definitions.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2010).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 13925.
196. See Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 851-54.
197. Mills, supra note 31, at 562.
198. See supra note 164.
199. See Heidi Bauer et al., California's Mandatory Reporting ofDomestic Violence Injuries:
Does the Law Go Too Far or Not Far Enough?, 171 W. J. MED. 118, 118-24 (1999) (series of
articles debating mandatory reporting of domestic violence injuries).
200. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 25-29; Michael A. Rodriguez et al., Mandatory
Reporting ofDomestic Violence Injuries to the Police: What Do Emergency Department Patients
Think?, 286 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 580, 580 (2001) ("Mandatory reporting is controversial among
clinicians, patients, and domestic violence prevention advocates. Supporters of the policy argue
that it will facilitate the prosecution of batterers, encourage healthcare clinicians to identify
domestic violence, and improve data collection. Opponents believe it may increase violence by
the perpetrators, diminish patients' autonomy, and compromise patient-clinician confidentiality."
(footnotes omitted)).
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mandatory reporting of IPV, that effectively insert the state into associated
domestic disputes, even when abuse is involved.201
The recent trend toward enacting mandatory reporting of IPV began when
California first enacted a specific reporting requirement. 202  The California
statute requires health practitioners to file a report with local law enforcement
when they know or reasonably suspect that a patient is suffering from wounds
or physical injuries caused by assaultive or abusive conduct.203 When
California enacted this change, healthcare providers already had to report
certain types of injuries-such as those inflicted by a knife, firearm, or other
deadly weapon-under existing statutes.204 The revision, however, specifically
encompassed "[a]buse of [a] spouse or cohabitant," as well as "[e]lder abuse,"
"[c]hild abuse or endangerment," and a number of other assaultive or abusive
actions.205 Like most child-abuse reporting statutes, this law imposes penalties
for failing to report abuse and provides individuals with immunity from
liability if they comply with the law by filing such a report. 20 6
The enactment of this controversial statute sparked opposition from
members of the medical community, but received strong support from many
law-enforcement groups. 2 0 7  The California Medical Association (CMA)
voiced concern that the statute, by requiring documentation and reporting of
potential domestic violence, placed a significant burden on physicians. 208 The
CMA further expressed its view that the statute's immunity clause for medical
providers afforded less protection than is generally conferred by child-abuse
reporting laws.209
When initially proposed, the bill stated that it was not meant to duplicate
existing child- and elder-abuse reporting statutes and that an additional report
201. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 20-32.
202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11150 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); Anne Rousseve, Domestic
Violence and the States, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 431, 448-49 (2005).
203. CAL. PENAL CODE § Ill 60(a)(2). As discussed, some credit the O.J. Simpson case in
1994 as influential in getting states, such as California, to adopt laws targeting domestic violence
in general. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
204. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160, added by Stats.1953, c. 34, § 1, amended by
Stats.1971, c. 1805, § 1, relating to reports of injury by deadly weapon or criminal act, was
repealed by Stats.1993, c. 992 (A.B.1652), § 2. As amended in 1994, these reports were limited
to wounds or other physical injuries inflicted by a firearm. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1l160(a).
205. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160(d).
206. Rousseve, supra note 202, at 448-49; see also Hafemeister, supra note 27, at
860-66 (discussing child abuse reporting statutes).
207. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 13-14; see also Rousseve, supra note 202, at 448-49
(highlighting California as the first state to require mandatory reporting for healthcare
professionals and reviewing the arguments in favor of and against such legislation).
208. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 14 n.71.
209. Donna R. Mooney & Michael Rodriguez, California Healthcare Workers and
Mandatory Reporting ofIntimate Violence, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 92 (1996).
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was not required if one was already mandated under existing law.210  When
enacted, however, the language of the statute was less explicit on this point,
only obliquely referring to other mandatory reporting statutes when it stated
that "it is the Legislature's intent to avoid duplication of information."211
Similar laws soon followed in Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Colorado.212
Notably though, Rhode Island's law only requires such reports for statistical
and training purposes and precludes the reporter from including the victim's
name.213 The New York legislature considered similar bills in 1997 and 1999,
which required medical professionals to report suspected domestic violence if
214
they had reasonable cause. Ultimately, the legislature did not enact either
bill, possibly because of the American Medical Association's (AMA)
215
opposition to mandated physician reporting. Currently, twenty-one states
and the District of Columbia explicitly require some type of mandatory
reporting of domestic violence.
216
A. Who Must Report
Notwithstanding explicit recognition of the harmful effects of IPV and of the
widely held view that the problem requires some societal mechanism to
address it (whether through law-enforcement responses or victim protection
and support services), mandatory reporting of IPV has enjoyed limited support
at best. In contrast to most child-abuse reporting statutes, the range of
210. Id.
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160(h).
212. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 13; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135 (2010); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 209A.030(2) (LexisNexis 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-9 (2002 & Supp.
2010).
213. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-9(a)(2).
214. See A. 4586, 220th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); A. 5788, 222d Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y.
1999).
215. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 21. Like a number of states, New York does require
medical personnel to report injuries caused by firearms, stab wounds, or severe burns. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 265.25-.26 (McKinney 2008).
216. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135
(2010); D.C. CODE § 16-1032 (2001 & Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29 (West 2010); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1 (2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/303 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209A.030 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2141 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4012 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 6 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.1227 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp.
2010) (reports forwarded to the central repository for Nevada records of criminal history); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-24 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-12 (West 2005); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2935.032(D) (LexisNexis 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.6 (West 2003); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-8 (2002 & Supp. 2010);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-619(e) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (2008); WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.99.030 (LexisNexis 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-801 (LexisNexis 2009); Wis.
STAT. § 968.075 (West 2007).
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217professionals legally required to report IPV is typically quite limited.
Although many states require law-enforcement personnel to file certain reports
when they respond to domestic violence calls, 218 only four states directly
require physicians or other medical personnel to file a report when they suspect
domestic abuse.219 Only Kentucky currently requires IPV reports from "any
person" or from a range of professionals beyond medical providers, as is
frequently required with child abuse.220 However, nearly all states have
separate laws requiring doctors to report patients' injuries that they suspect are
the result of violent or criminal conduct, which tends to encom ass the more
egregious IPV cases because they often necessitate medical care.
Medical personnel are frequently singled out as mandated reporters because
of studies suggesting that victims of IPV are more likely to seek medical
treatment than to call the police after incidents of domestic violence. 222
Proponents of IPV-reporting statutes thus argue that requiring medical
providers to report suspected IPV is the best means to ensure early intervention
217. Compare Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 851-54, with infra notes 219-20 and
accompanying text.
218. D.C. CODE § 16-1032 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29(2) (West 2010); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-20.1(c) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/303 (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 209A.030 (LexisNexis 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2141 (2010); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4012 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West 2007); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 171.1227 (LexisNexis 2006) (reports must be forwarded to the central repository
for Nevada records of criminal history); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-24 (West 2005); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-12 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032(D) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.6 (West 2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105(c) (West 2010); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-29-8 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-619(e) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-36-2.2(5}-(6) (LexisNexis 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030(6)(b) (West 2002);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-801 (LexisNexis 2009); Wis. STAT. § 968.075 (2007).
219. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160; COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 209A.030; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-9 (stating that reports should be made for statistical
purposes only, without any identifying information about the victim). In Tennessee, physicians
are "encouraged to report" suspicions of domestic abuse to the Department of Health. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-621 (2010).
220. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209A.030 (requiring reporting by "[any person, including but
not limited to physician, law enforcement officer, nurse, social worker, cabinet personnel,
coroner, medical examiner, mental health professional, alternate care facility employee, or
caretaker" who suspects spousal abuse); Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 851-52 (noting that all
states and the District of Columbia have enacted mandatory child-abuse reporting laws applicable
to "medical personnel, teachers/school officials, and social workers," while most also require
police officers and clergy members to report child abuse and some "require all citizens to report
suspected child abuse" (footnotes omitted)).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 229-34. Oklahoma specifically exempts domestic
abuse from the mandatory reporting required of healthcare professionals, except when the victim
is incapacitated or under eighteen. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 58 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
222. Mordini, supra note 58, at 325.
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by law-enforcement or other officials.223  However, critics respond that the
mandatory filing of IPV reports by medical providers may discourage victims
from seeking necessary medical treatment, as victims may not desire police
involvement. 224  Furthermore, concerns have been raised that such
requirements may adversely impact the doctor-patient relationship.225 For
instance, in one study, most doctors surveyed indicated that they would be
reluctant to file a report if their patient objected, due to concerns about
confidentiality and the integrity of the patient-physician relationship. 22 6
Indeed, the AMA opposes mandatory reporting of IPV, arguing that it violates
both the patient's rights and the physician's ethical duties to protect the
patient's health.227 This stance is consistent with the AMA's position on
mandatory reporting of child abuse, which it opposes because parents might
choose not to seek needed medical care for their abused child.228
B. When to Report
Mandatory IPV reporting laws also differ from child-abuse reporting laws
by the indirect means they use to identify abuse. Child-abuse reporting laws
229
explicitly state that "child abuse" must be reported. In contrast, the
IPV-reporting laws of only four states (California, Colorado, Kentucky, and
Rhode Island) require medical personnel to file a report when they have treated
a victim of IPV. o Most other state reporting laws target IPV only indirectly
223. Id; see also Mills, supra note 3 1, at 562 (contending that mandatory reporting laws for
medical personnel "ensures state intervention in a violent relationship at the earliest possible
point").
224. Mordini, supra note 58, at 325.
225. Michael A. Rodriguez et al., Mandatory Reporting of Intimate Partner Violence to
Police: Views ofPhysicians in Calfornia, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 575, 578 (1999).
226. Id at 577.
227. Am. Med. Ass'n [AMA], House ofDelegates Resolution: 610 (A-07), at 2, AMA Pol.
H-515 (May 16, 2011), available athttp://www.amaassn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/467
/61 0.doc; see supra note 216 and accompanying text.
228. John B. Reinhart & Elizabeth Elmer, The Abused Child: Mandatory Reporting
Legislation, 188 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 358, 361 (1964); see also Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 840
("The AMA model ... rejected mandatory reporting in general because of concerns that abusive
parents would be deterred from seeking medical care for their children . . .
229. Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 851.
230. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135
(2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209A.030 (LexisNexis 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-9
(LexisNexis 2002) (requiring reports for statistical purposes only, without any identifying
information about the victim). North Dakota's statute implies the reporting duty includes
domestic violence, as it states that when a domestic violence report is made "as required by this
section," the victim must also be given information on domestic-violence assistance programs or
organizations. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-41(3) (2009). Although Ohio and Texas do not
directly require healthcare providers to file a report when they treat a victim of domestic abuse,
these two states do require healthcare providers to note any suspected domestic violence in the
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by requiring medical personnel to report nonaccidental or intentional
injuries;231 those caused by criminal conduct, 232 violence, 233 firearms, knives,
or other sharp instruments or weapons,234 or bum injuries;235 or "suspicious"
patient's records. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(F)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 91.003 (West 2008). Tennessee encourages-but does not require-healthcare providers
to report domestic violence. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-621 (2010).
231. ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.369 (2010) (limiting mandated reports to injuries likely to cause
death); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-602 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.24 (West 2007) (limiting
mandated reports to life-threatening injuries); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-9 (2009); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.411 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629.041 (LexisNexis 2008); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §2921.22; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 146.750 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5106 (West 1983 & Supp. 2010) (limiting mandated reports to serious
bodily injuries or injuries caused by a deadly weapon). Colorado, in addition to requiring medical
personnel to report when they have reason to believe an injury resulted from domestic violence,
also requires a report filing when they treat injuries that are reasonably believed to have been
intentionally inflicted. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135(1).
232. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3806 (2010) (requiring reports of injuries that may have
resulted from an unlawful act); D.C. CODE § 7-2601 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1390 (2002)
(requiring reports of injuries indicating a criminal offense); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 2630/3.2 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.111 (West 2005) (requiring
reports of injuries that appear "to have been received in connection with the commission of a
criminal offense"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12A1/2 (West 2003) (requiring reporting
of rape or sexual assault, but prohibiting disclosure of the victim's identity); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-902 (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring reports of injuries that "appear[] to have been
received in connection with the commission of a criminal offense"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 631:6 (LexisNexis 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.20 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-41
(2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5106 (West 2009 & Supp.
2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-101 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-23a-1 (LexisNexis 2007);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-27 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 255.40 (West 2010).
Colorado also requires medical personnel to file a report when they treat injuries that they have
reason to believe involved a criminal act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135(1).
233. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-14 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2010) ("[A]ny injury that
would seriously maim, produce death, or has rendered the injured person unconscious, caused by
the use of violence .... ).
234. ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.369 (firearms, stab wounds); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3806
(firearms, stab wounds); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-602 (firearms, stab wounds); CAL. PENAL
CODE § I 160(a)(1) (firearms); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135(1) (firearms, knives, and other
sharp instruments); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-490f (West 2003) (firearms); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 1762 (2005) (firearms, stab wounds); D.C. CODE § 7-2601 (firearms, dangerous
weapon); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.24 (firearms); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-14 (firearms, stab
wounds); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1390 (firearms); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 2630/3.2
(firearms); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-7-1 (LexisNexis 2009) (firearms, stab wounds); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 147.111 (firearms, stab wounds); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4213 (2007) (firearms, stab
wounds); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.5 (2004) (firearms); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 512 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (firearms); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-703 (LexisNexis
2009) (firearms); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12A (firearms, stab wounds); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.411 (firearms, stab wounds, deadly weapon); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.52
(West 2009) (firearms, dangerous weapon); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-31 (West 2009 & Supp.
2010) (firearms, stab wounds); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.350 (West 2003) (firearms); MONT. CODE
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wounds.236  These types of injuries often result from incidents of domestic
violence; therefore, mandating these reports has the effect of flagging possible
IPV without requiring medical personnel to make the subjective and often
difficult determination of whether the injury was actually a product of
domestic violence. However, this indirect approach is potentially both
over-inclusive, as these types of injuries may have other causes unrelated to
IPV, and under-inclusive, as cases of IPV without physical injury, like
237psychological harm, will remain undetected. Further, unlike child abuse,
four states (Alabama, New Mexico, Washington, and Wyoming) do not even
require mandatory reporting through indirect means.238
IPV laws, however, do share a common characteristic with child abuse laws:
various levels of certainty are required to trigger a healthcare provider's
obligation to report.239 A few states limit mandated reports to situations where
ANN. § 37-2-302 (2009) (firearms, stab wounds); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629.041 (firearms,
stab wounds); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:6 (firearms); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-8 (West 2005)
(firearms, explosives, weapons); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 2010) (firearms, stab
wounds); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.20 (firearms, stab wounds); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-41
(firearms, stab wounds); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (firearms, stab wounds); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 146.750 (firearms, stab wounds); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5106 (firearms); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-47-48 (firearms); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1072 (2003) (firearms); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23-13-10 (2006) (firearms); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-101 (firearms, stab
wounds, poisons, suffocation, other deadly weapons); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
161.041 (West 2009) (firearms); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-23a-1, -2 (firearms, stab wounds,
deadly weapons); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4012 (2009) (firearms); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2967
(2009) (firearms, stab wounds); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-27 (firearms, stab wounds); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 255.40 (firearms).
235. ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.369; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-7-3; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403.4; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12A; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.52; NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 629.045; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-8; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22; Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 255.40.
236. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-14; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.52.
237. The Minnesota statute mandates reports for one of the broadest ranges of potential IPV
and resulting injuries, with reports required for "all bullet wounds, gunshot wounds, powder
bums, or any other injury arising from, or caused by the discharge of any gun, pistol, or any other
firearm, which wound the health professional is called upon to treat, dress, or bandage," and "a
burn injury or wound that the professional is called upon to treat, dress, or bandage, if the victim
has sustained second- or third-degree burns to five percent or more of the body, the victim has
sustained bums to the upper respiratory tract or sustained laryngeal edema from inhaling
superheated air, or the victim has sustained a bum injury or wound that may result in the victim's
death." See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.52(2)-(3).
238. See TERESA P. SCALZO, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR
COMPETENT ADULT VICTIMS 15, 97, 154, 164 (2006), available at http://ncdsv.org/images/
Rape%20and%20SA%2OReporting%20Requirements%20%20%20Scalzo%206.15.06.pdf; Table
1: State Codes on Intimate Partner Violence Victimization Reporting Requirements for Health
Care Providers, FUTURES WITHOUT VIOLENCE (2004), http://www.futureswithout
violence.org/userfiles/file/HealthCare/mandatoryreporting tablesl.pdf.
239. See Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 854-56 (discussing child abuse laws).
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the healthcare provider personally believes that IPV has occurred.240 For
example, healthcare providers in New Hampshire must "believe" that the
injury was caused by a criminal act.241 A number of states, however, require
less certainty and mandate reports whenever the provider "suspects" that the
requisite criteria are present. Regardless of the level of certainty required,
most states provide some degree of latitude by requiring reports from
mandated persons only when there is a reasonable basis for the belief or
suspicion. Some states take another approach and require a report when a
"reasonable person" would believe that the criteria have been met.244  This
objective standard can be construed broadly, if one expects colleagues to be
proactive in filing reports, or narrowly, if one expects colleagues to be
relatively selective in their reporting.
C. Penalties for Failure to Report and Immunity from Liability
245Like child-abuse reporting laws,25 IPV reporting laws generally impose
penalties for a failure to comply with reporting requirements, which include
fines, misdemeanor convictions, or both.246 However, roughly half of the
states with direct or indirect mandatory 1PV reporting requirements rovide
immunity from civil liability to mandated reporters who file a report. Such
240. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:6 (LexisNexis 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135
(2010) (has reason to believe); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-9 (2009) (cause to believe).
241. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 631:6.
242. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011) (mandating report
filing when a health practitioner "knows or reasonably suspects" that the criteria for filing a report
have been met).
243. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160(a) ("knows or reasonably suspects"); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 2630/3.2 (West 2008) ("reasonably appears"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209A.030
(LexisNexis 2007) ("reasonable cause to suspect"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.52 (West 2009)
("reasonable cause to believe"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.20 (2009) ("if it appears"); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 43-17-41 (2007) ("reasonable cause to suspect"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22
(LexisNexis 2010) ("reasonable cause to believe"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 255.40 (West 2010)
("reasonable cause to believe").
244. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-27 (LexisNexis 2010) ("lead a reasonable person to
believe").
245. See Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 854-56 (discussing child abuse laws).
246. James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Damage Actions Against Non-Reporting
Physicians, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 191, 201-03 (1996); see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3806
(2010) (stating that failure to report constitutes a misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1762
(2005) (imposing a fine for failure to report).
247. ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.369 (2010) (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11160 (protecting reporters from any sanctions related to the filing of a report);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135 (2010) (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 1762 (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-7-9 (2009) (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1390(3)
(2002) (providing immunity from any liability as long as the reporter acted in "reasonable
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248protection is similar to that provided to child abuse reporters2. Fifteen of
these states require that the report be filed in "good faith" before affording
immunity,249 but four of the fifteen have adopted a presumption of good
faith. 2 50 Only North Dakota provides good-faith immunity for both filing and
not filing a report-the other states provide immunity only for the filing of a
report or for compliance with the law. 2 Finally, several states whose laws
lack an explicit good-faith safe-harbor provision employ alternate protective
language, such as: "any person . . . shall be held harmless from any civil
liability for his reasonable compliance" with the reporting law.252
D. To Whom to Report
Whereas child abuse reporting requirements typically mandate that reports
be directed to Child Protective Services (CPS) or a comparable social-service
compliance" with the statute); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/3.2 (LexisNexis 2009) (providing
immunity as long as the reporter acted in "reasonable compliance" with the statute); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 209.050 (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2142 (2004) (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.411 (West 2004) (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.52
(requiring a report to be filed in good faith); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-31 (West 2009 & Supp.
2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-303 (2009) (adopting a presumption of good faith); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.20 (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-41
(requiring a report to be filed in good faith); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(e)(5) (providing
immunity from any liability related to the filing of a report); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 146.760
(West 2003) (requiring a report to be filed in good faith); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5106 (West
1983 & Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1072 (2003) (adopting a presumption of good
faith); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-13-12 (2006) (absolving a reporter from any liability related to
the filing of a report); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-621 (2010) (adopting a presumption of good
faith); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-23a-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (providing immunity from civil or
criminal liability); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2967 (2009) (providing immunity from any liability
related to the filing of a report); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-27 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring a
report to be filed in good faith); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 255.40 (adopting a presumption of good
faith).
248. Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 860. Virtually all states, however, only provide this
immunity following a good-faith report of child abuse. Id.
249. See supra note 247 (noting that the fifteen states are Alaska, Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
250. See supra note 247 (identifying the four states as Montana, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Wisconsin). Although Virginia has no explicit good-faith requirement, its statute establishes
that reporters will be immune absent a showing of bad faith or malicious intent. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2967.
251. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-41(6).
252. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1390(3) (emphasis added); see also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 2630/3.2 (reasonable compliance); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.050 (providing immunity from
liability if acting upon reasonable cause in the making of a report).
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agency charged with responding to child abuse and neglect,2 5 3 almost all IPV-
254related reports must be filed with a law-enforcement agency. Reliance on
the criminal-justice system, rather than a network of social service providers, is
likely explained by three central characteristics that distinguish IPV and child
abuse: (1) required reports of IPV are typically triggered by injuries that
strongly suggest a criminal act without the parental immunity provisions that
often shield child abuse from criminal prosecution; (2) IPV reporting laws
primarily target the apprehension of perpetrators, rather than the delivery of
protective assistance to indisputably dependent and vulnerable victims
(children); and (3) social-service agencies are considered comparatively less
well-equipped than law enforcement to directly respond to violent behavior
between adults.
E. Responses to Filed Reports
Unlike child-abuse reporting laws, IPV-related, mandated reporting statutes
rarely include a timetable for initiating and completing an investigation of
reported IPV.255 Instead, law-enforcement agencies receiving these reports
256
typically enjoy broad discretion regarding their response2. This latitude may
reflect lawmakers' greater confidence that a law-enforcement agency, as
opposed to a social-services agency, will respond to such reports in a timely
manner. However, a recurrent complaint is that law-enforcement officials fail
to either take IPV reports seriously or respond promptly.257 Some officers
253. Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 858-59.
254. Mordini, supra note 58, at 324-25; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135(1)(a)
(2010) (stating that a healthcare provider must "report the injury at once to the police of the city,
town, or city and county or the sheriff of the county in which the licensee is located"); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1390; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.311 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 750.411 (West 2004); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:6 (LexisNexis 2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 2008); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 43-17-41(3); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2921.22(F)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4012 (2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 255.40 (West 2010).
255. Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 869-70.
256. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-490f (West 2009); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-8 (West 2005).
257. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751-74 (2005) (describing a
father's kidnapping and murder of his three children after police failed to adequately enforce the
mother's restraining order against him); see also Dana Harrington Conner, To Protect or to Serve:
Confidentiality, Client Protection, and Domestic Violence, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 877, 887 (2006)
("Historically, police have been slow to react to domestic calls."); Litchman, supra note 9, at 767
("[Dlomestic violence is the single most frequent form of violence that police encounter on the
job. However, despite the frequency with which police officers encounter domestic violence, the
effectiveness of their response is often inadequate." (footnotes omitted)). Police responses to
domestic violence are often criticized for being insufficient. Sara R. Benson, Failure to Arrest: A
Pilot Study of Police Response to Domestic Violence in Rural Illinois, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 685, 687 (2009); Ariella Hyman, Dean Schillinger & Bernard Lo, Laws Mandating
2011] Society's Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence
have asserted that they do not receive sufficient training to prepare them to
respond appropriately when they encounter domestic violence.
Highlighting this problem, one study examined police manuals and found
that they generally contain little guidance or established procedures for
handling domestic violence cases or for responding to and enforcing protective
orders. Instead, the manuals tend to advise police officers to respond with
caution, including waiting until backup arrives before proceeding with an
investigation.260 In addition to minimal training and guidance, officers are
provided little incentive to respond vigorously to domestic violence cases.
Promotions in law enforcement are purportedly based on the number of felony
arrests made; therefore, spending time responding to domestic calls properly
may effectively discourage police officer involvement-particularly when the
call does not suggest felonious behavior-because doing so reduces the
amount of time officers have to pursue more prestigious arrests to bolster their
record. 261
F. Critique of Mandatory IPV Reporting
Those opposed to IPV reporting laws argue that they may generate frivolous
reports (when filing criteria are too broad or the penalties for failing to file are
too great) or spurious reports (when reports are used to obtain revenge or
leverage following the dissolution of a relationship).262 Although such
concerns seem to be raised less frequently in the context of IPV than in the
263
context of child abuse, inappropriate reporting of IPV does occur. One
survey of Missouri judges found that over seventy-percent of them had
"personally been involved in an adult abuse proceeding when an order of
protection [had] been used for a purpose other than that stated in the
Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do They Promote Patient Well-Being?, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N.
1781, 1784 (1995). However, many years of training and an emphasis on the harmful
consequences of IPV may be having an effect. See Angela R. Gover et al., Law Enforcement
Officers' Attitudes About Domestic Violence, 17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 619, 630 (2011)
(reporting a recent exploratory survey of a large urban police department that found that police
officers were well versed in the handling of IPV incidents and "supported treating domestic
violence as a violent crime," although they were concerned about their limited discretion when
responding to domestic violence calls).
258. Litchman, supra note 9, at 781.
259. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 71.
260. Id at 72.
261. See id. at 40.
262. See RESPECTING ACCURACY IN DOMESTIC ABUSE REPORTING, WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF DOMESTIC RESTRAINING ORDERS 2, 3, 6 (2008), available
at http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/RADARreport-VAWA-Restraining-Orders.pdf
263. See Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 890 (noting concerns that child-abuse reports are
sometimes filed as a means to obtain child custody).
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statute."264 Judges have observed domestic partners misuse IPV reporting in
an attempt to obtain custody of children, to generate sympathy during a divorce
settlement, or even to retaliate against a partner's prior filing of an IPV
report. 265
A second, more frequent criticism of mandatory IPV reporting is that it
disempowers victims by limiting their ability to choose how to respond to the
abuse. Critics note that women have endured a long history of paternalistic
subjugation by a society that presumes them to be incompetent to make their
own decisions, and such critics contend that mandatory IPV-reporting laws
similarly categorize women as incompetent to decide how to respond to their
IPV experiences.267 They maintain that victims of IPV are not analogous to
abused children, who are highly dependent and vulnerable, lack
decision-making capacity as a matter of law, and need proactive intervention to
ensure prompt delivery of protective services.268 These critics maintain that
IPV constitutes a complex social dynamic, wherein any number of viable
reasons could result in victims not seeking intervention; 9 furthermore, they
note that a societal response in some instances may actually be harmful to the
victims. 270 Although the critics believe protective and social services should
be made readily available to IPV victims, they typically oppose the imposition
of automatic societal responses, such as mandatory reporting, and favor
allowing the victim to direct what response, if any, occurs.271 Some states
have embraced this critique and attempt to provide IPV victims greater control
over these situations by allowing them to block otherwise mandatory IPV
264. David H. Dunlap, The Adult Abuse Act: Theory vs. Practice, 64 UMKC L. REV. 681,
687 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 197; Eve Buzawa, Gerald Hotaling & Andrew
Klein, The Response to Domestic Violence in a Model Court: Some Initial Findings and
Implications, 16 BEHAV. Sci. & LAW 185, 190 (1998).
266. Agikalin, supra note 99, at 1059; Han, supra note 140, at 175; Miccio, supra note 61, at
242.
267. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
268. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 25-26.
269. Mordini, supra note 58, at 316 (noting that a victim of IPV may not want intervention if
the victim is financially dependant on his or her abuser, if the victim has children who could
witness a potential arrest, or if an arrest would be particularly stigmatizing in the victim's
community).
270. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 17.
271. See Gelles, supra note 105, at 788 ("[T]he prevailing sentiment, especially among
advocates, is that . . . mandatory reporting systems are not appropriate in the case of violence
against women."); McFarlane, supra note 152, at 22-23, 27-29 (contending that the state is in a
poor position to protect victims from retaliation after a report is made, and that victims will be
discouraged from seeking medical treatment if they fear retaliation).
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reports 272 or by requiring their affirmative consent before reports can be
filed.273
Although not as widely expressed, another criticism of mandatory
IPV-reporting laws is that the generated reports may be a relatively ineffective
means of redressing IPV because assessin which party instigated the violence
can be a difficult (if not impossible) task. Although one partner may have
suffered a greater physical injury, which may have triggered a call for
intervention, violence between the partners may have been occurring for an
extended period of time, with both partners contributing to and bearing some
responsibility for the violence in their relationship. The assessment of
responsibility is complicated by the abused partner's refusal in some cases to
confirm the occurrence of the abusive incident, which may even cross over into
276
an affirmative defense of the abuser. Further, a negative interaction with
law-enforcement officials may realign the victim with the abusive partner,
making the victim resistant to intervention and perhaps less willing to call for
assistance in the future.277 A mandatory IPV-reporting requirement may
therefore fail to target the abusive party, exacerbate an already volatile
situation, and place responding law-enforcement officials in a difficult and
potentially counterproductive role.
272. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:6(11) (2007) ("A person who has rendered
treatment or assistance is excepted from the reporting provisions . . . if the person seeking or
receiving treatment or other assistance: (a) is 18 years of age or older, (b) has been a victim of a
sexual assault offense or abuse as defined in RSA 173-B:1, and (c) objects to the release of any
information to law enforcement officials. This exception shall not apply if the sexual assault or
abuse victim is also being treated for a gunshot wound or other serious bodily injury.").
273. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 58C (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5106 (West 1983 & Supp. 20 10).
274. Lynn D. Wardle, Marriage and Domestic Violence in the United States: New
Perspectives About Legal Strategies to Combat Domestic Violence, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 791,
799 (2003). One consequence of the difficulty in assessing which party instigated the violence is
that both parties may be arrested, which may only further compound the IPV victim's dilemma.
See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic
Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1657, 1680-81 (2004); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Renewing the
Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 613, 623 (2007); supra notes 411-18 and accompanying text.
275. Johnson, supra note 137, at 285 ("One of the surprising findings of Straus and his
colleagues' national surveys was that women were evidently as likely to utilize violence in
response to couple conflict as were men."). But see Lenore E. A. Walker, Current Perspectives
on Men Who Batter Women-Implications for Intervention and Treatment to Stop Violence
Against Women: Comment on Gottman et al. (1995), 9 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 264, 265 (1995)
("[M]ost battered women use violence in reaction to the abuse they experienced . . . .").
276. See Richard B. Felson et al., Reasons for Reporting and Not Reporting Domestic
Violence to the Police, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 617, 640 (2002) ("[T]hree factors inhibit victims from
calling the police ... : the desire for privacy, the desire to protect the offender, and ... the fear of
reprisal. Privacy is by far the most important factor inhibiting reporting an incident.").
277. See Mills, supra note 31, at 595.
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Another critique of mandatory IPV-reporting laws, particularly those that
target physicians, is that mandatory reports may lead abusive partners to
prevent their victims from obtaining needed medical assistance.278
Alternatively, victims themselves may avoid seeking medical treatment out of
fear that it will result in an lPV report, which may cause them embarrassment,
lead to retaliation by their abusive partner, or have other negative effects.279
These laws may also adversely impact doctor-patient confidentiality.280 The
AMA's ethical guidelines advocate for complete doctor-patient confidentiality,
although they do provide an exception when the law requires disclosure of
confidential information. 2 8 1 Not surprisingly, a study in California found that
fifty-nine percent of primary care and emergency physicians "might not
comply with the mandatory reporting law if a patient objected."282 Some
commentators argue that physicians can provide greater assistance to abuse
victims by instead encouraging and empowering them to take affirmative steps
on their own.283 A collaborative approach may also enhance victims' trust in
284their physicians, encouraging them to confide in their doctors.
Finally, some commentators believe that mandatory reporting of IPV "is
potentially the most dangerous" state-mandated intervention. 28 One study
found that more than half of domestic-violence perpetrators threaten violent
retaliation if they are held criminally responsible for their behavior.286 Not
surprisingly, fifty-two percent of women in another survey said they feared
mandatory reporting would increase their risk of abuse.287 Further, this study
determined that sixty-seven percent of women would be less willin to tell
their physicians about abuse if they knew of mandatory reporting laws.
278. Mordini, supra note 58, at 326-27.
279. Id.
280. ARIELLA HYMAN, FAM. VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, MANDATORY REPORTING OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS: A POLICY PAPER 5 (1997), available at
http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/HealthCare/mandatory policypaper.pdf.
281. CODE OF MED. ETHICS, Op. 5.05 (Am. Med. Assoc. 2010). These guidelines state that
physicians who are legally required to disclose confidential information should notify the patients
of the need to disclose, disclose the minimal amount of information possible, and, in some cases,
lobby to change the law. Id.
282. Rodriguez et al., supra note 225, at 577.
283. See McFarlane, supra note 152, at 2.
284. See id. at 30 (positing that mandatory reporting statutes may dissuade battered women
from trusting their doctors, while the absence of mandatory reporting statutes may encourage
open communication and trust between doctors and their patients).
285. Mordini, supra note 58, at 324.
286. See Hyman, Shillinger & Lo, supra note 257, at 1783.
287. Andrea Carlson Gielen et al., Women's Opinions About Domestic Violence Screening
and Mandatory Reporting, 19 AM. J. PREV. MED. 279, 281 (2000).
288. Id.
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In addition to the potential danger they pose, mandatory reporting laws may
provide little meaningful relief to women in abusive relationships. As many
as thirty percent of individuals charged with IPV continue to batter their
victims while being prosecuted.290 Additionally, in one nationwide study of
organizations dedicated to redressing domestic violence, eighty-six percent of
the respondents believed that police respond to domestic-violence complaints
ineffectively; seventy-one percent stated that domestic-violence cases are
rarely prosecuted; and forty-two percent claimed that no perpetrator in their
291i
county had ever received a jail sentence for domestic violence. Further, the
authors of this study determined that only twenty-five to thirty percent of all
domestic-violence calls receiving a police response had been reported as
required by law. 292
Despite the many concerns that critics have voiced about the mandatory
293
reporting of IPV, it still has supporters. Proponents typically note two
primary justifications for mandatory reporting laws: to remedy significant
under-reporting and to identify otherwise difficult-to-detect and dangerous
cases of IPV.294 Whereas the compulsory school enrollment and related
mandatory vaccinations of child-abuse victims typically provide opportunities
for third parties-such as teachers, other school officials, and doctors-to
observe signs of abuse,295 adult victims of IPV are more easily isolated by their
abusers, to the point where they no longer have daily or even weekly contact
296
with third parties who can spot indications of abuse.
Proponents of mandatory reporting maintain that reporting laws promote
early intervention and protection of victims, 297 offer counseling and other
rehabilitative services to abusive partners to help them control their abusive
conduct,298 help document a history of abuse in anticipation of future
prosecution,299 and enhance data collection and research regarding the nature
289. See id; McFarlane, supra note 152, at 22-23.
290. See Hyman, Shillinger & Lo, supra note 257, at 1783.
291. Id. at 1784.
292. Id
293. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 32-34; Rodriguez et al., supra note 225, at 580.
294. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 33; Rousseve, supra note 202, at 449.
295. See Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 840.
296. See HINES & MALLEY-MORRISON, supra note 17, at 163 (arguing that isolation
contributes to spousal abuse); see also Leigh Goodmark, The Punishment of Dixie Shanahan: Is
There Justice for Battered Women Who Kill?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 269, 303 (2007) (explaining
that isolation often obstructs a victim's ability to seek help).
297. Mills, supra note 31, at 564; Rousseve, supra note 202, at 449.
298. See Shelly Jackson, Batterer Intervention Programs, in BATTERER INTERVENTION
PROGRAMS: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 1, 1 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/nij/195079.pdf.
299. McFarlane, supra note 152, at 33.
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and causes of IPV.3 00 Others argue that mandatory reporting "force[s] state
actors to treat crimes against women in the same manner in which they treat
other crimes."301
Arguably, assertions of misplaced paternalism may be less compelling to the
extent that "battered spouse syndrome," or an equivalent impairment, has
debilitated the person experiencing IPV. 3 02 Indeed, increased manifestation of
psychiatric disorders, including depression, is reported among some victims of
IPV.3 03 These victims may be less capable of protecting themselves or looking
out for their own interests. 304 As noted, it has been hypothesized that women
300. See id; Walker, supra note 275, at 264.
301. Mills, supra note 31, at 563.
302. See WALKER, supra note 17, at 214-15 (explaining that battered woman syndrome is
present when a woman's behavior focuses on minimizing injuries and preventing death at the
hands of her abuser, rather than exiting the relationship). The presence of a mental illness has
long justified state intervention in other contexts, notably with regard to the appointment of a
guardian or conservator or the initiation of civil commitment. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 370-71 (3d ed. 2007).
303. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Patterns and Mental Health Predictors ofDomestic Violence in
the United States: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey, 24 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
487, 487 (2001); see also LORRAINE M. HARTIK, IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONALITY
CHARACTERISTICS AND SELF-CONCEPT FACTORS OF BATTERED WIVES 41 (1982) (finding that
the battered wives in a study group "appear[ed] to be generally more maladjusted, with higher
scores of psychosis, personality disorder, and neurosis factors. The group show[ed] overall less
integration of personality when compared with the nonbattered group"); Bo Bergman & Bo
Brismar, A 5-Year Follow-up Study of 117 Battered Women, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1486, 1487
(1991) (examining medical records of battered women treated in a hospital over a fifteen-year
period and determining that they were much more likely to seek hospital care for medical,
gynecological, psychiatric, and unspecified disorders, in addition to traumatic injuries); Ann L.
Coker et al., Physical and Mental Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence for Men and
Women, 23 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 260, 260 (2002) ("For both men and women, physical IPV
victimization was associated with increased risk of current poor health; depressive symptoms;
substance use; and developing a chronic disease, chronic mental illness, and injury.").
304. See The Impact of Mental Illness on Society, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, U.S.
GOV'T, http://www.masterdocs.com/fact sheet files/pdf/mental illness.pdf (last visited July 14,
2011) (noting that "disability caused by major depression was found to be equivalent to blindness
or paraplegia" and that "[m]ajor depression is the leading cause of disability (measured by the
number of years lived with a disabling condition) worldwide among persons age 5 and older");
see also Daphna Levinson et al., Associations of Serious Mental Illness with Earnings: Results
from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 197 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 114, 114 (2010)
("Respondents with serious mental illness earned on average a third less than median
earnings...."). But see ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS
OF THE MENTALLY ILL 10 (2002) (arguing that mental illness can compromise an individual's
capacity to make decisions in one context, but does not necessarily undercut the full range of a
person's decision-making capacities). Saks notes that "giving the impaired patient freedom to
choose may bolster her ability to choose well and wisely. The less than fully autonomous agent
may become more autonomous when she is treated as though she were autonomous." Id.
(emphasis in original). For a discussion of the role of mental illness among IPV victims and the
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who experience chronic abuse can develop a condition of "learned
helplessness" over time that prevents them from leaving abusive relationships;
this condition is commonly referred to as "battered woman syndrome" or, most
recently, "battered spouse" or "battered person" syndrome. 305 This syndrome
is now widely viewed as a type of post-traumatic stress disorder, and its
presence has been cited to defend battered spouses (particularly women) who
injure or kill their batterer.306 Although somewhat controversial when offered
as a criminal defense, 30 7 the presence of an IPV-related disabling psychiatric
disorder may provide a stronger rationale for mandatory IPV reporting because
it can explain a battered partner's failure to leave an abusive relationship and
the necessity for intervention.30s
Relatedly, some argue that the extreme domination some abusive individuals
exercise over their victims justifies intervention. 309 Proponents of this line of
reasoning assert that the battered intimate partner is essentially a hostage who
is isolated from ordinary means of obtaining help, particularly when the victim
has dependent children living in the home. 310 Because the abuser may place
the victim in a state of helpless isolation by employing extreme isolation
measures such as hiding car keys, forcing the victim to remain in the house,
need for caution before assuming they lack decision-making capacity, see Thomas L. Hafemeister
& Rebecca Vallas, Intimate Partner Violence and Victims with a Mental Disorder: What to Do
When the Choices You've Got Are Bad Ones and Screaming for Help Seems to Make Them
Worse 5-8 (Aug. 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
305. Karyn M. Plumm & Cheryl A. Terrance, Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of
Expert Testimony and Empathy Induction in the Courtroom, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
186, 187 (2009); accord WALKER, supra note 17, at 10, 214-15; see supra notes 141-42 and
accompanying text.
306. Phyllis Goldfarb, Intimacy and Injury: Legal Interventions for Battered Women, in THE
HANDBOOK OF WOMEN, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 212, 221 (Andrea Barnes ed., 2005);
Loring Jones, Margaret Hughes & Ulrike Unterstaller, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in
Victims of Domestic Violence: A Review of the Research, 2 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 99,
99-100 (2001) (explaining that many battered women need treatment for PTSD, not just
depression or other psychological disorders); Plumm & Terrance, supra note 305, at 187.
307. BARNETT ET AL., supra note 28, at 291-93. But see Thomas L. Hafemeister & Nicole
A. Stockey, Last Stand? The Criminal Responsibility of War Veterans Returning from Iraq and
Afghanistan with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 85 IND. L.J. 87, 131 (2010) ("[Battered spouse
syndrome as a] defense may have also received a more sympathetic response from judges and
jurors because the defendants in these cases often attacked individuals who had verbally or
physically battered them . . . .").
308. But see Mills, supra note 31, at 595 ("Mandatory interventions [presume] state actors
are incapable of distinguishing between battered women who are truly suffering from 'learned
helplessness' and battered women who are capable of making reasoned decisions about which
healing strategies to pursue.").
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and disconnecting the phone line, some believe that reporting laws for IPV are
appropriate.3 11
In attempting to resolve this debate, it is important to recall the two basic
and relatively distinguishable forms of IPV-patriarchal terrorism and
common couple violence-discussed earlier.312 Social-science research
suggests that patriarchal terrorism (more commonly referred to today as
"intimate terrorism" or "intimate partner terrorism") 313 is likely to leave
victims debilitated, isolated, unable to take steps to protect themselves, and at
considerable risk of future harm. 314  In contrast, common couple violence
(more frequently referred to as "situational couple violence" today)315
generally does not leave victims highly vulnerable, subject to escalating
violence, incapable of seeking assistance, or in need of medical treatment.
For incidents of intimate partner terrorism, state intervention may be
particularly appropriate as a means to protect the victims' well-being.3 17 In
these cases, the victims (and any children involved) are at great risk because
they are unlikely to be able to escape, avoid violence, or otherwise exercise
their autonomy. 3 Intervention is typically less imperative for situational
couple violence and is more likely to be counterproductive and contrary to the
victims' wishes.319  For situational couple violence, it will generally be
311. Id; see also Julianne Toohey, Domestic Violence and Rape, 92 MED. CLINICS N. AM.
1239, 1247-48 (2008) (noting that it was not until recently that it was mandatory for healthcare
providers to report child abuse and that the same laws should be enacted for battered women).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
313. See Michael P. Johnson & Janel M. Leone, The Differential Effects of Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women
Survey, 26 J. FAM. ISSUEs 322, 322-23 (2005). This form of IPV is characterized by "systematic
male violence." Kelsey Hegarty, Mary Sheehan & Cynthia Schonfeld, A Multidimensional
Definition of Partner Abuse: Development and Preliminary Validation of the Composite Abuse
Scale, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 399, 400 (1999). It is also "embedded in a larger context of control
tactics." Johnson, supra note 137, at 291; see supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
314. See Johnson, supra note 137, at 287-88; see also Hegarty, Sheehan & Schonfeld, supra
note 313, at 401 ("Partner abuse . . . is best understood as a chronic syndrome that is
characterized not by the episodes of violence that punctuate the problem, but by the emotional
abuse that is used by the perpetrator to maintain control over his partner." (citation omitted)).
315. See Johnson & Leone, supra note 313, at 322-33. This form of IPV is more widespread
but less focused on control as is tends to "erupt[] . . . from particular conflicts rather than from a
general intent to control one's partner." Johnson, supra note 137, at 291. It usually consists of
sporadic minor violence. Hegarty, Sheehan & Schonfeld, supra note 313, at 400; see supra text
accompanying notes 158-62.
316. See Johnson, supra note 137, at 286, 289.
317. See id.
318. See id at 284, 287-88 (explaining that a defining feature of patriarchal terrorism is the
husband's desire to exercise control over his wife by any means possible).
319. See Felson et al., supra note 276, at 620 ("The incentives for calling the police should
vary depending on the seriousness of the assault .... The incentives should be greater when the
assault is more serious, because the desire for protection and retribution should be greater."
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inappropriate to employ highly proactive reporting laws that set a series of
required investigations and responses in motion.320
Although not perfect, medical injuries can be a relatively reliable indicator
of intimate partner terrorism.321 Healthcare providers, particularly those
staffing emergency rooms whose medical assistance may be relatively
unavoidable, can thus be appropriately charged with reporting this form of
IPV.322 In addition, mental-health professionals may receive relatively reliable
evidence of the domination and control associated with intimate partner
terrorism in the course of providing their clients with services and may note a
victim's inability to take protective measures on his or her own behalf.323 Just
as these professionals are charged with reporting child abuse,324 it may be
appro riate to require mental-health professionals to report this form of IPV as
well. 5 As other professionals are less likely to be presented with relatively
reliable evidence of intimate partner terrorism, they should be encouraged to
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson, supra note 137, at 292 ("[A]dvice ... based on a
mistaken assumption of impending terrorism may do some women a great disservice.").
320. Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 866-84 (discussing the many agencies and state actors
that become involved when child abuse reports are filed). This is not to suggest that this form of
IPV is not a concern and that society should not provide services to address it (including readily
available counseling and a diverse range of social services to ameliorate the underlying problems
and conflicts that may have contributed to this violence), but rather that mandatory reporting laws
should instead be focused on detecting intimate partner terrorism.
321. See Johnson, supra note 137, at 287 (discussing the frequency of
intimate-partner-terrorism beatings, which occur on average more than once a week).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 221, 231-36 (discussing how providers are required
to file reports in many states for injuries often associated with IPV).
323. See Jones, Hughes & Unterstaller, supra note 306, at 113-15 (noting that medical and
mental health providers must know "how to intervene" when a victim is experiencing IPV-related
harm).
324. Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 851-52.
325. Mental health providers are already widely required to engage in assessments of future
dangerousness under existing Tarasoff doctrines and child-abuse reporting requirements, and are
routinely employed to provide assessments of decision-making capacity. See MELTON ET AL.,
supra note 302, at 81-82 (noting that "[e]very state .. . provides that clinicians who observe or
suspect child abuse must notify the appropriate agency, even if the information is obtained
through a confidential relationship" and that a clinician who fails to warn the agency of the
danger faces monetary liability (footnotes omitted)); Barry Rosenfeld, The Psychology of
Competence and Informed Consent: Understanding Decision-Making with Regard to Clinical
Research, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 173, 176 (2002) ("[D]ecisions regarding a patient's decision-
making capacity are often heavily influenced by the input and opinions of a psychologist or
psychiatrist. Most judges look toward mental health professionals for guidance to determine
when an impairment exists and the extent of such an impairment." (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted)). But see Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 852 ("One group of professionals for whom
designation as a mandated reporter [of child abuse] has proven particularly controversial involves
mental health professionals." (footnote omitted)).
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report related suspicions that arise in the course of their duties, but should not
be mandated to do so.
The criteria for filing such a report should supplement and generally parallel
the criteria re arding various physical injuries that must already be reported in
most states. 32 They should encompass specific indicators of intimate partner
terrorism, such as non-accidental or intentional injuries, injury caused by the
use of violence, or injuries caused by a weapon. Although more controversial
due to the subjective nature of the assessment, legislators should also consider
including criteria that would mandate reporting when IPV is believed to have
occurred and the victim is deemed incapable of taking actions to curb or avoid
this abuse. However, because of the intrusive and more speculative nature of
these reports, legislators should only require reports when the mandated
reporter has a reasonable personal belief (a relatively high standard) that
327intimate partner terrorism occurred.
The development of screening instruments that can readily and reliably
detect intimate partner terrorism when placed in the hands of these
professionals is a critical component of imposing this latter reporting
requirement. Mere supposition is generally not a sufficient basis to interject
society into the private affairs of intimate partners, particularly when the
purported adult victim has not requested intervention.328 Fortunately, the
development of such instruments has progressed, 32 9 although they need further
refinement before professionals can use them to reliably identify intimate
partner terrorism. Only when a sufficiently reliable instrument is available
should this reporting requirement of a subjective belief of the occurrence of
intimate partner terrorism be imposed.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 231-36.
327. See supra notes 241, 244 and accompanying text.
328. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (invalidating a Texas law
criminalizing homosexual acts and noting that "[Iliberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home . . . . Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct").
329. See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 130, at 1089-90 (studying risk factors of IPV);
Judy C. Chang et al., Partner Violence Screening in Mental Health, 33 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY
58, 62-64 (2011); Hegarty, Sheehan & Schonfeld, supra note 313, at 404-14 (interpreting factors
and abuse categories based on a questionnaire); Demetrios N. Kyriacou et al., Risk Factors for
Injury to Women from Domestic Violence, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1892, 1892-98 (1999); Robert
L. Peralta & Michael F. Fleming, Screening for Intimate Partner Violence in a Primary Care
Setting: The Validity of "Feeling Safe at Home" and Prevalence Results, 16 J. AM. BOARD FAM.
PRAC. 525, 525 (2003); Rebecca F. Rabin et al., Intimate Partner Violence Screening Tools: A
Systematic Review, 36 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 439, 439 (2009); Mieko Yoshihama, Domestic
Violence Against Women of Japanese Descent in Los Angeles: Two Methods of Estimating
Prevalence, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 869, 875-77 (1999).
330. See Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of
Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 574-80 (2010).
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Another key question is who should receive mandated reports of intimate
partner terrorism. As discussed, almost all IPV-related mandated reports are
currently filed with a law-enforcement agency because such agencies can
readily target the abusive individual (often by removing this person from the
home). 331 This is particularly appropriate when mandated reporting is directed
at intimate partner terrorism, where the abusive individual tends to be a chronic
offender and the victim, albeit at considerable risk, is a relatively self-sufficient
adult who will not need to rely on social-service assistance to maintain himself
or herself and any dependent children who live in the home.
At the same time, to the extent that local law-enforcement officials have
proven incapable of adequately and appropriately handling IPV-related
mandated reports, the justification for mandated reporting is considerably
diminished. Proponents should give considerable attention to ensuring that
these officials have the training and resources needed to handle these sensitive
and potentially dangerous situations.
A more difficult issue to address is whether the victim should be allowed to
block mandated reporting of IPV-related intimate partner terrorism. As
discussed, at least three states allow victims to prevent IPV reports from being
filed.333  But because victims of intimate partner terrorism may be under
considerable pressure from their abusive partner to block these reports and may
be otherwise unable to protect themselves,334 allowing these victims to halt
mandated filings may be problematic. However, societal intervention over the
objection of the person who is the purported beneficiary carries a considerable
risk of harm to the victim, and is generally not permitted, absent procedural
checks to respect and protect the person's autonomy and dignity. 35 These
331. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 269-70, 276 and accompanying text.
335. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[O]ur notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom
and self-determination . . . ."); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("A finding of
'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will and keeping
him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement . . . . May the State confine the mentally ill
merely to ensure them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community? ...
[T]he mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to
the comforts of an institution."); MELTON ET AL., supra note 302, at 368 (noting that "mental
disability does not, in and of itself, equate with or even imply incompetency" and that mentally
disabled persons also "have the right to self-determination absent compelling reasons to the
contrary"); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, ARTI RAI & RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 924 (5th ed. 2009) ("We value autonomy
because we assume people are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests and because, even
if they are not, taking away their opportunity to decide would show insufficient respect for the
person."); Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
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procedural checks are particularly appropriate for victims of IPV and for
individuals with a psychiatric disorder-two populations that have historically
experienced deprivations of liberty and subjugations of their rights, ostensibly
to promote and protect their interests.336
As a result, it seems appropriate for a mandated reporter to first inform the
victim (when possible) that a report of intimate partner terrorism is going to be
filed, thereby giving the victim an opportunity to refute what appears to be
evidence of this type of IPV. However, because batterers who engage in
intimate partner terrorism can effectively deny their victims an opportunity to
protect themselves,337 these victims should not be able to block report filings if
a mandated reporter remains convinced that intimate partner terrorism is
occurring. Further, the mandated reporter should not be expected to provide
this notice to the victim if the reporter does not have a reasonable and timely
opportunity to meet with the victim alone, or if circumstances exist that place
either the victim or the reporter at risk, such as the abuser being present. It is
recognized, however, that this scenario may leave mandated reporters in an
uncomfortable and delicate situation that leaves them uncertain whether to file
these reports; this scenario is particularly likely if the victim steadfastly denies
IPV despite strong evidence to the contrary. As a result, it is imperative to
devise appropriate screening mechanisms and to protect mandated reporters
with good-faith immunity.33
REv. 1190, 1231-32 (1974) ("Requiring a competent individual to accept treatment for his own
benefit should be viewed as an additional deprivation of liberty rather than as a benefit. . . .").
336. Hafemeister & Vallas, supra note 304, at 52 ("Crafting an appropriate societal response
to meet the needs of individuals with a mental disorder who suffer IPV is an incredibly
challenging and nuanced task. Any response needs to recognize the centuries of discrimination,
stigma, and second-class status that individuals with a mental disorder have experienced. It is
imperative that the dignity and autonomy of such individuals be respected whenever possible, and
that they be encouraged to assume responsibility for their well-being and recovery. They are not
the equivalent of children, and although their cognitive, volitional, and emotional capacities may
be impaired, unless they have been determined to lack decision-making capacity, their
relationship choices should be respected. Like most people, their interpersonal relationships tend
to be relatively complex and of great, if not greater, importance to them. Further, respecting the
choices they make with regard to these relationships may be integrally linked to their mental
health."); From Privileges to Rights: People Labeled with Psychiatric Disabilities Speak for
Themselves, NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (Jan. 20, 2000), http://www.ncd.gov/publications
/2000/Jan202000 ("People with psychiatric disabilities are routinely deprived of their rights in a
way no other disability group has been . . . . The testimony [received] pointed to the inescapable
fact that people with psychiatric disabilities are systematically and routinely deprived of their
rights, and treated as less than full citizens or full human beings."); see supra notes 266-72 and
accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 309-17 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text (discussing good-faith reporting
requirements).
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Notwithstanding the justifications for implementing mandated reporting of
intimate partner terrorism, exclusive reliance on this mechanism in lieu of
social services should be avoided. Society, unfortunately, tends to address a
range of social ills by relying heavily on law enforcement-a relatively
well-funded and preexisting mechanism-notwithstanding that law-
enforcement officers and others caution that these extended duties are outside
their expertise, may distract them from their established duties, and may leave
them unable to accomplish what society expects of them. 339 Mandated IPV
reporting to law-enforcement officials should not be viewed as a panacea for
combating IPV. Even when officers receive appropriate training for IPV
issues, their efforts should be accompanied by a range of services designed to
assist the victim, so that responses do not singularly focus on punishing the
offender and fail to provide other forms of assistance that may be more
productive. 340  Finally, the risks and adverse consequences associated with
situational couple violence should not be overlooked, with needed services
made readily available to these victims as well.
V. OTHER EFFORTS TO COMBAT IPV
Whether the result of mandatory reports or other mechanisms, the
involvement of the criminal justice system tends to be the next step in society's
339. See Carolyn Hoyle & Andrew Sanders, Police Response to Domestic Violence, 40 BRIT.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 14, 27 (2000); Morley & Mullender, supra note 4, at 276 ("Only a very small
proportion of women see the police as the best means of stopping men's violence; many more
believe provision of shelters and public education to be more desirable."); Lawrence W. Sherman
& Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc.
REV. 261, 262 (1984) ("Police have been typically reluctant to make arrests for domestic violence
... unless victims demand an arrest, the suspect insults the officer, or other factors are present."
(citations omitted)); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law ofMisdemeanor Domestic Violence,
1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47 (1992) ("[P]olice are largely indifferent to
domestic violence, and . . . attach to it a very low priority."); see supra text accompanying notes
257-60. But see R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Evaluating Criminal Justice
Interventions for Domestic Violence, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 252, 266 (2000) (stating that "[a]ll
forms of criminal justice intervention appear to have some effect on the reduction and/or
elimination of men's use of violence in intimate relationships," but noting that judicially
mandated programs are more often "associated with an elimination of violence").
340. Hoyle & Sanders, supra note 339, at 27, 32 ("[A]rrest and prosecution can give victims
the confidence to 'do something' about violence, . . . but it may have little or no effect unless it is
coupled with further, more directly supportive, action."); see also Larry Bennett et al.,
Effectiveness of Hotline, Advocacy, Counseling, and Shelter Services for Victims of Domestic
Violence: A Statewide Evaluation, 19 3. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 815, 817 (2004) (reporting
that hotline, counseling, advocacy, and shelter programs all provided positive assistance for
domestic-violence victims); Mangai Natarajan, Women Police Stations as a Dispute Processing
System: The Tamil Nadu Experience in Dealing with Dowry-Related Domestic Violence Cases,
16 J. WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 87, 104 (2005) (finding that dispute-resolution techniques can help
resolve disputes between intimate partners).
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response to IPV. 341 This section describes various roles the criminal justice
system has played in conjunction with IPV and evaluates their effectiveness.
A. PENAL PROVISIONS AND GREATER INVOL VEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
After initially focusing on opening shelters, safe houses, and
domestic-violence hotlines, recent efforts to combat IPV have shifted to
increase the involvement of the criminal justice system. 342 These efforts have
included utilizing the criminal law to both punish and deter abusive
individuals, as well as to provide protection to abused domestic partners.343
Supporters seek to employ the criminal justice system's normative function to
send a powerful messae that IPV is unacceptable, while giving victims access
to needed resources. Measures include enacting laws to facilitate the
prosecution and punishment of domestic violence 345 by removing impediments
to prosecuting "marital rape," 346  criminalizing stalking, enforcing
mandatory-arrest laws, 348 implementing "no-drop" prosecution policies,
mandating IPV training and guidelines for prosecutors, police, and judges,350
creating mechanisms to monitor and control sex offenders (such as
341. See supra text accompanying notes 196-216.
342. Murphy, supra note 97, at 500-01. Some believe that this shift grew as the political and
legal clout of women-the most frequent target of IPV-increased. Id. at 501; see also Fran S.
Danis, The Criminalization of Domestic Violence: What Social Workers Need to Know, 48 Soc.
WORK 237, 237 (2003) ("During the past 20 years, the social science and criminal justice fields
developed interventions designed to deter abuse and rehabilitate abusers so they will not abuse
again. Central to these interventions has been the increasing role of the criminal justice system to
enforce laws that regard the use of violence against one's intimate partner as a criminal act.").
343. Murphy, supra note 97, at 501-02.
344. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1897-98 (1996); Elizabeth L. MacDowell,
When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts and Court Pluralism, 21 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. (forthcoming Spring 2011) (manuscript at 10-11).
345. See EVE CLARIAN ZAMORA, BATTERED WOMEN'S JUSTICE PROJECT, ENHANCED
PENALTIES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1-4 (2005), available at http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp
/articles/EnhancedPenalties_2005.pdf (discussing enhanced state penalties for domestic violence
offenses as a deterrent to this behavior).
346. See infra Part V.B.
347. See infra Part V.C.
348. See infra Part V.D.
349. See infra Part V.E.
350. Murphy, supra note 97, at 502-03. Some states require police agencies to create
guidelines for arrests and investigations of abuse, whereas others mandate victim assistance and
protection. See generally, e.g., N.J. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
GUIDELINES ON POLICE RESPONSE PROCEDURES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES (2004),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/3dvpolrs.pdf.
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sex-offender registration and notification and sexually violent predator
laws),351 and enhancing the enforceability of protective orders. 352
These efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system's response to IPV,
however, have also raised concerns. Critics have argued that a
criminal-justice-based approach will have a disparate impact on offenders in
poor and minority communities, who are more likely to be subject to
prosecution and conviction in general, notwithstanding the society-wide nature
of IPV.3 53 Additionally, although strongly disputed, some scholars assert that
the increased criminalization of domestic violence is mainly symbolic and
unlikely to bring about substantive change, with the basic acts underlying IPV,
such as assault and battery, already being illegal.354 More troubling is a lack of
351. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). In the 1990s, the United
States saw a large increase in the number of laws with an emphasis on sex-offender registration,
community notification, and sexually violent predator civil commitment. Lucy Berliner, Sex
Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 NW. U.L. REv. 1203, 1211-12, 1216 (1998); Samuel Jan
Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric
Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 75-76 (2000). These laws
have both supporters and detractors. Compare Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Department of
Justice Announces Proposed National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification,
and $25 Million in Grants (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/May
/07_ag_366.html (reviewing the guidelines' direction on the implementation of victim-
notification and offender-registration requirements, articulating that the guidelines will help to
"strengthen[] law enforcement's ability to track and monitor sex offenders"), with ERIC S. JANUS,
FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA'S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE
STATE 3 (2006) (arguing that legislation such as civil-commitment laws and Megan's law are
"well intentioned ... [but] ill-conceived, bad policy" because such laws are both ineffective and
distort society's understanding of sexual violence). The resolution of this debate, however, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
352. Murphy, supra note 97, at 502.
353. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 801 (2001) ("[P]olice often exercise their
power in ways that reinforce . . . the disadvantages experienced by members of poor and minor
communities . . . ."); see also DAG MACLEOD ET AL., BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEMS IN
CALIFORNIA: AN EVALUATION 54-55 (2009), available at http://courts.ca.gov/documents
/batterer-execsummary.pdf (finding men sentenced to batterer intervention programs are
disproportionately poor and Hispanic); Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy,
Black Women, and Feminist Legal Theory, II CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 323 (2005) (noting
that minorities fear that mandatory-arrest and "no drop" policies will result in "disparate policing,
racial profiling, and police brutality").
354. Burke, supra note 20, at 561-64; see also Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating Types of
Domestic Violence: Implications for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REv. 1379, 1415 (2005) (noting
that statutory definitions of IPV are inadequate because they do not target aspects other than
physical abuse). Supporters of these efforts counter that there is a significant difference between
violent acts committed by an intimate partner and those committed by a stranger. See
Tuerkheimer, supra note 274, at 617-78. They assert that prior to these criminal code additions,
existing law only punished isolated incidents of physical violence, such as battery, and failed to
adequately address the broad range of other behaviors associated with IPV or its debilitating
effects on victims, such as psychological and economic control, intimidation, domination,
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evidence that these measures have been effective; one widely cited review
asserts that "research and evaluation ... have generated weak or inconsistent
evidence of deterrent effects on either repeat victimization or repeat offending.
For every study that shows promising results, one or more show either no
effect or even negative results that increase the risks to victims." 355  The
ineffectiveness of these measures has been attributed, in part, to the complexity
of the underlying behavior, the relationships involved, and the challenge of
implementing and applying an appropriate response.356 In general, the
criminalization of domestic violence and IPV in particular has engendered
considerable debate.
B. Removal of "Marital Rape" Immunity
One IPV-related area of criminal prosecution that has been particularly
controversial is marital rape. 357  Until only recently, many states did not
consider nonconsensual sex within a marriage to be a criminal offense based
on the premise that marriage implied an "irrevocable consent to sex" with
isolation, fear, psychological abuse, and coercion. See id. at 618; see also Tamara L. Kuennen,
Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 8-10 (2007).
355. JEFFREY FAGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 1 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/
crimdom.pdf, see also Danis, supra note 342, at 242 ("Research addressing the effectiveness of
the criminalization of domestic violence has yielded inconsistent and inconclusive results."); id.
at 239 ("Serious unintended consequences can occur as a result of police interventions, including
retaliation against victims by their abusers, dual arrests, and the potential lack of cultural
sensitivity to victims and perpetrators." (citing FAGAN, supra)); Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence
W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic Violence?, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS
WORK? 43, 43 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) ("[Tjhe movement to arrest
batterers may be doing more harm than good. Research in six cities testing the 'arrest works best'
premise in deterring future assaults has produced complex and conflicting results. Police and
policymakers are now faced with the dilemma that arrest may help some victims at the expense of
others and that arrest may assist the victim in the short term but facilitate further violence in the
long term.").
356. FAGAN, supra note 355, at 1 ("Domestic violence and partner assault are complex
behaviors. The range of sanctions for offenders has been limited, their deterrent effects mitigated
by social and contextual factors, and their implementation constrained by practical operational
contingencies."); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1507 (1998) ("Unless we take a harder look at
punishment in domestic violence cases, we fool ourselves into thinking that well-intentioned
arrest and prosecution policies alone will sufficiently curb domestic violence."); Lawrence W.
Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of
Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680, 680 (1992) (finding that arrests did not reduce
domestic-violence incidents and questioning their effect on deterrence).
357. See Leonard Kerp & Cheryl Kerp, Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flow . .. Infliction of
Emotional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389, 391 (1994).
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one's marital partner, thus rendering marital rape a legal impossibility.358 Due,
in part, to reports that "one in seven married or formerly married women [had]
been raped by her husband," states began to eliminate the marital rape
exception from their criminal laws during the 1980s. 59  By 2005, all fifty
states had criminalized marital rape.360
However, most states continue to either "criminalize a narrower range of
offenses if committed within marriage, subject the marital rape they do
recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create special procedural hurdles for
marital rape prosecutions." 361 For example, in South Carolina, unless a
married couple lives apart, one partner cannot be guilty of criminal sexual
conduct towards the other.362  Other policies adopted by states that weaken
their responses to marital rape include establishing shorter statutes of
limitations for marital rape363 and requiring a showing of actual force.364 In
short, pursuing a criminal prosecution for marital rape is still difficult in many
jurisdictions. 35
358. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1498, 1533 (1993) [hereinafter Developments].
359. Id
360. Rousseve, supra note 202, at 435.
361. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1373, 1375 (2000) (citations omitted); see also Developments, supra note 358, at 1533-34
(finding that only a few states have really abolished the distinction between marital rape and rape
entirely, as most states have lower levels of punishment for marital rape).
362. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (2003 & Supp. 2010). The conduct must also constitute
first or second-degree criminal sexual conduct and must be reported within thirty days of its
occurrence to an appropriate law-enforcement authority. Id.; see also Developments, supra note
358, at 1534 (noting that in some states marital rape cannot be prosecuted unless the couple is
separated); see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
363. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615.
364. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99. For a summary of the barriers to marital rape
prosecution and a listing of state statutes, see Morgan Lee Woolley, Note, Marital Rape: A
Unique Blend of Domestic Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
269, 282-84 (2007).
365. Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction,
43 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 351, 360 (1995) (noting that convictions for marital rape are sparse); see
also Woolley, supra note 364, at 270 ("[M]arital rape is a unique problem that encompasses both
physical violence and the psychological trauma of being raped by someone who has taken
marriage vows to love and honor his or her spouse. Thus a comprehensive framework for marital
rape must include aspects of the emotional and physical cruelty, as well as the exposure of family
privacy, that often accompanies domestic violence. Additionally marital rape laws must include a
reassessment of traditional notions that marriage represents implied consent and the unique
difficulties of evidentiary proof in prosecuting marital rape.").
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C. Stalking Statutes
Another area in which IPV has attracted greater criminal-law attention
involves so-called stalking statutes. Some studies have shown that
approximately half of the women who leave violent relationships are later
366stalked by the abusive individual3. Additionally, ninety percent of all
females killed by husbands or boyfriends were stalked for a period of time
367before they were killed. One report revealed that "an estimated 3.4 million
persons [in the United States] age 18 or older were victims of stalking" over a
twelve-month period, which is 14 of every 1000 adults. 3 68 Almost half of the
victims face a minimum of one unwanted contact each week, and eleven
percent experience the stalking for five or more years. 369  Stalking can be
emotionally terrorizing to victims, especially as it is often associated with acts
of physical violence.3' 0 As a result, many victims constantly worry that the
stalker may be nearby and ready to harm them. 371 This fear can disrupt the
victim's life and lead him or her to avoid answering phone calls, quit his or her
job, or relocate to a different residence. 372
In the 1980s and 1990s, celebrity stalking garnered considerable media
attention.373 The existing legal structure provided little real protection to
victims, 374 as the burden of obtaining and enforcing a protective order fell
largely on the victim. 375  Additionally, criminal statutes originally did not
376permit prosecution until the victim was actually physically assaulted. The
366. Developments, supra note 358, at 1534.
367. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 226.
368. KATRINA BAUM ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2001), available at http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/stalkingvictimization.pdf.
369. Id Approximately 2.4 million individuals are victims of harassment. Id at 2.
370. Developments, supra note 358, at 1534; see also BAUM ETAL., supra note 368, at 6-7 &
tbl.10 (noting that nine percent of stalking victims feared they would die as a result, twenty-nine
percent feared the stalking would never stop, and more than half "feared bodily harm to
themselves, their child, or another family member"). Twelve percent of surveyed stalking victims
were hit, slapped, or knocked down; six percent had a family member attacked; almost 139,000
victims were attacked with a weapon; and nearly 279,000 victims were injured in an attack, with
approximately one in five sustaining serious injuries. Id at 8.
371. Susan Bernstein, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence
Victims?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 525, 525 (1993).
372. Id at 531; see also BAUM ET AL., supra note 368, at 6 (finding that 21.6% of stalking
victims changed their daily schedules, 18.1% stayed with family members, 16.7% took leave
from work or school, 13.4% changed their travel routes, 9.5% left or changed their job or school,
and one in seven moved).
373. See Rende R6mkens, Protecting Prosecution: Exploring the Powers of Law in an
Intervention Program for Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 160, 162 (2006).
374. Bernstein, supra note 371, at 539.
375. Id Furthermore, in some cases the victim is not certain as to the identity of the stalker,
which makes it particularly difficult to obtain a protective order. Id.
376. Id at 525-26.
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first anti-stalking statute to address this issue was enacted in California in 1990
after the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer.377 In an effort to protect
stalking victims, a 1992 federal task force advocated that states criminalize
stalking as a felony and created a model stalking statute.378 By 1994,
thirty-one states had "stalking statutes" that criminalized stalking behavior,379
and ten years later stalking was a crime in all fifty states, as well as a federal
crime.38
However, a recent national survey of stalking victims determined that
although 41.0% of female victims and 36.8% of male victims reported this
behavior to police, nearly 20% said the police did not act on their report.
When asked why they thought the police took no action, 28.6% said they
believed it was because the police did not want to get involved, 17.7% said
they thought the police had no legal authority to act, 16.2% thought the police
were inefficient or ineffective, 13.2% thought the police did not believe them,
and 11.2% felt the police did not have enough evidence.3 82  After first
reporting the stalking behavior to the police, 48.9% of the victims said the
situation stayed the same and 22.9% said the situation worsened. Charges
384
were filed in 21.0% of the cases. Overall, only 45.7% of the victims were
satisfied with the criminal-justice outcome.385
377. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 230.
378. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis ofStatutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 874-75 (1993).
379. Developments, supra note 358, at 1534-35.
380. BAUM ET AL., supra note 368, at I ("The federal government, all 50 states, the District
of Columbia, and U.S. Territories have enacted laws making stalking a criminal act, although the
elements defining the acts of stalking differ across states . . . ."); Stalking Fact Sheet, STALKING
RESOURCE CENTER (2004), http://www.ncvc.org/src/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer
/Download.aspxnz?DocumentlD=38733 (last visited July 19, 2011); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261A
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2010); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 256, § 43 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:12-10 (West
2005 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2011). The federal
government adopted an anti-stalking law because it viewed state laws as often inconsistent and
underfunded. Belinda Wiggins, Stalking Humans: Is There a Need for Federalization of
Anti-stalking Laws in Order to Prevent Recidivism in Stalking?, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067,
1091 (2000). Stalking statutes have provided police a way to punish offenders and judges a
means to detain offenders (by refusing to release them on bail) before they actually harm
someone. Bernstein, supra note 371, at 545.
381. BAUM ET AL., supra note 368, at 9 tbl. 14.
382. Id. at 14 tbl.16.
383. Id. at 15 tbl.17.
384. Id. at 15 tbl.18.
385. Id. at 15 tbl.19.
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D. Mandatory-Arrest Laws
In 1984, researchers Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk compared the
deterrent effects of three different police approaches to IPV in Minneapolis: (1)
arrest, (2) mediation, and (3) requiring the batterer to leave the house for at
least eight hours.386 The study reported that arrest was the best deterrent of
future violence.387 In response to these findings, the U.S. Attorney General
urged that arrest be the standard response to domestic assault. Eight years
later, however, only seven states had enacted mandatory IPV arrest laws.389
It was not until 1994, the year of the much-publicized murder of Nicole
Brown Simpson, that many states passed mandatory-arrest laws.390  It was
asserted at the time that the acquittal of O.J. Simpson in this case sent a two-
fold message: that the criminal justice system offered no protection for victims
of domestic violence and that batterers go unpunished.391 This perception may
have increased the push for mandatory-arrest laws to enhance the punishment
of batterers and the protection of IPV victims.392 As one researcher
commented, "[w]ith the death of Nicole Brown, politicians raced to the state
house to invoke domestic violence laws, jumping on the 'zero tolerance'
bandwagon." 393
Before mandatory-arrest laws, most state laws already permitted police
officers to make an arrest without a warrant when they had probable cause to
suspect domestic violence; 394 however, mandatory-arrest laws were unique
because they removed the officer's discretion to execute an arrest under these
circumstances. 395 Currently, twenty-nine states mandate arrest when there is
probable cause to believe that the suspect has violated a protective order.396
386. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects ofArrest for
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261, 261-63 (1984).
387. Id. at 261.
388. Developments, supra note 358, at 1536.
389. See Miccio, supra note 61, at 239 n.2 (noting "Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin" had passed such legislation).
390. Id at 240.
391. Edmonds, supra note 84.
392. See Miccio, supra note 61, at 238.
393. Id
394. Han, supra note 140, at 174.
395. Id (noting officers might otherwise be "reluctant" to make such arrests). But see Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-61 (2005) (holding that mandatory-arrest statutes
do not prevent officers from declining to arrest an individual).
396. Miccio, supra note 61, at 239 n.2; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(2) (2010);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (West 2008 & Supp. 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5
(2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(2) (LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79(E)
(2004 & Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 764.15b (West 2000 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011);
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Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia mandate arrest or have a
preferred arrest policy in cases of domestic violence, regardless of whether a
protective order has been violated.397
Mandatory-arrest laws have been extremely controversial. Supporters of
mandatory-arrest laws contend that such laws force police officers to take IPV
seriously398 and undercut stereotypical views that otherwise downplay the
gravity of IPV.399 They point to data indicating that these laws have resulted in
an increase of IPV arrests400 and assert that a mandatory-arrest policy
establishes that the IPV victim is the "victim of a crime, not ... merely another
guilty participant in a battling family."401 One commentator insists that these
laws were enacted because IPV victims were not receiving adequate
law-enforcement protection and "[t]here was no other alternative" to ensure
402that would change4. It has also been asserted that mandating arrest eliminates
invidious racial discrimination previously associated with officer discretion,
because mandatory-arrest means that every batterer will be treated similarly.403
However, critics of mandatory-arrest laws say that they disempower victims
of IPV by taking away their ability to decide whether the batterer should be
removed or punished, which implies that victims are too weak, helpless, or
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3)(a) (West 2006 & Supp 2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(2) (West
2003 & Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-928 (LexisNexis 2005); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.070(1) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:9(1)(a)
(LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a)(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-13-6(C) (2006 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(b)(i) (McKinney
2004 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4.1(b) (2009 & Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-11(1) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.310(3)-(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113(a) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(b)(1)(iv) (2002); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.l(1)-(2) (2004 & Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a)
(2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-36-2.4(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.31.100(2)(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1001(a) (LexisNexis
2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(7)(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010). Ohio suggests, but does not
mandate, arrest in this situation. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
397. Miccio, supra note 61, at 239 n.2 (listing the state statutes).
398. Mills, supra note 31, at 563 (asserting that IPV by males had been sanctioned by society
before mandatory-arrest provisions).
399. See Miccio, supra note 61, at 240-41; Mills, supra note 31, at 565 (arguing
mandatory-arrest laws were embraced by feminists to call attention to state actors who were not
sensitive to the needs of battered women).
400. See, e.g., Frances Lawrenz, James F. Lembo & Thomas Schade, Time Series Analysis of
the Effect of a Domestic Violence Directive on the Number of Arrests Per Day, 16 J. CRIM. JUST.
493, 496 fig.2 (1988); Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic
Violence, but Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 558-59.
401. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 143.
402. Miccio, supra note 61, at 279.
403. Mills, supra note 31, at 564.
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incapable to make these decisions themselves. 40 4 Hence, some commentators
assert that mandatory-arrest laws are more likely to undercut a victim's
situation than to strengthen it.405 Furthermore, mandatory arrests may actually
increase the incidence of violence experienced by the victims of IPV,406 as
mandatory arrests may trigger retaliation by the batterer or cause victims to
become reluctant to seek help in the future, thereby perpetuating the cycle of
violence.407 Additionally, documenting the existence of violence within the
family pursuant to a mandatory arrest may result in child protective services
removing children from the home, which could add to the anguish of IPV
victims and make them even more reluctant to report abuse.408
Critics also argue that mandatory-arrest policies harm victims in other ways.
For example, they have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of
women arrested. Women currently account for up to twenty-five percent of
IPV arrests nationally,410 but it is estimated that these women were the primary
404. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 823-24 (2007)
(proposing that feminists stop advocating for mandatory policies because it leads to the
objectification of women); Han, supra note 140, at 175 ("By removing choice from the
victim, ... the state replicates the control wielded by the batterer.").
405. See Radha lyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence? Evidence
from Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 85, 88-89 (2009); Miccio,
supra note 61, at 242.
406. Mills, supra note 31, at 565-67 (citing LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 3 (1992)). But see Matthew J. Carlson, Susan D.
Harris & George W. Holden, Protective Orders and Domestic Violence: Risk Factors for
Re-Abuse, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 205, 218 (1999) ("[N]either arrest nor permanent [protective
order] status were significantly related to the risk of post-[protective order] abuse.").
407. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 163 (explaining that after a more aggressive
arrest policy was instituted, there were significantly fewer calls made to the police).
408. Han, supra note 140, at 176. Mandatory arrest may also result in the removal of the
person who has been providing critical financial support for the family, providing an additional
basis for the removal of the children from the home. Id. The presence of children may also
exacerbate the likelihood of abuse reoccurring after law-enforcement intervention. Carlson,
Harris & Holden, supra note 406, at 217-18 ("The odds of re-abuse for women who have
biological children with their abusive partner was nearly four times higher than for other
couples . . . .").
409. See Carol Bohmer et al., Domestic Violence Law Reforms: Reactions from the Trenches,
29 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 71, 78 (2002) ("One Ohio study indicates that, while arrest rates in
general have risen 142% in the year since the implementation of preferred arrest policies, the
increase in arrests of women has been 428%." (citation omitted)); see also David Hirschel et al.,
Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest
Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 256, 259-61 (2007) (finding higher dual arrest
rates in states employing mandatory-arrest laws).
410. Brian Renauer & Kris Henning, Investigating Intersections Between Gender and
Intimate Partner Violence Recidivism, 41 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 99, 102-03 (2006).
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411
aggressors in only thirteen percent of these cases. Mandatory arrest often
leads to dual arrests because police cannot identify who the initial or primary
aggressor was, a situation that is particularly likely when the woman acted out
of self-defense.412 Ironically, victims who most fear for their safety or the
safety of their children are the most likely to respond to IPV in a way that
increases the likelihood of a dual arrest.4 13
The arrest of a victim may have a number of negative consequences,
including ineligibility for future services and support, disempowerment, and
re-victimization. 414 The potential of a dual arrest may further make victims of
IPV reluctant to call the police for fear that, after both parents are arrested,
their children will be left without support and forced to enter foster care.415 In
fact, one study conducted after a mandatory-arrest law was implemented found
that 68.4% of women interviewed would not call law enforcement as a result
of this law.416
In general, critics of mandator -arrest policies assert that the costs of this
approach outweigh its benefits. They claim that the original Minneapolis
study was flawed,418 contending that attempts to replicate this study yield
411. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE
STATISTICS: INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 13 (2005), available
at http://dsusa02.degreesearchusa.com/t.pl/000000A/http/bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvs
02.pdf.
412. Dennis M. Cullinane, Offender-Victim Body Mass Ratio and the Decision to Arrest in
Cases ofintimate Partner Violence, 49 MED. SC. L. 200, 201 (2009); Wanless, supra note 400, at
565 (explaining some police officers become confused when identifying the initial aggressor); see
also Peter S. Hovmand et al., Victims Arrested for Domestic Violence: Unintended Consequences
of Arrest Policies, 25 SYS. DYNAMICS REV. 161, 172 (2009) (suggesting that having victims
teach and work with police officers may help the officers to differentiate between self-defense
and the initiating aggression).
413. Hovmand et al., supra note 412, at 172.
414. Id. at 166.
415. Id (noting that once arrested, IPV victims often risk losing child custody).
416. GIGI STAFNE, WiS. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE WISCONSIN
MANDATORY ARREST MONITORING PROJECT: FINAL REPORT 38 (1989).
417. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 161-65.
418. Richard J. Gelles, Constraints Against Family Violence: How Well Do They Work?, in
Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 355, at 34-35 (asserting that the
study may not have been based on a random assignment of officers, that the results came from a
few officers in only two precincts, and that there was a substantial amount of missing data).
Indeed, five subsequent studies, conducted shortly thereafter and intended to replicate the
Minneapolis study, reached conflicting results. Developments, supra note 358, at 1539. Two of
the studies confirmed the results of the Minneapolis study, whereas the other three found that
arrest correlated with an increase in subsequent violence. Id Moreover, despite their intent to
provide replications, the experimental designs of these five studies actually varied considerably
from the Minneapolis study, which may help explain the different results. Id.
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much lower or no correlation between arrest and deterrence, 419 and that
mandator 7 arrest can be counterproductive by actually increasing the rate of
violence. o Police officers themselves are hesitant to adopt new policies, such
as mandatory arrest, when they do not conform with their own beliefs.42 1
Other commentary suggests that a policy of presumptive, rather than
422
mandatory, arrest provides a better vehicle. Presumptive arrest policies
generally require a law-enforcement official who responds to a domestic
violence call to make an arrest, unless the victim expressly states that an arrest
is not desired and the officer determines that the victim is safe.423  This
alternative ensures that law enforcement can exercise needed discretion by
allowing an officer to consider the victim's desire while reaching his or her
final decision. 424
E. No-Drop Prosecutions
As jurisdictions increasingly implemented mandatory-arrest policies,
"prosecutors [began] to use a policy . .. referred to as 'mandatory or no-drop
prosecution,"' which requires prosecutors to pursue domestic-violence cases
425
even if the victim opposes prosecution4. These laws were crafted in response
to prosecutors' discretionary power and tendency to not pursue
domestic-violence cases426 and judges' propensity to minimize and dismiss
427them. Many prosecutors fail to prosecute these cases because they believe
419. See Franklyn W. Dunford, The Measurement of Recidivism in Cases of Spouse Assault,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 120, 122 (1992) ("[T]he differences [in the Omaha Experiment]
were counter to those found for the Minneapolis Experiment."); Gelles, supra note 418, at 35
(explaining that the results from experiments in Charlotte, Milwaukee, and Omaha all found that
arrest was not a deterrent, unlike the Minneapolis study); see also Richard A. Berk et al., A
Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 170, 182-84 (comparing the Milwaukee, Omaha, and Colorado Springs
experiments, finding little difference in the effect of arrest versus no arrest in most cases).
420. Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The
Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 138-39 (1992)
("[D]omestic violence ... arrests with brief custody increase the frequency of domestic violence
in the long run among offenders in general.").
421. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 158-59.
422. Han, supra note 140, at 185-86 (explaining how presumptive arrest is an appropriate
"compromise among the various conflicting theories of arrest in cases of domestic violence").
423. Id. at 186.
424. Id. (noting that "discretion is held by the police officer, who makes the final decision").
425. Mills, supra note 31, at 561 (stating that the prosecution policy was a "natural
extension" of mandatory-arrest policy).
426. See Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution ofDomestic Violence Cases:
Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 865-67 (1994). In
jurisdictions without no-drop policies, "prosecutors dispose of approximately fifty to eighty
percent of cases by dropping the charges," whereas jurisdictions with no-drop policies report case
dismissal rates of only ten to thirty-four percent. Id at 857.
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that the violence was difficult to prove or trivial, "that victims are somehow to
blame," or that "the victim will ultimately change her mind about
prosecution."428 Indeed, many victims of IPV choose not to prosecute for
various reasons, including the prospect of reconciling with their assailant.429
Proponents of a no-drop prosecution policy argue that prosecution should
continue regardless of the victim's desire or willingness to cooperate,430 as
"domestic violence should be considered as a crime against the public order of
the state," and that without punishment, these batterers are likely to strike
again, towards either the same victim or another.43'
"Hard" and "soft" no-drop policies are the two basic types of mandatory
prosecution policies.432 Hard no-drop policies "require prosecutors to pursue
cases regardless of the victim's recantations or protestations and some require
victims to testify by issuing subpoenas" or other coercive measures.433 Soft
no-drop policies encourage prosecution and victim participation, but allow
prosecutors more discretion regarding whether to pursue a case and the extent
of victim participation required.434  Although victims of IPV have greater
decision-making authority under a soft policy regarding their level of
participation, the decision to proceed with a case remains with the prosecutor,
who acts on behalf of the state and its need for public order.435 As of 2003,
twenty-six percent of prosecutors' offices in major urban areas had adopted
some type of no-drop policy. 436
Mandatory-arrest laws and no-drop prosecution policies are supported by
similar arguments.437 Proponents argue that such policies are necessary for
public safety,438 for protecting the victims,439 and for preventing the batterer
427. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 96.
428. Corsilles, supra note 426, at 867.
429. Id at 865.
430. Bohmer et al., supra note 409, at 75-77 (also explaining that "[a] recognition of the
behavior as criminal is an important part of obtaining the [victim's] cooperation in the
prosecution").
431. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 177-78.
432. Mordini, supra note 58, at 318.
433. Id. (stating that "the victim's decision-making ability ends" once the charges are filed).
434. Id.
435. Han, supra note 140, at 187-88.
436. Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 373-74
(2003).
437. Compare Mordini, supra note 58, at 315-16 (describing proponents' arguments in favor
of mandatory arrest, which include providing notification to the offender that society will not
tolerate abuse and indicating to the victim that society is a support system for him or her in
finding an end to the abuse), with id. at 319 (reviewing arguments in favor of mandatory
prosecution, which include establishing that abuse is a social issue, not just a personal issue, and
indicating that society will help the victim in finding an end to the abuse).
438. Id. at 319.
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440from pressuring the victim to drop the complaint. Additionally, proponents
assert that no-drop policies inform society and notify batterers that IPV is in
fact a serious crime and that batterers will be punished for their actions.441
No-drop policies have also been supported because they "close the gap
between the statutor4 promise of protection for battered [victims] and the
justice they receive. Finally, some advocates contend that no-drop policies
allow victims to disclaim responsibility for prosecution, which may convince
some batterers to quit harassing and coercing their victims as they do not have
the ability to drop the charges. 4 3
Critics of no-drop policies, however, believe they disempower victims b
removing their decision-making autonomy,444 coercing their participation,
446
and impeding their emotional recovery. Further, critics contend that victims
who perceive that they have little control over what happens in court are likely
to be less satisfied with the outcome and may avoid calling for help in the
future when the need for intervention may be more acute. 47  Critics also
439. Han, supra note 140, at 186 (arguing that in reality, no-drop prosecution policies do
little to protect the victim).
440. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 186.
441. Corsilles, supra note 426, at 874.
442. Id. at 881.
443. Id at 874; Kalyani Robbins, No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence: Just Good
Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 205, 217-18 (1999) (explaining that
victims are often relieved that they do not have to make the choice to testify and
"batterers ... stop harassing their victims about the process once they realize that the victims are
not responsible for the case going forward").
444. Hanna, supra note 344, at 1855-56 (stating that mandated participation may be
paternalistic or revictimizing); Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence:
Engaging the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 240-42
(2008) (noting such policies might convey that system actors "are more capable of making these
decisions for the victims") (emphasis in the original)); Kuennen, supra note 354, at 6 (explaining
that such policies limit "victim's fundamental rights of freedom, choice, and autonomy");
Mordini, supra note 58, at 318-19 (stating that no-drop policies relegate the victim to the role of a
witness).
445. Lauren Bennett Cattaneo et al., The Victim-Informed Prosecution Project: A
Quasi-Experimental Test of a Collaborative Model for Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 1 5
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1227, 1229 (2009); Han, supra note 140, at 185; Mills, supra note
31, at 556.
446. Mills, supra note 31, at 556.
447. GERALD T. HOTALING & EVE S. BUZAWA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORGOING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE: THE NON-REPORTING OF NEW INCIDENTS OF ABUSE IN A
COURT SAMPLE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 26 (2003), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/19566
7.pdf (finding that women who "said they had no voice or rights with criminal officials" were less
likely to report future abuse); Cattaneo et al., supra note 445, at 1229-30; Ruth E. Fleury-Steiner
et al., Contextual Factors Impacting Battered Women's Intentions to Reuse the Criminal Legal
System, 34 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 327, 338-39 (2006) (exploring future willingness to use the
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question whether such policies protect the victim, as the batterer may retaliate448
against the victim regardless of the victim's role in the prosecution.
Additionally, no-drop prosecution policies may substantially deplete
already-limited prosecutorial and judicial resources,449 thereby limiting the
prosecution of other crimes.450  For example, from 1993 to 1996, after the
adoption of no-drop policies, the filings of domestic-violence cases increased
by 699 percent in the New York State Family Court system, which some
judges contended caused a "breakdown of the system. 1 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court's holding in Crawford v. Washington-that cross-examination
is generally required to admit prior testimonial statements of unavailable
witnesses under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 452-has
"frustrated prosecutors' efforts to present victims' statements through other
witnesses.
One set of researchers, who reviewed over one thousand misdemeanor IPV
cases, suggested that the benefits associated with no-drop policies may not
outweigh their costs, and that prosecution of an abusive individual had no
effect on the likelihood of recidivism over a period of six months.454 Similarly,
another study found that whether a prosecutor accepted a case did not change
the amount of violence committed in the aftermath of the original crime.455
F. Civil Protection Orders
Driven in part by concerns that the criminal justice system provides an
inadequate response to IPV, all fifty states enacted legislation between 1976
criminal justice system based on whether victims were satisfied with the outcome after their first
encounter with the legal system).
448. See Mordini, supra note 58, at 321 (noting that the state cannot guarantee the victim's
future safety).
449. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 178-79.
450. Corsilles, supra note 426, at 873-74 (noting that "prosecutors' efforts could have been
better used in cases in which convictions were easier to secure").
451. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 84.
452. 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
453. Jean Ferguson, Professional Discretion and the Use of Restorative Justice Programs in
Appropriate Domestic Violence Cases: An Effective Innovation, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF 3, 7 (2009). A
study conducted before Crawford found that over fifty percent of prosecutors' offices employed
victims' statements to police, 911 operators, or other witnesses as evidence when the victims
themselves were unwilling to testify-a practice now typically impermissible. Donald J.
Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey of Large
Jurisdictions, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 355, at 186.
454. Robert C. Davis, Barbara E. Smith & Laura B. Nickles, The Deterrent Effect of
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and 1992 to make civil protection orders (CPOs) available.456 Some
commentators attribute this legislation to a combination of a "heightened social
awareness" of IPV during the 1960s and 1970s, emerging research
documenting the impact of being a victim of IPV, such as the battered spouse
syndrome, and several prominent class action suits in the 1970s that exposed
law enforcement's failures to arrest individuals who battered their domestic
partners.458
456. Murphy, supra note 97, at 502.
457. Campbell, supra note 40, at 264.
458. SCHNEIDER, supra note 30, at 44; see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, VIOLENCE IN
FAMILIES: ASSESSING PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS 172 (Rosemary Chalk &
Patricia A. King eds., 1998) (citing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn.
1984); Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979)).
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Regardless of the cause, CPO laws remain widely in effect today.459
Protective orders are generally available to victims of domestic violence as
either emergency or temporary ex parte orders, or as permanent orders
following a court hearing, and impose legally binding restrictions on an
abuser's future conduct. 46  Such orders may be based on evidence of abuse,
threats or attempts to harm, reckless endangerment, sexual assaults (including
marital rape), interference with personal liberty, property damage, and, in some
states, harassment or other forms of emotional abuse.461 They may require the
subject of the order to refrain from specific actions, such as harming the victim
459. ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to 30-5-08 (1989 & Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 18.66.100-180 (2010); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-15-201 to -217 (2009); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6200-6389 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 13-14-101 to -104 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 2009 & Supp.
2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1041-1048 (1999 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE §§ 16-1003
to -1006 (2001 & Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-13-3, -4 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 586-1 to -ll (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 39-6306 to -6308 (2002 & Supp. 2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/201-227 (West
2009 & Supp. 2010); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-26-5-1 to -19 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 236.4-.8 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3102 to -3112
(2005 & Supp. 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.740-785 (LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46:2131-:2143 (2010 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 4001-4014
(1998 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-505, -506 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 3-4 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. §§ 600.2950-2950a (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2006
& Supp. 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-1 to -29 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 455.010-090 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-15-201, -204 (2009);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-924 to -928 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 33.020-100 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:1 to:25
(LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-13-3 to -6 (2006 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 828, 842-847 (McKinney 2010
& Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-2, B-3.1 (2009 & Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-07.1-02 to .1-03 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp.
2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60-60.18 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 107.716, .718 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6107-6108 (West
2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-15-3 to -4 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-4-10 to 160 (1995
& Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-10-1 to -13 (2004 & Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 36-3-601 to -624 (2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-009 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-7-102 to -116 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §§ 1101-1115 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-251 to -253.4, -279.1 (2010); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.50.060-.070 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-27-203,
48-27-501 to -511, 48-28-1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.122
(West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (specifically for children); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-21-101 to -111
(2009 & Supp. 2010).
460. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 109. Protective orders are similarly
available to halt child abuse. Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 844.
461. See Klein & Ordloff, supra note 378, at 849-74.
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462
or coming within a specified distance of the victim's residence. The order
may also require the subject to take certain affirmative steps, such as
relinquishing firearms, providing child support, or entering a treatment
463
program.
CPO legislation has been popular because it affords individuals who have
been subjected to IPV an opportunity to shape the protections they receive,
backed by the power and resources of the criminal justice system.464 CPO
hearings may also aid victims by simply providing a forum where they can tell
465
and validate their experiences. Further, it has been argued that this approach
empowers victims of IPV by allowing them to initiate and direct the
intervention, rather than remaining a assive victim subject to the whims of
responding law-enforcement officials. 6 Protective orders are also embraced
because they can provide financially dependent victims economic benefits that
they may miss if their abuser is jailed. Additionally, CPOs may be issued
more quickly (as opposed to a lengthy criminal prosecution), and they may
prevent abusive conduct from occurring or escalating by enabling early
intervention before a crime occurs.468 Further, CPOs may facilitate a victim's
future access to the criminal justice system, as police officers are often more
willing to arrest an abusive individual if a protective order already exists.
469
462. See Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L. Q. 43, 44 (1989) (discussing types of "stay away"
remedies).
463. See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-506(d), (f) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2010).
464. Murphy, supra note 97, at 504, 514.
465. Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107,1111 (2009).
466. Murphy, supra note 97, at 504.
467. Sesha Kethineni & Dawn Beichner, A Comparison of Civil and Criminal Orders of
Protection as Remedies for Domestic Violence Victims in a Midwestern County, 24 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 311, 320 (2009) (finding the preservation of a perpetrator's earning power, which
would otherwise be compromised if arrested and jailed, is an advantage of CPOs).
468. A CPO may be issued in response to acts that are not crimes, such as harassment, and
may also be available for minor offenses that would be unlikely to result in meaningful penalties
in the criminal system or where evidentiary problems would limit the likelihood of a criminal
conviction. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence:
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1508-09 (2008); see also Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1405 (1991) (noting a lower standard of proof required to
obtain a civil protection order).
469. See PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 2 (1990).
988 [Vol. 60:1
2011] Society's Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence 989
Despite these benefits, protective orders have also received much
criticism. 470 Some victims have reported that the process of obtaining a CPO
is too confusing and time consuming, which discourages them from obtaining
these orders.471 Critics have asserted that protective orders are "soft" on IPV
because haphazard enforcement, coupled with relatively light sanctions for
472
violation, fail to adequately deter the underlying abusive conduct. Similarly,
they contend that the presence of dual civil and criminal remedies for IPV
leads to a fragmented system, inconsistent responses, and delayed or
inadequate assistance for victims. 473 Critics have also argued that these orders
are "frequently violated" and "often fail to prevent further violence."474 One
study reported that sixty percent of protective orders are violated,475 yet only
eighteen percent of the violators of these orders were jailed.476 This has been
attributed, in part, to police officers who respond to a call for assistance being
unaware that a protective order exists.477 Responding officers may not have
ready access to central databases containing information regarding protective
470. See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting that potential concerns do exist, including lack of due process
during protective-order proceedings, the perception that protective orders may not adequately
deter violence, and general non-enforcement); see also Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence:
Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO
ST. L. J. 303 (2011) (advocating the "Stages of Change" model to reform civil protection orders).
471. See ADELE HARRELL, BARBARA SMITH & LISA NEWMARK, THE URBAN INST., COURT
PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS OF RESTRAINING ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
31-32 (1993).
472. Developments, supra note 358, at 1510-11; see also Goldfarb, supra note 468, at
1511-12, 1516 (suggesting that divergent estimated rates of compliance with protective orders
may be partially explained by inconsistent enforcement).
473. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3,
21-23 (1999); see also Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child
Protection System, 93 KY. L.J. 613, 637 (2004) ("Lack of communication among various systems
impedes batterer accountability.").
474. Developments, supra note 358, at 1510. CPO restrictions on gun purchase and
possession by alleged batterers, however, attract little criticism, possibly because some estimates
show that 3.5 individuals are killed each day by their domestic partners. See Elizabeth
Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws Restricting Access to Firearms by Domestic
Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner Homicide?, 30 EVALUATION REV. 313, 313 (2006).
However, states that restrict gun purchases by individuals subject to protective orders have
evinced a ten percent decrease in intimate-partner homicides, compared to the period before these
restrictions were enacted. Id. at 315, 333. Additionally, these restrictions may decrease the
immediate physical threat faced by IPV victims and embolden them to leave abusive
relationships. See id at 321-22.
475. Thueson, supra note 168, at 276.
476. Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male Batterers: Why
Restraining Orders Don't Work, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note
355, at 208-09.
477. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 190-91.
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orders, precluding them from detaining potential violators, unless the victim
can readily produce a copy of the order-a relatively infrequent event.479
480Mutual orders of protection, in particular, have been strongly criticized.
These orders impose limitations on both partieS481 and are often issued as a
quick alternative to conducting a hearing to assign blame,482 even when there is
no evidence of mutual violence.483 Thus, they are highly controversial because
they may be issued hastily and without evidence, or may restrict parties who
484
were merely violent in self-defense. Critics also assert that mutual orders
"undermine the purpose and strength of domestic violence" statutes because
they punish the victim, rather than focus on the individual responsible for the
violence.4 85 The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
opposes mutual protection orders because of due-process concerns, noting that
they may be issued without substantiating evidence of mutual violence;
furthermore, they create enforcement problems for police, as they give no
indication which party is the aggressor, and may reflect gender bias in their
issuance.486 As a result, many states refuse to issue them without a requesting
487petition and significant substantiating evidence of abuse by both parties.
Furthermore, as alluded to earlier, the effectiveness of protective orders has
been seriously questioned following the Supreme Court's 2005 decision Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, because victims may no longer be able to rely on
478. Id. at 196.
479. See Kerry Campbell, Chapter 631: Increasing the Effectiveness of Domestic Violence
Protective Orders, 37 McGEORGE L. REV. 217, 219 (2006). Some studies suggest that even if
CPOs are not enforced, simply having a CPO issued may reduce incidents of re-abuse, as abusers
with "high stakes in conformity" may be adequately deterred by the fear of future arrest. See
Kethineni & Beichner, supra note 467, at 319 (finding that re-abuse was less likely when CPOs
were issued against violent partners without a criminal history, or offenders with a higher
"stake[] in conformity" than an abuser with a prior conviction); Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil
Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved Question of "Efficacy", 11 S. CAL.
INTERDisc. L.J. 361, 390 (2002) (theorizing that restraining orders are only effective when
'reinforced by informal social controls" under the "stakes in conformity" theory).
480. See infra text accompanying notes 482-87.
481. Karen Morao, Domestic Violence and the State, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 787, 803
(2006).
482. See Janice A. Drye, The Silent Victims of Domestic Violence: Children Forgotten by the
Judicial System, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 229, 244 (1999).
483. See Klein & Ordloff, supra note 378, at 1074.
484. See id. at 1074-75 (noting that researchers and members of the judiciary have
condemned mutual protective orders issued quickly and without a determination of which party
was the primary aggressor).
485. Id. at 1074.
486. Id at 1075; see also Philip Trompeter, Gender Bias Task Force: Comments on Family
Law Issues, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2001) (suggesting that judges may issue
unrequested mutual protection orders inappropriately to abusive males).
487. Klein & Orloff, supra note 378, at 1076-77, 1077 n.1717.
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the state to enforce these orders with any certainty.488 In dismissing the
mother's federal civil rights action, the Court determined, in part, that because
of limited resources and the sheer impossibility of enforcing all protective
orders, the mandate to enforce all protective orders could not be taken
literally.489
Critics claim this ruling significantly undercuts the strength and value of
protective orders, as it allows police officers to enforce the orders-or not-at
their own discretion, 490 it leaves victims of IPV with little legal recourse when
they are not enforced, it perpetuates and condones law enforcement's
indifference to IPV calls, and it conveys to both abusive individuals and their
victims that IPV will be tolerated by society.491 Critics further contend that the
Court's ruling in Town of Castle Rock demonstrates that although laws have
been written to condemn IPV, it is nevertheless condoned in practice.492
G. Specialized Courts
Finding the traditional judicial response to IPV lacking in coordination and
enforcement, an increasing number of jurisdictions have established
specialized courts-sometimes referred to as "dedicated" or "problem-solving"
courts-offering a more comprehensive and integrated approach to IPV,
although the structure of these courts varies considerably. 493 Because a single
instance of IPV may result in multiple interactions with the court
488. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
489. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-62 (2005). The Court also
held that the nature of the wife's interest in having the police enforce her restraining order was
not sufficient to constitute "property" or to trigger Due Process protections. Id at 768. The
Court also noted that police generally enjoy discretion in deciding whether to arrest someone,
even when operating under mandatory-arrest statutes, but did indicate that state laws may be
crafted to hold police departments financially responsible for crimes that could have been
prevented. Id at 760, 768-69; see also Vi T. Vu, Note, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales: A
Hindrance in Domestic Violence Policy Reform and Victory for the Institution of Male
Dominance, 9 SCHOLAR 87, 90-91 (2006) (noting that police discretion to deny the "benefit" of
enforcement prevented the Court from holding that this benefit is a constitutionally protected
property interest).
490. Nicole M. Quester, Note, Refusing to Remove an Obstacle to the Remedy: The Supreme
Court's Decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales Continues to Deny Domestic Violence
Victims Meaningful Recourse, 40 AKRON L. REv. 391, 411-12 (2007) ("[The Court] rendered
civil protection orders meaningless in the context of domestic violence." (footnote omitted)).
491. Zanita E. Fenton, State Enabled Violence: The Story of Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 379, 408 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M.
Wildman eds., 2011); Vu, supra note 489, at I10-11.
492. Vu, supra note 489, at 101.
493. Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are They Worth the Trouble in
Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 208 (2008) (noting that the first such court was
purportedly established in Brooklyn in 1976); The Advocates for Human Rights, Specialized
Domestic Violence Court Systems, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.stopvaw.org
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system-including obtaining a CPO, pursuing criminal prosecution, mandated
treatment, and seeking a divorce-many jurisdictions determined that their
courts inconsistently tracked and responded to IPV cases and lacked
494
coordination with law enforcement and community service providers. As a
result, domestic-violence courts were established with the ability to hear both
criminal and civil matters and address a variety of issues, such as misdemeanor
or felony criminal charges, restraining orders, child-custody issues, and other
IPV-related legal matters.495 In specialized domestic-violence courts, judges
may exclusively or predominantly hear IPV cases; therefore, they can arguably
develop greater expertise and consistency in their dispositions, and hold
offenders more accountable.496 They may also be better equipped to address
issues underlying the IPV and bring to bear needed services, such as
counselin or substance abuse treatment, in an effort to reduce future
violence.
Although some studies have addressed the effectiveness of such specialized
domestic-violence courts, results have been inconsistent.498 Supporters of such
programs assert that a "successful" court should not only be measured in terms
of IPV reduction, but also by the speed with which decisions are reached,
/Specialized Domestic ViolenceCourt Systems.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2009) ("Some
jurisdictions have created courts that handle only domestic violence cases; others have altered
court processes to ensure more effective processing of domestic violence matters; yet others have
specialized staff that provide support to victims."). There are currently more than 300 courts in
the United States that offer a specialized domestic-violence program, including courts in
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. SUSAN
KEILITZ, NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., SPECIALIZATION OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASE MANAGEMENT IN THE COURTS: A NATIONAL SURVEY 3, 11 (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/186192.pdf.
494. Maytal, supra note 493, at 208; see also Amy Karan, Susan Keilitz & Sharon
Denaro, Domestic Violence Courts: What Are They and How Should We Manage Them?, 50 JUv.
& FAM. CT. J. 75, 75 (1999).
495. Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations, 2 J. CENTER
FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 23, 23-24 (2000).
496. Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts: Violence Against
Women Online Resources, VAWOR, http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/helling/helling
.html#id431979 (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
497. Gerald Lebovits & Michael V. Gervasi, The Integrated Domestic Violence Court, 8
RICHMOND COUNTY BAR Ass'N J. 7 (2008); Catherine Shaffer, Therapeutic Domestic Violence
Courts: An Efficient Approach to Adjudication?, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 981, 994-95 (2004).
498. Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on
an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1285, 1309-10 (2000). See generally BUZAWA &
BUZAWA, supra note 25, at 181-85 (detailing the outcomes of various domestic-violence court
programs).
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consistency in the application of the law, and victim satisfaction with the legal
499process.
Despite the apparent advantages of specialization, there has also been strong
opposition to the development of domestic-violence courts. Critics point out
that hearing all IPV cases in a single court increases the effects of "judicial
tyranny" or incompetence.soo The risk of this "all eggs in one basket"
approach, they argue, is that if the system does not work, victims have no other
legal recourse.s0 Others argue that combining civil and criminal jurisdictions
into a single court poses significant problems, which include exposing judges
and prosecutors to factors and evidence typically irrelevant to criminal cases
and, thus, potentially violating the constitutional rights of the purported
batterers.502 For example, whereas a criminal defendant has a Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, no such right attaches in a civil
matter.50 3 Therefore, a court with both criminal and civil jurisdiction may be
forced to either allow an accused batterer to remain silent throughout a
proceeding, quickly derailing it or undercutting its effectiveness, or risk
violating the individual's constitutional rights. 504 Further, domestic-violence
courts have faced opposition from those charged with their implementation.505
Judges, attorneys, and court staff have noted that IPV cases are both effort and
resource intensive, and that supporting such programs can pose significant
challenges for courts and systems with limited resources and other competing
worthwhile needs, 506 a challenge that can be quite significant in the current
financial climate. 507
499. Helling, supra note 496.
500. Id. (discussing some of the disadvantages to specialized domestic-violence courts).
501. Id (explaining that a court may start out well-staffed and led by a judge, but end up
malfunctioning).
502. Maytal,supra note 494, at 231.
503. Id.
504. Id
505. Helling, supra note 496 (discussing the problems that specialized courts pose to
attorneys, judges, and court personnel).
506. Id.
507. Joseph Goldstein, After Budget Cuts, Defendants' Wait to See a Judge Often Exceeds 24
Hours, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2011, at A22; Bob Drogin, Trials Halted to Save Money, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/22/nation/na-courts22 ("At least [20] .
. . states, including California, have slashed court budgets and other government services as their
economies have tanked . . . ."); Paul Elias, San Francisco Court Closure: 200 Employees and 25
Courtrooms Gone, HUFFPOST S.F. (July 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/18
/san-francisco-courtroom-closure n 902097.html; Lloyd Mann, California Financial Crisis Hits
Los Angeles Courts Hard, EXAMINER (L.A.), July 7, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/legal-
profession-in-los-angeles/califomia-financial-crisis-hits-los-angeles-courts-hard ("As a result of
the severe financial crisis in California, Los Angeles Courtrooms will be going out of business for
one day this month, followed by one day each month until further notice."); Kristen Wyatt, State
Budget Cuts Decimate Mental Health Services, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.
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H. Private Lawsuits
Although not as widely discussed, private lawsuits might be a useful legal
mechanism to combat IPV. These suits can result in the recovery of damages
for injuries that an individual incurred as the result of IPV, thereby
compensating victims for their losses and deterring future IPV.508 In 1989, a
Georgia jury awarded Louise Catlett $30,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages after her former husband admitted to hitting her, restraining her on
multiple occasions, and "dragg[ing] her down a stairway by her feet because he
thought it was comical." 509 Catlett claimed that her husband committed three
intentional torts: assault, battery, and false imprisonment. 50 Similar suits have
obtained awards for intentional (or reckless) infliction of emotional distress,
511intentional interference with custody, defamation, and invasion of privacy.
In the past, inter-spousal tort immunity-based on the rationale that a wife and
husband became one person at marriage and thus could not sue one
another-prohibited many such suits.512 As of 2006, however, this doctrine
has been abolished in all but two states.5 13
In the 1970s, the American Bar Association contended that law-enforcement
officers should use arrest as a last resort when responding to a domestic
violence call, arguing that civil suits can provide a more effective remedy
because they do not remove from the household-at times over the objection
of the battered individual-a person providing needed financial support.514
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030900507.html ("[Thirty-two]
states and Washington, D.C., cut funding just as economic stressors such as layoffs and home
foreclosures boosted demand for services. .. . In many states, the picture is likely to get uglier.").
508. See infra notes 511-18 and accompanying text.
509. Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
510. Id.
511. Rousseve, supra note 202, at 457; Heather Tonsing, Battered Women Syndrome as a
Tort Cause of Action, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 407, 426-27, 432 (1998). Infliction of emotional
distress is usually defined as an action so extreme that it is considered "intolerable in a civilized
community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. D (1965). For an example of a
lawsuit in which a wife successfully pursued such a claim for abusive conduct in conjunction with
a divorce action, see Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 395, 399-400 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
For an example of a lawsuit where damages for intentional interference with parental custody
were recovered, see Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1300, 1302 (N.H. 1983). For an example of
a domestic-violence-related defamation suit, as well as claims of malicious harassment, outrage,
assault and battery, and the tort of domestic violence, see Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601,
605 (E.D. Wash. 1998). For an example of a domestic-violence-related claim for the making of
"terroristic threats and harassment," see Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 391 (N.J. 1998).
512. Developments, supra note 358, at 1530.
513. Morao, supra note 481 at 811.
514. Mordini, supra note 58, at 311-12 (citing AM. BAR ASSOC., PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR URBAN POLICE FUNCTION 12 (1973)). The American
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However, civil lawsuits have not been widely employed in response to IPV for
many reasons.515 For one, the abusive individual involved may be relatively
judgment-proof because of their limited assets and income, with insurance or
other third-party payers unavailable to cover any compensation award. 1  In
addition, because the statute of limitations is generally short for intentional
torts, an abused person in a complex ersonal relationship may fail to file a suit
until after this deadline has passed.1 Third, these lawsuits can be ineffective
because of their lengthy proceedings, the delayed and unpredictable judicial
response, and the "lack [of] social condemnation" usually seen in criminal
cases.518 Lastly, civil suits "provide an incomplete remedy" because they are
relatively unlikely to address more immediate needs for protection and safety,
may fail to deter future violent acts, and may be relatively inaccessible for a
victim without the resources needed to pursue this remedy.519
I. Court-Mandated Treatment Programs
Batterer intervention programs were developed in the 1970s520 as a way to
provide abusive domestic partners with the skills and motivation needed to
abandon or resist violent tendencies.521 In the mid-1980s, as arrests and
prosecutions of batterers increased, support for and use of these programs
522became widespread. Courts may mandate such programs in conjunction
with: (1) a pretrial diversion where an abuser, typically a first-time offender,
agrees to obtain treatment in exchange for a no-prosecution agreement; (2) a
Bar Association now advocates that local and federal governments take an active role when
responding to domestic violence calls. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION
(Aug. 7-8, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2006/annual/daily
journal/hundredten.doc.
515. See infra notes 516-19. A victim may also file a lawsuit against a governmental entity,
such as a local police department, for failing to take adequate steps to protect the victim of IPV;
however, such a suit faces various impediments following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005). See supra notes 488-92 and
accompanying text.
516. See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 139, 155-56 (2005).
517. Id. at 155.
518. See Developments, supra note 358, at 1533.
519. See id at 1532-33.
520. Larry W. Bennett & Oliver J. Williams, Intervention Programs for Men Who Batter, in
SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 3, at 216, 216.
521. WALKER, supra note 17, at 183.
522. David Adams, Treatment Programs for Batterers, 5 CLINICS FAM. PRAC. 159, 160-61
(2003) (noting that the 1985 Boston-based program "EMERGE" was the first batterer
intervention program to be the focus of a court referral); Juliet B. Austin & Juergen Dankwort,
Standards for Batterer Programs: A Review and Analysis, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 152,
152 (1999).
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plea bargain; or (3) a condition for receiving a reduced bond or sentence.523 In
addition, enrollment in such a program is frequently attached to an assignment
of probation and is a key component of specialized IPV courts.524 One study
found that over one-third of all men charged with spouse abuse are ordered to
attend treatment programs.525
The goals of these treatment programs are rehabilitation and victim safety.526
To meet these goals, the programs use a variety of techniques and treatment
plans to curb abusive behavior.527 For example, they seek to make batterers
realize the consequences of their actions and overcome their denial that such
consequences are serious.528 These programs also aim to teach batterers the
precipitants or warning signs of abusive behavior so that in the future they can
remove themselves from situations where abuse may occur.529 Treatment
programs seek to get batterers to take responsibility for their abuse, rather than
to blame abuse on exogenous forces, and to realize that they can control their
actions.530  These programs also attempt to change domineering attitudes,
which are often commonly associated with IPV. 531 Finally, they seek to reduce
batterers' dependence on their partners in order to reduce jealousy and allow
abusers to recognize that their partners can lead lives of their own, and they
attempt to teach better communication and interaction skills.532 Depending on
the thematic approach of the program and the typology of the batterer, different
programs utilize different combinations of these features.533 Reformed abusers
often take fault for past violence, recognize the legitimacy of their partner's
fears, reduce dependence on their partner, and learn relevant communication
skills.534 These accomplishments are usually achieved through a combination
523. Edward W. Gondolf, Batterer Programs: What We Know and Need to Know, 12 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 86, 86 (1997).
524. See Bennett & Williams, supra note 520, at 263.
525. Katreena L. Scott & David A. Wolfe, Change Among Batterers: Examining Men's
Success Stories, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 827, 827 (2000).
526. Bennett & Williams, supra note 520, at 263.
527. See id.
528. Donald G. Dutton & Barbara M. S. McGregor, The Symbiosis of Arrest and Treatment
for Wife Assault: The Case for Combined Intervention, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY
RESPONSES 131, 132 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991).
529. Id. at 133.
530. Id. at 133-34.
531. See Goodmark, supra note 473, at 645-46 (suggesting that batterers who changed their
disposition toward women had lower re-assault rates).
532. See id at 646; see also Scott & Wolfe, supra note 525, at 836-37 (attributing change to
a reduction in dependency, recognition of their partner's autonomy, and improvement in
communication skills).
533. See Scott & Wolfe, supra note 525, at 828 (describing theories that can be used to help
identify processes to make a program successful).
534. Id. at 834-37.
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of group therapy, individualized programming, and post-program
maintenance.535
As batterers' programs emerged in the 1980s, attention focused on ensuring
their adequacy, effectiveness, and inclusion of key components; this eventually
led to the creation of state and local standards germane to them.536 Currently,
forty-five states have adopted standards for batterer intervention programs.
In some states, the standards are voluntary and serve only as a model for these
programs. Other states make the standards mandatory, although the sources
of these standards vary.539 In both cases, the standards seek to enhance the
quality and consistency of the approach to the treatment of batterers, 540 and
they are relatively similar across the states.541 Most of these standards dictate
the qualifications of staff, the content, goals, and techniques of the programs,
535. See Bennett & Williams, supra note 520, at 263-64.
536. See Austin & Dankwort, supra note 522, at 152.
537. State Standards Listing By State, BATTERER INTERVENTION SERVS. COALITION MICH.,
http://www.biscmi.org/other resources/state standards.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). This
website provides a link to all existing state standards and indicates that the five states without
standards are Arkansas, Connecticut, Mississippi, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id.
538. See, e.g., N.D. COUNSEL ON ABUSED WOMEN'S SERVS., NORTH DAKOTA ADULT
BATTERER'S TREATMENT STANDARDS (1997), available at http://www.ndcaws.org/what-wedo
/projects.html/title/batterers-treatment-forum; R.I. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR BATTERER'S PROGRAM STANDARDS: FINAL DRAFT (1994),
available at http://www.biscmi.org/other resources/docs/rhode-island.html.
539. For example, Maine, Tennessee, and Washington all provide statutory support for their
guidelines, while the states of Alabama and South Carolina have mandatory standards but they
are not the direct result of legislation. Compare DEP'T OF CORR., 03-021, BATTERER
INTERVENTION PROGRAM CERTIFICATION, available at www.maine.gov/correctionsNictim
Services/Batlntervent2.htm (explaining the standards and procedures applicable to these
programs), and RULES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATE COORDINATING COUNCIL: RULES FOR
BATTERER'S INTERVENTION PROGRAMS 0490-1.01-.02 (1999), available at http://www.state
.tn.us/sos/rules/0490/0490-0 1.pdf (providing both statutory and administrative underpinnings for
the rules), and WASH. ST. LEG., WAC 388-60, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PERPETRATOR TREATMENT
PROGRAM STANDARDS, available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/WAC
/default.aspx?cite=388-60 (last updated Mar. 30, 2001) (providing the statutory authority for each
subsection of the chapter), with ALABAMA CERTIFICATION STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PERPETRATOR INTERVENTION PROGRAMS [hereinafter ALABAMA CERTIFICATION
STANDARDS], available at http://www.biscmi.org/other-resources/docs/alabama.doc (lacking any
indication of statutory authority for the guidelines), and S.C. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., STANDARDS
OF CARE FOR BATTERERS TREATMENT (2005), available at http://www.state.sc.us/dss/dv/scbt.pdf
(lacking any indication of statutory authority for the guidelines).
540. Kristina C. Evans, Can a Leopard Change His Spots?: Child Custody and Batterer's
Intervention, II DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 121, 129 (2004).
541. Larry Bennett & Marianne Piet, Standards for Batterer Intervention Programs: In
Whose Interest?, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 6, 7 (1999) (asserting that the various state
standards are similar because they all share a foundation in the battered women's movement).
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their length, their discharge procedures, and procedures for notifying the
542
victims of the batterers who participate in these programs.
Assessment of program effectiveness remains difficult for several reasons: a
lack of comparative studies with alternative criminal-justice responses, a lack
of data about the re-offense rate of batterers who participate in these programs,
varying definitions of re-offense, the failure of many offenders to complete
their treatment programs, and the unrepresentative makeup of the treatment
groups studied, which included self-selection by treatment programs that
refused to accept offenders they thought would fail.543 One of the better
studies of treatment programs-which examined police, wife, and husband
response and matched for prior violence-found that the forty percent re-arrest
rate for non-treated offenders dropped to four percent among those who
completed the targeted treatment program. 544 Most other studies report more
545
modest but still positive results from these programs.
Nevertheless, these programs and the state standards that govern them have
546
many critics. Some contend that the programs are basically ineffective at
preventing future violence. 547 Others suggest that because these programs are
based on philosophical beliefs-such as IPV is the result of pervasive gender
disparity-rather than empirical evidence, there is no certainty that the
programs represent the best approaches for remedying these problems.548
Some researchers conclude that treatment is not effective for all types of
542. Bennett & Williams, supra note 520, at 270; Evans, supra note 540, at 130-31; see, e.g.,
ALABAMA CERTIFICATION STANDARDS, supra note 539.
543. Evans, supra note 540, at 133.
544. Dutton & McGregor, supra note 528, at 148-49.
545. Julia C. Babcock, Charles E. Green & Chet Robie, Does Batterers' Treatment Work? A
Meta-Analytic Review ofDomestic Violence Treatment, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1023,
1043-44 (2002) (finding that the reduction in recidivism rates due to treatment remains small);
Goodmark, supra note 473, at 644-45 (noting that according to victim reports in four studies,
recidivism rates were twenty-six percent and nine percent, respectively, according to official
reports). But see Dutton & McGregor, supra note 528, at 144-45 (noting other studies with much
higher re-arrest rates for those who completed a treatment program).
546. See infra notes 547-50 and accompanying text.
547. See, e.g., MELISSA LABRIOLA, MICHAEL REMPEL & ROBERT C. DAVIS, TESTING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF BATrERER PROGRAMS AND JUDICIAL MONITORING: RESULTS FROM A
RANDOMIZED TRIAL AT THE BRONX MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT 61 (2005),
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/uploads/documents/battererprogramseffectiveness
.pdf ("The preponderance of evidence now accumulated in the field calls into serious question the
efficacy of batterer programs based on the most prevalent national models. The main findings
from our randomized trial are consistent with those of other recent trials, ... none of which found
that mandating offenders to a batterer program produces lower rates of re-abuse."); Kenneth
Corvo, Donald Dutton & Wan-Yi Chen, Do Duluth Model Interventions with Perpetrators of
Domestic Violence Violate Mental Health Professional Ethics?, 19 ETHICS & BEHAV. 323, 325
(2009) (stating that some studies found little resulting effects for treatment programs).
548. See Bennett & Piet, supra note 541, at 12-13.
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offenders, thus making it critical to better identify how and under what
circumstances an offenders' behavior is likely to change before assigning
individuals to various programs. 549  Others contend that IPV is a societal
problem and that greater attention must be given to social change through
education and reduction of gender discrimination, rather than just targeting
individual batterers for therapy.5 50
VI. CONCLUSION: SOCIETY'S CURRENT "RULE OF THUMB,
551
After millennia of condoning and even encouraging IPV, the past few
decades appropriately witnessed the increased condemnation of this violence
and the adoption of multiple measures-most of them involving the criminal
justice system-to limit, control, and remediate this abuse. Considerable
resources have been devoted to this effort, but the success of these programs is
mixed at best. Although the overall prevalence of IPV has diminished, this
likely can be attributed more to society's somewhat improved attitudes
552
regarding this violence, rather than to the direct impact of these measures.
549. See Goodmark, supra note 473, at 649-51 (suggesting that some types of batterers are
more likely than others to change as a result of treatment). As discussed, a number of distinct
types of IPV have been identified-including "patriarchal terrorism" as opposed to "common
couple violence"-that tend to be characterized by different forms of violence. It is likely that the
batterers associated with these various types of IPV have different motivations, mindsets, and
learned behaviors and will need different treatment programs to help change their actions. See
supra notes 157-62, 312-20 and accompanying text.
550. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 17, at 188 (arguing that psychotherapy alone will not
reduce violent behavior and that attitudes and gender discrimination must also be changed);
Austin & Dankwort, supra note 522, at 166 (explaining that spousal abuse is a societal problem
that requires social change beyond individual therapy).
551. Although perhaps apocryphal, some report that the prevailing social policy under
English common law allowed a man to beat his wife as long as he used a rod no thicker than his
thumb-a so-called rule of thumb. Rule of Thumb, THE PHRASE FINDER,
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/rule-of-thumb.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2011). But see
Robert Sheaffer, The "Rule-of-Thumb for Wife Beating" Hoax, http://www.debunker.com
/texts/ruleofthumb.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (citing CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO
STOLE FEMINISM?: How WOMEN HAVE BETRAYED WOMEN 203 (1994)) (asserting that the "rule
of thumb" with regard to wife beating is a myth developed to promote a feminist agenda).
552. See EVA S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 61-62 (3d ed., 2003) ("Until at least the 1970s, American pop culture often
trivialized domestic violence. Consider television programs such as I Love Lucy, in which Ricky
Ricardo regularly 'spanked' Lucille Ball, resulting in considerable audience laughter, or the
Honeymooners, in which Jackie Gleason's arguments with his wife, Alice, typically ended with
his catch phrase, "One of these days, Alice . . . pow, zoom, right to the moon." John Wayne
movies similarly used spanking as a staple strategy to "tame" and "win over" independent, strong
women, typically in front of the entire town, and such taming did not stop until the woman
stopped struggling. Although the spanking may have been seen as trivial, and no injuries ever
resulted from them on camera, in effect women were seen to encourage "moderate" violence by
taunting the male until he gave her the beating she tacitly appeared to desire. The reality or
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The number of individuals suffering from IPV and the magnitude of its adverse
* - 553
consequences continue to remain staggering.
Critics of society's response to IPV often argue that various provisions of
domestic-violence laws, such as mandatory reporting, mandatory arrest, and
no-drop policies, have led to an "over-reliance on criminal strategies." 554
Moreover, the adoption of these measures has been driven by a few widely
publicized cases in which culpability and the appropriate response seemed
obvious.555 However, too great a focus on so few cases has resulted in what
tends to be a one-size-fits-all approach that fails to adequately address the
complexity of IPV and the range of factors and behaviors associated with it.
This societal response can be counterproductive if it fails to adequately
distinguish among various types of IPV or does not provide sufficient latitude,
flexibility, and nuance for responding to the different needs, desires, and
circumstances of the victims. For example, exclusive reliance on a traditional
criminal-justice approach, without also empowering the victim, can diminish
the victim's feelings of self-worth and increase the victim's isolation,
dependence, and vulnerability.556 This is not to say, however, that traditional
criminal-justice remedies have no place. Certainly, when injured victims are
rendered isolated, dependent, or otherwise unable to exercise their autonomy
as a result of IPV, the protection and safety that can be afforded by the
criminal justice system should be readily available. Additionally, the nature of
the abuse and the characteristics and motivations of the abuser should be taken
into account. Mandatory criminal-justice intervention is generally appropriate
when the abuse reflects a systematic, terrorizing violence that is perpetrated to
potential for serious domestic violence was simply never addressed."). But see NANCY BERNS,
FRAMING THE VICTIM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MEDIA, AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 19-21 (2004)
(suggesting that the acceptance of violence is deeply engrained in society).
553. See supra notes 127-28.
554. Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider's "Murky Middle Ground" Between
Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, II AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 427, 431 (2003).
555. For an analogous discussion regarding sex offenders, see JANUS, supra note 351, at 3-4;
for one regarding child abuse, see Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 822.
556. See JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 133 (1992) ("No intervention
that takes power away from the survivor can possibly foster her recovery, no matter how much it
appears to be in her immediate best interest."). Similarly, a need to balance safety concerns and
the autonomy of victims also dominates recent debates on how best to respond to elder abuse.
See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Financial Abuse of the Elderly in Domestic Settings, in ELDER
MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 418, 427
(Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace eds., 2003) (suggesting that although guardianship or
other assistance may protect an elder-abuse victim, it may consequently disempower a victim).
557. Caution must be exercised lest the mere presence of a psychiatric disorder be viewed as
grounds for concluding that a victim lacks decision-making capacity. See Hafemeister and
Vallas, supra note 304, at 5-8.
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maintain control over the victim. However, an alternative victim-directed
approach tends to be better suited in cases when the IPV involves a relatively
isolated outburst of mild violence under circumstances that are relatively
unlikely to be repeated or can be readily avoided.
In general, more emphasis needs to be placed on assessing the nature and
causes of a given case of IPV and the characteristics of the parties involved.
For example, before deciding whether the autonomy or the safety of the victim
should take priority, an assessment should be made regarding whether the
victim understands their predicament, whether they are unable to exercise their
autonomy because of isolation or dependence, and whether they have access to
adequate remedial options. This approach empowers victims whenever
possible to make their own choices about whether to invoke society's
assistance, educates them about the services that are available, and
acknowledges that cases of IPV vary considerably and require an
individualized response, while still providing protection to victims unable to
help themselves.
Once this assessment is completed, there should be a range of programs
from which to select-including a greater number of education, treatment, and
rehabilitation programs-that better respond to the particular needs and risks
of the individuals involved. 55 9 A failure to respond appropriately to such
disputes can overlook significant dangers, but can also solidify conflict and
convert what could have been a temporary disagreement into a relatively
intransigent one from which long-term adverse consequences result. For some
cases of IPV, a more graduated, measured, inclusive, and individualized
approach may better defuse an otherwise explosive situation and avoid many
of the adverse short- and long-term consequences that can otherwise result.
In crafting the societal response to IPV, it should be recognized that IPV is a
complex phenomenon for which the most appropriate and effective response
can vary considerably. Although IPV should under no circumstances be
condoned, a more enlightened understanding of IPV and the factors that
contribute to it can lead to a more rational, nuanced, and efficient use of
society's resources to combat it.
558. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
559. Similar calls for reforming society's response to child abuse and elder abuse have been
made. See, e.g., Hafemeister, supra note 27, at 904-08.
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